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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates whether the European Union and its member states have 
been able to balance normative priorities – specifically the promotion of human 
rights – and material priorities – specifically economic interests – within the 
strategy of constructive engagement towards China embraced since 1995. In 
order to respond to this central question this thesis originally elaborates a liberal 
intergovernmental approach for the study of the promotion of human rights 
within the EU’s system of multilevel governance in external relations. Such an 
approach is applied to analyse the issues of consistency and coordination in the 
policies for the promotion of human rights in China elaborated by the European 
Community and three selected member states, namely Germany, France and the 
UK.  
 
The choice of the country cases serves theoretical and analytical purposes. At a 
theoretical level it allows consideration as to whether the EU’s overall policies 
were mainly influenced by the interests and policy preferences of the three 
selected member states, which had the most bargaining power and the highest 
stakes in China, as expected by liberal intergovernmentalism. At an analytical 
level, the choice of the country cases allows for consideration of whether the 
EC’s policies for the promotion of human rights in China were coordinated with 
those of the three selected member states, which had the most conspicuous 
development assistance policies towards China and whose approaches to human 
rights in the country were broadly representative of the other member states. 
This supports the assessment of the achievement, or otherwise, of a significant 
EU promotion of human rights through development assistance in China. 
 
From the study it emerges that the EC and its three selected member states have 
been unable to devise consistent and coordinated policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China. On the one hand these findings suggest that the EU and 
its member states have been unable to balance normative and material priorities 
in their relations with China. On the other hand this thesis illustrates that this 
was due to the influence of the material interests and policy preferences of 
Germany, France and the UK, thus supporting the expectations of liberal 
intergovernmentalism.  
 
These findings form an original contribution to the study of the EU’s promotion 
of norms because they suggest that the EU can promote human rights, as well as 
other norms, in a consistent, coordinated and ultimately strategic way, only if 
the member states with the most bargaining power and the highest stakes in a 
specific policy issue privilege normative interests over material ones. 
 
At the same time this thesis offers an original contribution to EU-China studies 
on human rights, as it suggests that due to the present interests of the most 
influential member states, the EU’s promotion of human rights should be 
reframed to address what Chinese authorities are willing to accommodate in the 
human rights field, namely give preference to the support of socio-economic 
rights, where a consensus among the EU’s member states can more easily be 
built. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Thesis topic 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the advancement of the so-called 
“normative globalisation” 1 created new opportunities for the European Union 
(EU) to acquire further international legitimacy as a promoter of human rights. 
However, the unprecedented rise of an authoritarian China confronted the EU 
with perhaps the biggest challenge to prove its adherence to such a commitment. 
China’s dramatic economic growth, its rapidly widening strategic influence on 
the world stage and its increasing assertiveness presented the EU with the 
daunting task of establishing a “strategic partnership” while attempting to put 
“human rights at the cornerstone of relations with China”.2  
This thesis investigates whether the EU and its member states have been able 
to balance normative priorities – specifically the promotion of human rights – 
and material priorities – specifically economic interests – within the strategy of 
the constructive engagement towards China embraced since 1995. In order to 
respond to this central question this thesis elaborates and applies a liberal 
intergovernmental approach to the study of the promotion of human rights 
within the EU’s system of multilevel governance in external relations. The 
suitability and explanatory power of such an approach are compared and 
contrasted with the other main approaches to the study of the EU’s promotion of 
norms, i.e. sociological institutionalism and constructivism. 
                                                 
1  Jack Donnelly, ‘Social Construction of International Human Rights’, in Tim Dunne and 
Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, p. 78. 
2  European Commission, A long term policy for China-Europe Relations, Commission 
Communication, COM (1995) 279 final, Brussels, 1995. 
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The theoretical and analytical approach developed is employed to primarily 
analyse and explain the issues of consistency and coordination in the policies 
for the promotion of human rights elaborated and implemented by the European 
Community (EC) and by three member states, namely Germany, France and the 
UK. The latter were the EU’s main China partners and were broadly 
representative of the other EU member states’ approaches towards human rights 
in China, as will be explained in Chapter 2.  
Consistency and coordination are the indicators which will be used to assess 
the ability of the EU and its member states to balance normative and material 
priorities. The analysis of consistency intends to test the ability of European 
institutions, in particular the European Commission, to devise policies towards 
China in line, or at least not in contradiction, with the EU’s objective to promote 
human rights. Similarly, the analysis of coordination intends to test the ability of 
the European institutions and the member states to devise a common, or at least 
complementary, policy for the promotion of human rights in China, as also 
repeatedly affirmed in several European Council declarations and Commission 
communications. 
In order to make this study manageable and meaningful for generalisation, 
this thesis employs a conceptualisation of consistency which refers to the ability 
of the EC to devise economic and development policies consistent with one 
another and with the EU’s objective to promote human rights in China. As the 
EU’s strategy of constructive engagement of China on human rights was 
principally based on economic engagement and development assistance, a 
concentration on these two sectors appears wholly justifiable. The 
appropriateness of concentrating on the European Community is also supported 
by the fact that, within the EU’s architecture, the EC has been primarily 
 13 
entrusted with the task of devising and implementing consistent and coordinated 
policies for the promotion of human rights, in particular through economic 
instruments and development assistance. Similarly, this thesis conceptualises 
coordination as the ability of the EC and of the three member states selected to 
pursue development policies coordinated, or at least complementary, with one 
another in the pursuit of the promotion of human rights in the country.  
The choice of the three country cases serves a theoretical and an analytical 
purpose, which will be made explicit in the research strategy presented in 
Chapter 2. In brief, Germany, France and the UK were the member states which 
had the most significant strategic and economic relations with China. Thus an 
analysis of their cases serves the theoretical purpose of assessing their influence, 
or otherwise, on the overall EU policies for the promotion of human rights in a 
liberal intergovernmental perspective. At the same time Germany, France and 
the UK were the member states giving the most significant development 
assistance to China and their approaches to human rights in the country were 
broadly representative of those of the other member states. Therefore the 
analysis of their policies for the promotion of human rights serves the analytical 
purpose of assessing the overall level of coordination of the member states’ 
policies with those of the EC and thus assessing the achievement of a significant 
EU promotion of human rights through development assistance in China.  
This thesis does not intend to prove that the EU and its member states’ 
achievement of a consistent and coordinated strategy had a tangible impact on 
China’s human rights record. Nor indeed to prove that China’s human rights 
record did not improve due to the failure of devising such a strategy. As argued 
by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset, “without doubts […] 
the course of political development and regime change [can be attributed] 
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primarily to internal structures and actions”. 3  Additionally, the EU and its 
member states have clearly not been the only external actors to pursue the 
objective of promoting human rights in China. Other Western countries, 
international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World 
Bank (WB), as well as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) 
have all dealt with the issue of human rights in their relations with China. 
In line with the liberal intergovernmental approach, which will be developed 
in Chapter 2, this thesis intends instead to show that the achievement, or 
otherwise, of consistent and coordinated EU policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China largely depended on the interests and policy preferences 
of the EU’s member states with the most bargaining power and the highest 
stakes in China, i.e. Germany, France and the UK. This has broader implications 
for the study of the EU’s external relations and norms promotion.  
The study suggests that the EU is able to balance normative and material 
interests in its external relations and thus exert its clout in international norms 
promotion only when the member states with the most bargaining power and the 
highest stakes in a specific foreign policy issue (in this case human rights 
promotion in China) privilege normative interests over material ones. This in 
turn contrasts with the claims of sociological institutionalist and constructivist 
approaches, according to which the specific EU institutions, identity and norms 
influence the conduct of the EU and its member states’ external relations. 
Similarly, it suggests that the EU’s institutions may contribute to the 
socialisation of negative norms as well as positive ones, depending on the 
orientations of the member states with the most bargaining power and the 
highest stakes in a specific foreign policy issue. 
                                                 
3  Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing 
Countries, London, Adamantine, 1987-1989. 
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While originally contributing to the literature on the EU’s external relations 
and human rights promotion, this thesis will also contribute to the study of the 
EU’s promotion of human rights in China. First, it will do so by providing a 
more theoretically and analytically grounded discussion of EU-China relations. 
Secondly, it will provide a more accurate analysis of the actual EU strategy of 
constructive engagement by focusing on case studies often neglected by the 
main literature. 
This Chapter presents an overview of the main themes which underline this 
thesis. The next section presents the core argument which provides the thrust of 
the thesis, and it shows the importance of developing an appropriate framework 
for the study of norms promotion in the EU’s external relations. Section 1.3 
provides a literature review of EU-China relations in general and the issue of 
human rights in particular, and it shows the original contribution of this research 
to such literature. Section 1.4 analyses China’s human rights discourse and 
practice, in order to set the context against which to assess the EU’s promotion 
of human rights in the country. Finally, section 1.5 introduces the structure of 
this thesis. 
1.2 Core argument 
In 1992 the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (also called the Treaty of the 
European Union – TEU) provided the basis for the development of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which had the objective to mainstream the 
European Community’s external relations and coordinate the foreign policies of 
the member states. In the words of Mario Telò, the TEU had the double 
significance of creating a monetary and political Union, the latter in order to 
“correct the gap between the massive international importance of the European 
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Economic Community (EEC) as a global economic and trade actor and its 
relatively minor political role”.4 
The end of the Cold War created new opportunities for the development of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as is exemplified by the transitions of 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the furthering of the 
process of globalisation. At the same time new international threats made the 
EU confront new challenges, in particular the revival of nationalistic tendencies, 
such as those occurring in the Balkans, and the menace of international 
terrorism.  
These new opportunities and challenges in turn triggered further internal 
institutional developments throughout the 1990s. For example, they opened the 
way to the recent debate on the inclusion of a European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). The external inputs combined with the institutional changes led 
the EU to intervene in international affairs on a broader range of thematic and 
geographical issues. These prompted the recognition of the EU as a significant 
political and economic international actor in world affairs.5 
However, European officials have never been at ease with the neutral 
characterisation of the EU’s actorness in world affairs. They have always 
strived to define its ‘uniqueness’ and the original contribution that it could bring 
to the international system. This can be captured in the constant institutional 
reference to the EU as a civilian power, inspired by an “ethic of responsibility”, 
which can play the role of a stabilising power in contemporary world politics.6  
                                                 
4  Mario Telò, Europe a Civilian Power? EU, Global Governance, World Order, London, 
Palgrave, 2006, p. 203. 
5 See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, 
Routledge, 1999. 
6 Sonia Lucarelli, ‘Values, principles, identity and European Union foreign policy’, in Sonia 
Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, 
London, Routledge, 2006, p. 3. 
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Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s external actions, or perhaps their 
interpretations, substantiated the institutional discourse in as varied instances as 
the democratisation of CEECs through the enlargement process, the stabilisation 
of the conflict in Kosovo, the inclusion of political conditionality in the EC’s 
development assistance, and the EU’s activism in promoting and supporting 
multilateral regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Round of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The combination of rhetoric and action has been appreciated by the 
academia. Inspired by sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches, 
an increasing number of works on the EU’s international actorness have begun 
to focus on notions of “normative, value-driven external policy”.7 This is in 
opposition to the usual realist view of an EU unable to make its voice heard 
when real crises emerge, mostly due to its lack of military capabilities. 
Similarly, this literature contrasts with the criticism of proponents of the term 
“fortress Europe”, for whom the EU merely serves as a vehicle to reinforce the 
member states’ economic interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. These works 
have given rise to concepts of ‘civilian’8, ‘normative’9, ‘ethical’10, ‘gentle’11 
power Europe.  
All these works point to the unique role that the EU has played and could 
play on the international stage as a promoter of its distinctive norms, which 
                                                 
7 Richard Youngs, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2004, p. 415. 
8 The main proponent of this terminology is François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, 
in Robert Mayne (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London, Fontana, 
1972, pp. 32-47. 
9 The first scholar to put forward the conceptualisation of normative power Europe is Ian 
Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235-58. 
10 See the special issue of International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2008 and the introduction by 
Lisbeth Aggestam, ‘Introduction: Ethical Power Europe’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 
2008, pp. 1-11. 
11 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Europa, forza gentile, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001. 
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range from multilateralism to sustainable peace, from democracy to human 
rights and rule of law. These works maintain that focusing on the EU’s distinct 
institutions, identity and norms, as they emerge from (i) the historical context in 
which it evolved, (ii) its hybrid polity and (iii) its political legal constitution12, 
offers important insights to the discipline of European studies, which has been 
dominated for too long by approaches on the “hardware” rather than the 
“software” of the EU’s foreign policy.13 
Consequently, these works suggest that the EU’s institutions, identity and 
norms play an important role in influencing the elaboration and conduct of the 
EU and its member states’ external relations. For sociological institutionalist 
approaches the EU’s institutions socialise the member states around the identity 
and norms, characterising the EU.14 In this perspective, the institutions provide 
the EU with the ability to behave in a supranational way. For constructivist 
approaches the very identity and normative basis of the EU “predispose[s] it to 
act in a normative way in world politics”.15 
However the emphasis on the EU’s normative power and the specific norms 
that it promotes has somehow sidelined more empirical enquiries on the actual 
normative policies pursued, their articulation within the system of multilevel 
governance in the EU’s external relations and their appropriateness to the 
varying contexts in which they are carried out. Although most ‘normative’ 
authors admit that they are aware that the EU is not merely motivated by its 
values, principles and norms, they fail to establish how such values, principles 
                                                 
12 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, p. 240. 
13 Sonia Lucarelli, Values and Principles, p. 3. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, p. 252 
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and norms coexist along with material interests and how they influence the 
articulation of the EU’s external relations.16 
In response to these shortcomings several authors have recently embarked on 
the challenge of analysing what lies behind the EU’s normative discourse and 
policies. In most of these studies it emerges that the EU often pursues strategic 
goals behind the language of norms. On one side some authors underline the 
security stance in European norm promotion. This is connected to the post-Cold 
War environment, where new security doctrines present normative policies, and 
particularly the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as 
integral to attacking the roots of international instability. For example Richard 
Youngs argues that security-conditioned specificities often lie behind the EU’s 
human rights promotion, and in particular behind the specific strategies and 
norms promoted and the instruments employed.17  
On the other side some authors demonstrate the EU’s attempts to pursue 
long-term economic goals behind the language of norms. This clearly emerges 
in accounts of the EU’s trade policies both in multilateral and bilateral venues. 
Andrew Storey and Jan Orbie both separately come to the conclusion that 
although there is some plausibility to the argument of a normative power 
Europe, the normative policies of the EU appear to be informed by a neoliberal 
agenda.18  
Besides attesting to the coexistence, and often the supremacy, of material 
interests in the EU’s normative policies towards third countries, these empirical 
studies also point to the EU’s inability (or unwillingness) to articulate consistent 
                                                 
16 Richard Youngs, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests’. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Andrew Storey, ‘Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, pp. 331-346. Jan Orbie and Lisa 
Tortell (eds.), The European Union and the Social Dimension of Globalisation, Oxford, 
Routledge Garnet Series Europe in the World, 2009. 
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policies with its normative objectives. For example, Gordon Crawford, in his 
analysis of the EU’s democracy promotion in Central Asia, comes to the 
conclusion that security-related concerns and the ensuing policies have hindered 
the achievement of a consistent strategy of democracy promotion in the 
region. 19  Similarly, in a study on the EU’s export of norms in the 
Mediterranean, Stefania Panebianco concludes that in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) “economic liberalisation and the establishment of 
free markets […] seem to come before human rights and democratic 
principles”.20 
Other authors also contend that the EU and its member states have often been 
unable to coordinate their specific policies for the promotion of norms both at 
the CFSP and at the EC levels. For example, in his analysis of human rights in 
European foreign policy, Toby King argues that “despite the rhetoric of a 
common European commitment to human rights, member states’ collective 
human rights diplomacy has remained extremely limited”. 21  Similarly, in a 
study on the EU’s democracy promotion in Ghana, Gordon Crawford 
demonstrates that the EC and four selected member states have been unable to 
coordinate their activities in support of democracy in the country, thus failing to 
achieve any concrete impact in the country’s transition.22 
                                                 
19 Gordon Crawford, ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa: the case of 
Ghana’, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2005, pp. 571-600 
and Gordon Crawford, ‘EU human rights and democracy promotion in Central Asia: from Lofty 
principles to Lowly self-interests’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
2008, p. 189. 
20  Stefania Panebianco, ‘The constraints on EU action as a ‘norm exporter’ in the 
Mediterranean’, in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, The EU’s Role in International Politics: 
Concepts and Analysis, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 141. 
21 Toby King, ‘Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure for Post-modern 
Diplomacy?’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 316. 
22 Gordon Crawford, ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa: the case of 
Ghana’, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 571-600. 
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These empirical analyses in the practice of the EU’s normative power do not 
rule out the importance of conceptualising the EU as a normative power and 
identifying its norms. However, they compel analysts to move forward in the 
study of how the EU manages to balance idealistic motives with material 
interests and under what conditions the latter prevails over the former in the 
elaboration and implementation of the EU’s normative policies in its external 
relations. 
In order to do so and respond to the main question of this thesis it is 
necessary to find appropriate ways to study and explain the EU’s normative 
policies in its external relations. This point will be elaborated in Chapter 2, 
which will draw from the contemporary theorising on the EU’s external 
relations. Chapter 2 will show that human rights promotion, likewise the 
promotion of other norms, is still a fragmented and shared competence in the 
system of multilevel governance in the EU’s external relations. Similarly, it will 
show that the EU’s member states are far from being socialised in the promotion 
of human rights, despite their sharing of common histories, traditions and 
values.  
Therefore, Chapter 2 will argue that the analysis and explanation of the EU’s 
promotion of human rights can still largely benefit from the application of a 
liberal intergovernmental approach, which maintains that the national interests, 
policy preferences and bargaining powers of the most influential member states 
are the basis of the policy output in each level of the system of the EU’s 
governance in external relations. This provides the original contribution of this 
thesis to the present literature on the EU’s promotion of norms, as such an 
approach will be compared and contrasted with the prevalent sociological 
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institutionalist and constructivist approaches to the EU’s promotion of human 
rights. 
1.3 The literature on EU-China relations and human rights 
Among EU-China scholars there is a widespread consensus that relations 
have progressed from being “derivative of the Cold War” 23  and at most 
“secondary” 24  to represent today a more independent, comprehensive and 
multidimensional partnership. 25  In the last thirty years, considering the 
aggregate economic relations of the member states, the EU has become China’s 
single largest trading partner, and China the EU’s second largest. Similarly, the 
EU has become China’s fourth biggest investor. 26  While the economic 
dimension has remained predominant in EU-China relations, several academics 
have also pointed at their increased politicisation. The EU and China have 
created a dense framework for institutional and political exchanges, which 
includes regular bi-annual summits, high level trade and economic dialogue, 
and several technical dialogues. 
Through these interactions the EU and China have broadened the scope of 
their relations. They now cover bilateral issues, such as trade, investment, and 
China’s internal affairs, and global issues, such as non-proliferation, climate 
change and international crime. Today both sides have referred to their relations 
as a “strategic partnership”27 and they are presently negotiating a PCA. This has 
                                                 
23 This concept was proposed by David Shambaugh. David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 
1949-1995, London, SOAS Contemporary Institute of Chinese Studies, No.11, 1996. 
24 This concept was proposed by Harish Kapur in Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and 
Europe, London, Pinter Publishers, 1990. 
25  Michael Yahuda, ‘The Sino-European encounter’, in David Shambaugh, Eberhard 
Sandschneider and Zhou Hong, China-Europe Relations. Perceptions, policies and prospects, 
London, Routledge, 2006, pp. 13-32. 
26 Robert Ash, ‘Europe’s commercial relations with China’, in David Shambaugh et al., China-
Europe Relations. Perceptions, policies and prospects, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 190. 
27  Council of the European Union, Joint Statement of the Ninth EU-China Summit, No. 
12642/06, Brussels, 11 September 2006. 
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the declared objective to provide a more appropriate framework to “encompass 
the full scope of their bilateral relationship, including enhanced co-operation on 
political matters”.28 
At the same time, the growing interaction between the EU and China has 
been mirrored and reinforced by the increasing efforts of the member states, 
who have attempted to establish more meaningful bilateral political and 
economic relations with the PRC. On some issues, in particular the protection of 
the European market from the penetration of Chinese goods, the member states’ 
policies supported those of the EU thanks to a “congruence of interests”.29 On 
other issues the member states have openly diverged and often competed with 
each other. This is particularly evident in the commercial and investment fields, 
where each member state has tried to engage China in order to promote its own 
national companies. 
The EU and its member states’ relations with China have thus expanded and 
deepened in the last thirty years. Economic, political and broad security interests 
towards China have grown consistently both as a function of China’s rise and of 
the EU and its member states’ increasing desire to assert themselves on the 
international stage and reap the benefits of a close cooperation with the PRC. 
Against such a backdrop what role did human rights play in the evolution of the 
EU and its member states’ relations towards China? Were the EU and its 
member states able to adhere to their commitments to promote human rights in 
China while pursuing their growing economic and strategic objectives? How did 
they translate their rhetoric into practice? 
                                                 
28 Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit, Beijing, 28 November 2007, retrieved on July 
15 2009, http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/Noticias_Documentos/20071202CHINA.htm. 
29  May-Britt Stumbaum, ‘Engaging China – Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy Towards 
China’, in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Mussu (eds.), European foreign policy in an Evolving 
International System, London, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2007, p. 58. 
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In order to address these issues it is necessary to locate the discussion against 
the recent, burgeoning literature on EU-China relations. To this purpose section 
1.3.1 offers a simple tripartite categorisation of the main literature. Then, 
section 1.3.2 considers the more limited literature on human rights in EU-China 
relations, evidencing its main shortcomings and the heuristic usefulness of the 
previous categorisation. Finally, section 1.3.3 shows how the approach of this 
thesis originally contributes to the broader EU-China literature and specifically 
to the works on the EU and its member states’ promotion of human rights in 
China. 
1.3.1 Categorisation of EU-China literature 
As maintained above, in the scholarly works there is a general agreement that 
the expansion and deepening of EU-China relations have brought economic, 
security and political dimensions into the bilateral partnership. However this is 
where the consensus ends. Scholars are divided on the meaning of the 
deepening and expansion of the EU-China partnership. For some EU-China 
relations represent a “new axis” in international affairs.30 For others, after a long 
honeymoon during the 1990s, the EU and China have now reached a new stage 
in their relationship, which obliges them to “address more of the difficulties that 
stem from their different values and political systems”. 31  Finally, for other 
scholars, EU-China relations represent “a great disillusion” tout court.32  
What are the reasons for these different assessments? It is maintained here 
that these accounts diverge on the interpretation of the member states’ interests 
and attitudes towards China and consequently of their readiness, or otherwise, to 
                                                 
30 David Shambaugh, ‘China and Europe: the Emerging Axis’, Current History, September 
2004. 
31 Michael Yahuda, ‘The Sino-European encounter’, p. 30. 
32 Jonathan Holslag, ‘The European Union and China: the Great Disillusion’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, No. 11, 2006, pp. 555-580. 
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cooperate for the development of a common European approach towards China. 
These accounts can be categorised into EU-centred, member states-centred and 
balanced multilevel approaches.  
Before proceeding with the description of the categorisation of the EU-China 
literature a small caveat is necessary. Most of the literature on EU-China 
relations is theoretically eclectic and it is mostly of a descriptive nature. 
Scholars on EU-China relations are mostly experts in international relations 
rather than in the more limited, but highly sophisticated, field of European 
studies. Consequently, their works are rarely informed by explicit theories of the 
EU’s foreign policy and external relations. The following categorisation 
therefore does not seek to capture the theoretical standings of the authors 
considered, but it rather attempts to highlight their main analytical focuses. 
Scholars who consider EU-China relations as a “new” or “strategic” axis in 
international relations either tend to overlook the member states level or to have 
a positive interpretation of their roles in the formulation of a common European 
China policy. 33  David Shambaugh’s article on EU-China as a new axis in 
international relations is a good example of this literature. Shambaugh’s 
prediction is based on a positive appreciation of the member states’ role in 
building a common European approach towards the PRC. Shambaugh appears 
confident that “China-Europe relationship will continue to grow and develop at 
a steady pace” because in his opinion “the two levels of European interaction 
with China – the bilateral national level and the multilateral EU level – reinforce 
each other”.34 
                                                 
33 Among these works it is possible to include most of the Chapters included in the recent 
Stanley Crossick and Etienne Reuter, China-EU: A Common Future, Singapore, World 
Scientific, 2008. Similarly, see David Scott, ‘China and the EU: A Strategic Axis for the 
Twenty-First Century?’, International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007, pp. 23-45. 
34 David Shambaugh, ‘China and Europe: the Emerging Axis’, p. 248. 
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Arguably Shambaugh’s position and that of other scholars who support a 
similar argument represent a minority within EU-China scholarship. Another 
minority view, although perhaps more vocal, is at the opposite extreme. It 
stresses the divergences among the member states and their influential roles in 
determining inconsistent and uncoordinated European policies towards China. 
The work of May-Britt Stumbaum can be taken as an example of this attitude in 
the academia. Stumbaum maintains that so far the EU has not proven able to 
“build a Common Foreign and Security Policy capable of encompassing and co-
ordinating the member states’ activities, and of exploiting the full potential of 
Europe”.35 This opinion derives from the demonstration that “European policy 
towards China so far originates from a congruence of interests, rather than from 
a convergence of the foreign policies of the individual EU member states”.36 
Stumbaum is negative on the evolution of EU-China relations because she 
predicts that the member states will continue to use the “European Union as an 
additional tool at their disposal to further their own national interests, even at 
the expense of a coherent European approach”.37 
Member states-centred works also find ample resonance and even more 
extreme positions in the policy briefs and reports of major European think tanks, 
which often highlight the lack of coordination among the member states as the 
single-most important explanation of the failing European approach towards 
China. The recent work of the European Centre on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is 
a good example of this position. 38  In early 2009 John Fox and François 
Godement produced one of the most comprehensive power audits of EU-China 
                                                 
35 May-Britt Stumbaum, ‘Engaging China – Uniting Europe?’, p. 58. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. p. 74. 
38 John Fox and François Godement, EU-China Relations: a Power Audit, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2009. 
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relations, which is entirely based on research work on the twenty-seven member 
states of the EU and their approaches to China. In their study the two authors 
highlight the ongoing differences and divergences of the EU’s member states. 
They categorise the twenty-seven odd approaches on the basis of two main 
issues: how to manage China’s impact on the European economy and how to 
engage China politically. The four typologies that emerge show a depressing 
division among the EU’s member states, which in the opinion of the authors has 
greatly contributed to the development of the European “unconditional 
engagement” towards China.39 
Between the two extreme positions of EU-centred and member states-centred 
accounts in EU-China relations literature rest the majority of the recent 
scholarly works. It is difficult, if not impossible, to classify them on the basis of 
any specific analytical approach though, as they are mostly of a descriptive 
nature. However, at the risk of oversimplification, the majority of these works 
can be categorised as employing “balanced multilevel” approaches as they 
consider the interaction of the EU and the member states’ levels without yet 
attributing any prominence to any of them.  
Most of these studies subscribe to Franco Algieri’s statement that the 
European approach is a function of its institutional framework. For Algieri the 
EU and its member states’ relations with China can only be understood through 
the analysis of their competences, interests and instruments. In his analysis 
Algieri comes to the conclusion that “apart from the interests of single member 
                                                 
39 The four typologies identified are: assertive industrialists, ideological free-traders, European 
followers, and accommodating mercantilists. 
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states, it is the EU’s policy-making and institutionalisation pattern that matters” 
in defining Europe’s China policy.40 
From this brief discussion it emerges that scholars agree that EU-China 
relations have clearly expanded and deepened in scope. However an assessment 
of their significance and future evolution largely depends on whether observers 
assume that the member states can, or are willing to, achieve a common 
approach towards China and thus establish a real European China policy. The 
tripartite categorisation of EU-China works is useful for the study of the more 
limited literature on EU-China relations and human rights, as is shown in the 
section below. 
1.3.2 Human rights in EU-China literature 
Despite the numerous monographs and edited volumes on EU-China 
relations none of them has so far explicitly and comprehensively dealt with 
human rights and only a few dedicated articles, policy briefs and book chapters 
exist on the topic. Obviously, scholars have opted to cover more mundane 
subjects reflecting the evolution of EU-China relations.  
In the few cases when human rights have been considered in the literature on 
EU-China relations, scholars have produced two types of works: studies logging 
the various policy initiatives carried out by the EU and researches analysing 
specific cases, mostly the resolutions of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) or the arms embargo. In both these types of works 
scholars generally agree that the EU and its member states failed to promote 
human rights in China in a consistent and coordinated manner. 
                                                 
40 Franco Algieri, ‘It is the system that matters. Institutionalization and making of EU policy 
toward China’, in David Shambaugh et al., China-Europe Relations, p. 79. 
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These accounts diverge in their analytical focus, which can be referred to the 
previous categorisation of EU-China studies. For the majority of scholars such a 
failure is due to the EU institutions’ prioritisation of economic and strategic 
interests. These works belong to the category of EU-centred works. In analysing 
the issue of human rights in EU-China relations these works show that the EU 
has been unable to prioritise human rights issues over economic and security 
concerns towards China. For example Richard Youngs argues that in the EU’s 
relations with China “the coordination between the governance, commercial and 
democracy agenda was weak”.41 Similarly, Stefania Panebianco shows that in 
the EU’s policy towards China, concrete action in defence of human rights and 
democracy “lags behind overriding security and economic interests”.42 
For other authors the role of the member states with their divergent political 
and economic interests towards China explains the EU’s inability to establish a 
coordinated policy for the promotion of human rights in China.43 These works 
fall into the category of member states-centred approaches. These works mostly 
consider the cases of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights and the arms embargo. In the latter, Jennifer Erickson shows the 
shortcomings of the socialisation of member states within the CFSP. Erickson 
maintains that “basic differences between members in how they conceive their 
proper role in the world, as well as their domestic interests and values, are more 
                                                 
41  Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s 
Mediterranean and Asian Policies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 189. 
42 Stefania Panebianco, ‘Promoting human rights and democracy in European Union relations 
with Russia and China’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles, p. 
131. 
43 See, among others, Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy; 
and Stefania Panebianco, ‘Promoting human rights and democracy in European Union relations 
with Russia and China’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles. 
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influential in determining their positions on the EU’s external policy than any 
sense, shared or otherwise, of the EU’s external identity”.44 
Similar conclusions are shared by Philip Baker’s seminal study on the 
member states’ positions towards China at the UNCHR.45 In Baker’s work the 
economic, mostly commercial, interests of the member states seem to have 
played an important role in changing the EU’s position within the UNCHR at 
the critical juncture of 1997. Since that year no resolution has ever been tabled 
by any of the EU’s member states. For Baker the disbandment at the UNCHR 
shows that from the point of view of the EU’s policy at CFSP level, “relations 
with China might be viewed as a case study of the failure to maintain a 
collective front and the ability of a few member states, driven possibly by 
commercial motives, to overturn a more principled policy”.46 
Finally, another set of authors identify in the European institutional 
framework the reasons for the EU and its member states’ failure to promote 
human rights in China. These studies clearly fall into the category of works with 
a balanced multilevel approach to EU-China relations. They are not only 
focused on the issue of human rights but they tend to consider human rights as 
just another important contentious issue in EU-China relations. Within these 
works one can also include several comprehensive reports by some of the most 
influential Brussels-based NGOs dealing with human rights in China, such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights in China, Human Rights Watch. 
Due to their analytical eclecticism it is impossible to review or take into 
account all these works. An example is Carol Glen and Richard Murgo’s work, 
                                                 
44 Jennifer Erickson, ‘Market Imperative Meets Normative Power: Human Rights and European 
Arms Transfer Policy’, Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations 
Conference, Turin, 15 July 2007, p. 27. 
45  Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, The China 
Quarterly, No. 169, 2002, pp. 45-63. 
46 Ibid. p. 47. 
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which has the objective to assess “whether political constraints have prevented 
the EU from taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the new 
Chinese economy”.47 These authors describe the institutional constraints of the 
EU and the divergences of the member states. Through this perspective they 
analyse the EU’s economic and political policies towards China. Eventually 
they conclude that a combination of economic rivalry among the member states 
and the underdeveloped nature of the EU’s foreign policy machinery “prevents 
the EU from creating and sustaining a consistent policy position on human 
rights”.48 
1.3.3 Consistency and coordination 
As shown above most studies on EU-China relations on the issue of human 
rights agree on the failure of the EU and its member states to elaborate 
consistent and coordinated policies for the promotion of human rights in China. 
However, this thesis argues that the issues of consistency and coordination 
rarely refer to the actual EU and member states’ commitments within their 
strategy of constructive engagement towards China. Chapter 3 will show that 
such a strategy principally relied on positive policies for the promotion of 
human rights, i.e. economic engagement, dialogue and development assistance, 
while sanctioning policies lost their prominence.  
As shown above, most works have only considered the consistency of the 
EU’s position at the UNCHR and the arms embargo with the other EU’s 
economic and security policies. The UNCHR and the arms embargo fall into the 
sanctioning policy of the EU. However, Chapter 3 will argue that the EU has 
instead clearly committed to constructively engage China through a positive 
                                                 
47 Carol Glen and Richard Murgo, ‘EU-China Relations: Balancing Political Challenges with 
Economic Opportunities’, Asia-Europe Journal, No. 5, 2007, pp. 332. 
48 Ibid. p. 343. 
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approach. Therefore, studying the consistency of the sanctioning policies 
automatically leads to proving that the EU has been inconsistent in its human 
rights policy towards China. This approach fails to analyse the actual 
consistency of the constructive engagement on human rights, which is broadly 
based on economic engagement, dialogue and development assistance.  
This thesis addresses this shortcoming by concentrating on the consistency of 
the EC’s economic engagement and development assistance. Within the strategy 
of constructive engagement the EU and its member states have been in favour of 
opening up the Chinese economy and helping its transition towards a market 
economy with an efficient rule of law. However, economic reform and opening 
up to international trade and investments may have significant effects on the 
political and social structure of a country and thus on the improvement of 
human rights. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the EC has 
combined its economic approach with a proactive policy in support of human 
rights through development assistance. Answering this question allows 
discussing as to whether the EC’s development projects were consistent with its 
economic policies towards China and whether these two policies were 
ultimately consistent with the objective of promoting human rights in the 
country. 
Similarly, the issue of coordination should also be reconsidered in light of 
the EU and its member states’ commitments to constructively engage China. 
Most studies have not considered the coordination of the EU’s positive policies 
for the promotion of human rights in China, i.e. the economic policies, bilateral 
dialogues and development projects, with those of its member states. The 
member states only appeared in some researches which showed their lack of 
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coordination in devising specific sanctions towards China, such as their 
positions at the UNCHR and the arms embargo. 
However, as will be illustrated in Chapter 3, the EU and its member states’ 
constructive engagement towards China on human rights is mostly based on 
economic engagement, dialogue and development assistance. Therefore 
coordination should actually be considered in the articulation of these policies. 
In the EU context coordination is the ability of the EU and its member states to 
devise common, or at least complementary, policies in pursuit of a specific 
objective, in this case the promotion of human rights. Thus in order to provide 
an appropriate analysis of coordination, this thesis addresses the coordination of 
the EC’s development policies for the promotion of human rights in China with 
those of the three selected representative EU member states: Germany, France 
and the UK. 
As mentioned in section 1.2, in order to explain the policy outputs of the EU 
and its member states’ promotion of human rights in China within their strategy 
of constructive engagement, this thesis will apply a liberal intergovernmental 
approach. This theoretical approach will be combined with an analytical focus 
on the system of multilevel governance in the EU’s external relations. In this 
way this thesis will offer an original contribution to the EU-China literature on 
the issue of human rights by providing a more accurate analysis of the actual 
strategy of constructive engagement and by explaining it through a framework 
developed on the basis of the contemporary theorising on the EU’s external 
relations. This provides the main contribution of this thesis to the EU-China 
literature on human rights. 
While considering the consistency and coordination of the EC and the three 
selected member states’ policies, this thesis will also, although secondarily, 
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consider their appropriateness to the specific context of the country. Although 
the EU may have at times produced consistent and coordinated economic and 
development policies towards China, these are not sufficient to achieve success. 
The latter depends significantly on the ability to devise and pursue strategies in 
line with the country’s needs and internal situation.  
Most studies presuppose that the EU’s policies are appropriate to the 
situation in China. They do so because only rarely do they study the actual 
positive policies carried out and their relation with China’s internal 
development. Almost no study on the EU’s approach to human rights in China 
has provided any analysis of the projects in the field and the dialogues.49 
Similarly most of the EU-China literature subscribes to the EU’s argument: 
more political and economic interaction leads to the improvement of human 
rights.  
However this is an argument which is far from proven. First, economic 
reform and opening have a substantial effect on the social and political situation 
of a country, which may be positive or otherwise for human rights. Second, 
economic growth may, at least in the short term, favour the survival of 
authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian development system of some Asian 
states is the best evidence of this.  
In summation, while closely analysing the consistency and coordination of 
the EC and the three selected member states’ policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China, this thesis will also reflect on their appropriateness to the 
Chinese context. The combined analysis of consistency, coordination and, to a 
lesser extent, appropriateness of the EU and the three selected member states’ 
                                                 
49 A recent exception is Richard Balme’s article on The European Union, China and Human 
Rights. See Richard Balme, ‘The European Union, China and Human Rights’, in Zaki Laïdi, 
(ed.), EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. Normative Power and Social Preferences. 
London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 143-173.  
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policies for the promotion of human rights will be used to assess the EU’s 
ability to balance normative and material priorities in its constructive 
engagement of China. In order to set the context against which to assess the 
appropriateness of the policies for the promotion of human rights in China, the 
next section discusses the Chinese human rights discourse and practice.  
1.4 The Chinese human rights discourse and practice 
The emergence and affirmation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), its 
resilience to external influence and its affirmation of a counter-paradigm, the 
so-called Beijing Consensus, seem to be posing perhaps the most potentially 
relevant challenge to the affirmation of human rights worldwide. China’s 
involvement and adherence to these principles have become paramount to their 
future credibility because of both China’s economic, strategic and demographic 
clout and its regional as well as international assertiveness.  
Consequently the ‘international community’ has concentrated a lot of effort 
and energy in ‘integrating’ the Chinese exception. Tough confrontation and 
positive engagement have been the two main approaches adopted by 
multilateral organisations and Western democracies since the Tiananmen 
Massacre. The Chinese government has responded to these pressures by 
repeatedly modifying its attitudes and by strategically and selectively accepting 
some changes. Simultaneously it has kept unchanged its belief in non-
interference in matters of sovereignty and its determination to adapt human 
rights concepts to its specific historical, cultural, political and socio-economic 
situation. This is also motivated by the Chinese government’s attempts to 
increase its legitimacy and respond to its people’s requests for more rights in 
connection with the evolution of the country’s reform process. 
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Ever since its comeback on the international stage in 1971, China has made 
no secret of its unwillingness to subject its national sovereignty and thus its 
political system to the pressures of any external actor. However China’s 
reluctance to expose its human rights situation and to concede to international 
pressures was strongly confronted by Western governments and international 
advocacy groups in 1989.  
For the first time since the inception of the ‘open-door policy’, China’s 
human rights record and internal polity was brought to the centre of 
international attention during the Tiananmen Massacre. If, as argued by Ann 
Kent, between the time of China’s reinstatement in the UN in 1971 and the 
Tiananmen Massacre, China’s human rights violations and lack of democracy 
failed to draw international attention, this all changed afterwards.50 
Throughout the 1990s, pressures on China were mounted in multilateral as 
well as bilateral fora. In the latter Western democracies pressed the Chinese 
government during high-level political visits and conditioned the lifting of the 
arms embargo imposed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre to the 
improvement of their human rights record. Similarly, prior to 1997 Western 
democracies made several attempts at passing resolutions at the annual sessions 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights and pressing China to sign 
international covenants on human rights. However starting from the mid-1990s, 
most Western countries embraced constructive attitudes and only maintained 
sporadic pressure mostly during behind-the-door meetings.51 Western countries 
engaged China through political dialogues on economic reform and human 
                                                 
50  Ann Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights: the Limits of Compliance, 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. 
51  See Andrew Nathan, ‘China and the international human rights regime’, in Elizabeth 
Economy and Michel Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, 
NewYork, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp. 136-170. 
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rights and supported them through development assistance programmes and 
projects. 
The combination of pressure and engagement had some impact on China and 
led to a partial socialisation of the country within the international human rights 
regime. In a study on China’s interaction with the United Nations human rights 
regime, Ann Kent distinguishes three chronological phases, which coincide with 
China’s evolving socialisation to human rights.52 In the first two phases, from 
1971 to 1979 and from 1979 to 1989, the Chinese government was able to 
maintain its control over the nature of its participation in the UN human rights 
regime mostly due to a lack of significant multilateral pressures. However after 
the Tiananmen Massacre, the growing activism of Western democracies and 
international advocacy groups made the Chinese government lose such control 
and obliged it to substantively confront and engage with the international human 
rights regime.  
Initially the Chinese government countered these pressures by denying and 
rejecting the UN human rights norms. However in the early 1990s the Chinese 
authorities embarked on a strategy of human rights diplomacy, which mixed 
strategic concessions, the use of material incentives to avoid sanctions and 
rhetorical revisionism. As accounted by Rosemary Foot, the Chinese 
government offered some tactical concessions by signing international human 
rights covenants, freeing some high profile political prisoners and accepting 
dialogues and projects.53  
At the same time when push came to shove the Chinese government was 
quick to return to realpolitik instruments to deflect criticism as amply 
demonstrated by its attitudes at the UNCHR. Finally, tactical concessions and 
                                                 
52 Ann Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights. 
53 Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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use of material incentives were combined with the development of a reformist 
rhetoric, which was aimed at stressing the historical, cultural and socio-
economic differences of China to justify the prioritisation of socio-economic 
rights over civil and political ones. This rhetoric also found favour among 
several other developing countries.  
The combination of tactical concessions, use of incentives and reformist 
rhetoric explain what Ann Kent has referred to as “the limits of compliance” of 
the Chinese government to the international human rights regime. Such limits 
have been further investigated in Caroline Fleay’s study on the influence of the 
transnational human rights network on China. By applying the spiral model 
developed by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Katryn Sikkink54 to analyse 
how norms violating states respond, adapt and are socialised to human rights 
norms, Fleay shows that China is stuck in the third phase: ‘tactical 
concessions’.55 For the author it is likely that China will remain in this phase for 
a long time due to two factors: the ability of a powerful Chinese government to 
put forward counter-criticism and the lack of powerful domestic agents of 
change to press it into a normative course.56 
Interestingly, Fleay also suggests that in the specific case of China the spiral 
model should be extended to also account for the influence of the norm 
violating state on the human rights regime. On the one hand this is clearly 
                                                 
54  The authors’ model categorises the response of norm-violating states to human rights 
criticism into five phases: phase one, which implies repression and activation of network; phase 
two, which implies denial by the incumbent government; phase three, which refers to tactical 
concessions; phase four, which features prescriptive status and phase five, which entails rule-
consistent behaviour. For the authors collaboration between domestic change agents and 
international human rights actors is essential for progress because it induces argumentative self-
entrapment by governments. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Katryn Sikkink (eds.), The 
Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
55 Caroline Fleay, ‘Human Rights, Transnational Actors and the Chinese Government: another 
look at the spiral model’, Journal of Global Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006, pp. 43-65. 
56 Ibid. p. 58. 
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motivated by the fact that China is a powerful country. On the other hand this is 
also explained by the fact that China has indeed ‘digested’, re-elaborated and 
appropriated the principles of human rights, imposing on them a peculiar 
Chinese flavour, often referred to in the official jargon as “Chinese 
characteristics”. This requires appreciating the internal reasons for the evolution 
of the Chinese government’s human rights discourse and how the latter is 
functional to increase its legitimacy and respond to societal requests emerging 
in response to the reform of the country. 
Chinese authorities have elaborated a systematic and dynamic view of human 
rights, which were introduced into the Chinese constitution in 2004. In a 
growing body of documents Chinese officials, taking their cue from the fact that 
China is a developing country, maintain that China upholds, respects and 
safeguards all human rights but gives priority to its people’s rights to 
subsistence as well as other fundamental economic and social rights, and only at 
a later stage will it be able to grant fully-fledged political and civil ones. This 
way of arguing is also compounded by frequent references to cultural, historical, 
ideological and social conditions, which in turn justify a different understanding 
and practice of human rights.57  
Major examples are the concepts of democracy and rule of law closely 
related to human rights. Notwithstanding the present lack of political and civil 
rights, the authorities still maintain that the government unrelentingly pursues 
democracy, as was recently confirmed by the publication of the White Paper on 
Political Democracy in China. Similarly, since the early 1980s the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has affirmed the importance of the rule of law, which 
                                                 
57 See Marina Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History, 
Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
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was eventually enshrined in the Constitution in 1999. However, it is unclear 
whether China is pursuing the rule of law, albeit of a thin sort, or rather 
practicing the rule by law.58 
The evolution of the CCP’s discourse on human rights and its insistence on 
subsistence rights, socio-economic development as well as on the creation of a 
rule of law responds to the long-standing dissatisfaction of the population with 
the growing inequalities, the dismantling of social and economic provisions and 
the widespread corruption of officials, which the reform process has triggered. 
These complaints have been a common feature of the process of economic 
reform and they are closely interlinked with it, as is stressed by Chinese 
intellectuals belonging to the influential New Left.59  
With the deepening of economic reforms in the 1990s these complaints have 
been further exacerbated and the Chinese government has been unable to 
concretely tackle them. For Ann Kent this is due to the fact that the Chinese 
government has embraced the market rule “without its antibiotics” such as 
social justice, rule of law and human rights.60 Therefore behind the Chinese 
government’s human rights discourse lie attempts to address, at least at a 
rhetorical level, the main socio-economic requests of its people, thus acquiring 
legitimacy while at the same time denying any request for more political and 
civil freedoms. 
From this section it appears clear that confronted with Western pressures 
China had to make some concessions on human rights. However the continuing 
presence of counter-criticism and the effective use of material incentives show 
                                                 
58  See Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Towards the Rule of Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
59 See on this point the illuminating discussion of the New Left thinking in Mark Leonard, What 
does China think?, London, Fourth Estate, 2008. 
60  Ann Kent, ‘China’s Growth Treadmill: Globalization, Human Rights and International 
Relations’, The Review of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2004, pp. 524-543. 
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that the Chinese government is still stuck at the level of ‘tactical concessions’ 
and it is not wholly socialised in the international human rights regime. While 
this can be attributed to China’s might there is also another important factor, 
that is China’s appropriation, re-elaboration and adoption of a human rights 
language to tackle the risks of a governance crisis due to the imbalances caused 
by thirty years of reforms. It is at the intersection of external pressures for 
change and the internal requests for social equality that it is possible to 
understand the Chinese government’s human rights discourse, its openness to 
improving the protection of its citizens’ human rights and consequently the 
appropriateness of the EU and the three selected member states’ policies. 
A deeper analysis of the actual human rights situation in China would be 
outside the scope of this thesis. However, on the basis of the above discussion it 
is possible to maintain that an ‘appropriate’ human rights policy towards China 
has to combine and balance the promotion of political and civil rights with the 
promotion of social and economic rights. This approach can take into account 
the political constraints of the Chinese leadership, its attempts to implement 
better social and economic rights through such strategies as the ‘Harmonious 
Society’61, its opening to foreign support in these sectors, as well as the main 
societal requests being voiced in China.  
This argument is widely shared by Chinese and European academics, as it 
has emerged during interviews62 as well as through the consultation of the main 
academic literature.63 Similarly, in the case of EU-China relations, the opening 
                                                 
61 For a discussion of the concept of the Harmonious Society see Gudrun Wacker, and Matthis 
Kaiser, ‘Sustainability Chinese Style. The Concept of the Harmonious Society’, SWP Research 
Paper, August 2008, Berlin. 
62 Interviews 27 and 31 with Chinese academics. 
63 See also the policy recommendations for Germany and the EU in Gudrun Wacker and Matthis 
Kaiser, ‘Sustainability Chinese Style’, pp. 24-25. Similarly, see the discussion in Richard Balme, 
‘The European Union, China and Human Rights’. 
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of the Chinese authorities in these fields is represented by China’s 2003 EU 
White Paper, which expressly requests the deepening of “cooperation in 
protecting, inter alia, citizens’ social and cultural rights and the rights of the 
disadvantaged”.64 Finally, an increased focus on social and economic rights also 
appears to be the main recommendation underlying one of the most influential 
reports on human rights promotion in China produced by several outstanding 
international academics and policy practitioners gathered by the Open Society 
and HRIC in 2001.65 References to this argument will be made in the analysis of 
the case studies throughout the thesis and in the final conclusions. 
1.5 Plan of the thesis 
This Chapter has offered a brief introduction to the main themes that will 
underline this thesis. Chapter 2 will develop the theoretical and analytical tools 
to study human rights in the system of multilevel governance in the EU’s 
external relations. In particular it will show the necessity to focus on the issues 
of consistency and coordination in the study of the EC and its member states’ 
policies for the promotion of human rights. The Chapter will propose a liberal 
intergovernmental approach, which explains the policy outputs through 
reference to the member states’ interests and policy preferences at the various 
levels of governance in the EU’s system of external relations. This will serve to 
elaborate the specific and appropriate research strategy and methodology for the 
study of human rights in EU-China relations. 
Chapter 3 will analyse the evolution of EU-China relations. It will show the 
growing economic and security interests of the EU and its member states 
towards China and how they led to the embracement of the strategy of 
                                                 
64 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU White Paper, 2003. 
65 Open Society and HRIC, Promoting Human Rights in China. Report of the China Human 
Rights Strategy Study Group, November 2001. 
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constructive engagement. In particular it will show the influence of the three 
selected member states, i.e. Germany, France and the UK, and their 
representativeness of the EU’s member states’ approach towards human rights 
in China.  
At the same time Chapter 3 will consider the traditional case studies adopted 
by the main literature on EU-China relations and human rights in order to 
develop two major points for the research on consistency and coordination: the 
embracement of the strategy of constructive engagement led the EU and its 
member states to abandon critical stances towards China on human rights; the 
member states were divided on the best way to engage China and they could 
only agree on common positions with a very low common denominator, mostly 
influenced by the strategic and economic interests of the main China partners in 
the EU. Since the sanctioning policies were mostly located within the CFSP, the 
Chapter underpins the expectations of the liberal intergovernmental approach. 
Further it suggests, without yet proving it, that the CFSP may have contributed 
to the socialisation of negative norms, as also member states more critical 
towards China abandoned sanctioning policies in two out of the three cases 
analysed. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will provide the empirical analysis of the consistency and 
coordination of the EC and its member states’ economic and development 
policies for the promotion of human rights in China. In order to analyse the 
consistency of the EC’s policies, Chapter 4 will consider the EC’s economic and 
development policies towards China and whether they reflected the EU’s 
identity and norms, as expected by sociological institutionalist and 
constructivist approaches, or the interests of the member states and in particular 
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those of Germany, France and the UK, as expected by a liberal 
intergovernmental approach. 
In order to analyse the issue of coordination, Chapter 5 will consider the 
development policies of the three selected member states within the context of 
their bilateral relations with China. The Chapter will analyse whether these 
policies converged with or were complementary to those of the EC, as expected 
by sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches, or alternatively, if 
they differed from and contrasted with them in order to respond to the interests 
of the three selected member states, as expected by liberal intergovernmental 
approaches. 
Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis by summing up the results of the analysis 
of consistency and coordination in the EU and in the three member states’ 
policies for the promotion of human rights in China. The Chapter will also 
elaborate on the specific research hypothesis of this thesis, which will be 
introduced in the Chapter 2, and discuss whether the EU and its member states 
were able to balance their normative and material interests towards China. 
Finally Chapter 6 will present elements for future research and elaborate on the 
possible future scenarios for the EU and its member states’ promotion of human 
rights in China. 
 
 
Chapter 2 - Human rights promotion in the EU’s 
external relations  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The evolution and institutionalisation of human rights in the EU’s external 
relations has been a long and arduous path, often characterised by setbacks. The 
member states have played a pivotal role in constructing the EU’s international 
identity based on respect for human rights through their declaratory policies and 
the inclusion of respect for human rights as essential requirements in the various 
enlargements of the EU. Similarly, the agency of the institutions of the EU, 
combined with the activities of some member states, has played an important 
role in furthering the institutionalisation of human rights in the EU’s external 
relations.  
The combination of the EU institutions and the member states’ agency has 
brought about traditional and non-traditional instruments for the promotion of 
human rights in the EU’s external relations. Despite this evolution, human rights 
promotion remains a fragmented and shared competence within the system of 
multilevel governance in the EU’s external relations. The pillarisation of 
competences in the Maastricht Treaty bears witness to this problem. Similar to 
the other major objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, human 
rights promotion has not been Europeanised in the EU’s external relations.  
This poses two major problems for the analysis of the consistency and 
coordination of the EU’s policies for human rights promotion. First, it requires 
identifying the most appropriate level or levels of analysis for the study of 
human rights promotion in the EU’s external relations. These may be the CFSP, 
the EC and the member states levels taken separately or a combination of more 
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than one of them. Second, it requires identifying an independent variable which 
can explain the policy output. This generally implies that the analyst has to 
choose to concentrate either on member states, institutions, or ideas in a liberal 
intergovernmental, sociological institutionalist or constructivist perspective. 
These themes will be considered below, where how to study the EU’s human 
rights promotion against contemporary theorising on the EU’s external relations 
will be discussed. The Chapter proposes to frame the analysis of the promotion 
of human rights through the notion of a system of multilevel governance in the 
EU’s external relations and to explain the consistency and coordination of the 
policy output through a liberal intergovernmental perspective. 
This Chapter opens with a brief introduction to the evolution of the EU’s 
human rights policy. It identifies the identity and normative basis of the EU, its 
instruments for human rights promotion, and the relevance of the two 
interrelated issues of consistency and coordination. Section 2.3 draws from the 
literature on the EU’s external relations and it elaborates a liberal 
intergovernmental approach to study consistency and coordination in the system 
of multilevel governance in the EU’s external relations. Section 2.4.1 applies 
the insights developed in section 2.3 to the study of the EC and its member 
states’ promotion of human rights. Finally sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 merge the 
arguments elaborated in the previous sections and propose an appropriate 
research strategy and methodology for the study of the EU’s promotion of 
human rights in China. 
2.2 Human rights in the EU’s external relations 
2.2.1 The EU’s identity and normative basis 
The Lisbon Treaty states that the EU’s external action 
 47 
shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own 
creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human rights, the principles of equality, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law.1 
 
According to the Treaty the presence of human rights in the EU and its member 
states’ external relations is therefore a function of the internal evolution of the 
protection of human rights within the EU and of the increasing assertiveness of 
the EU to define and give substance to its international role within the evolving 
framework of international law.  
Within the EU, the consolidation of respect for human rights was driven by a 
combination of the EU institutions and the member states’ activities. First, the 
activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Parliament 
(EP) were instrumental in eroding the sovereignty of the member states and in 
de facto formalising respect for human rights within their national borders. 
Secondly, in order to provide international legitimacy to the ‘European 
enterprise’ the member states repeatedly affirmed that the EU’s international 
identity was (and is) grounded, among others, on respect for human rights. This 
was further strengthened by making entry into the EU conditional on respect for 
human rights during the various enlargement rounds.2 
Externally, the end of the Cold War and the affirmation of “normative 
globalisation” provided the EU with the opportunity to “assume a more 
proactive international role by drawing on international ethics”, which was 
                                                 
1 European Union, ‘Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community: Lisbon Treaty’, Official Journal of the European Union, 
No. C 306, 2007, pp. 1–271, Ch. 1, Article 10 A.1. 
2 Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004. 
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emerging in those years.3 For example, the affirmation of the human rights’ 
approach to development gave substance to the EU’s rhetoric, through the EU’s 
involvement in human rights promotion in developing countries. 
The development of an internal normative basis and its combination with the 
new opportunities offered by the international system after the end of the Cold 
War strengthened the EU’s international identity centred on human rights 
protection and promotion. According to Alston and Weiler “a strong 
commitment to human rights is one of the principal characteristics of the 
European Union”.4 
Considering that the EU’s international identity is the product of the internal 
interaction of the EU institutions with the member states and their external 
interaction with the international arena, it is possible to argue that the EU and its 
member states share common norms, principles and objectives in human rights 
protection and promotion. However, such norms, principles and objectives are 
not completely homogeneous to those of the international human rights regime 
and they maintain some European peculiarities, which characterise the alleged 
European distinctiveness in human rights promotion and protection worldwide 
often referred to in the academic literature. 
As argued by Charles Leben, the EU upholds universal “rights called 
sacrosanct from which no derogation is permitted”, such as, for example, the 
right to life, liberty and security, the prohibition of torture, slavery and other 
degrading treatment or punishment, equality before the law and the legality of 
                                                 
3 Lisbeth Aggestam, ‘Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?’, p. 4. 
4 Philip Alston and John Weiler, ‘An Ever Closer Union in Need of a Human Rights Policy: the 
European Union and Human Rights’, in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 6. 
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punishment.5 These rights are to be found almost identically in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and in the Charter of Human Rights 
signed in 2000 at the Nice Council.  
At the same time the EU makes it explicit that it subscribes to the 1993 
Vienna Convention stressing the universality, indivisibility and interdependence 
of all human rights. In this respect the EU has been described as helping to 
“harden international human rights law”. 6  These points have been clearly 
highlighted in the previous quote from the Lisbon Treaty. However the quote 
also points at the distinctiveness of the EU in the promotion of human rights and 
it refers it to the integration process that characterised the evolution of the EU. 
The peculiar norms which feature in the EU’s normative basis appear to 
make the EU able to contribute in innovative ways to the international human 
rights regime. This is evident for example in the EU’s insistence on second-
generation human rights, which derives from the social democratic traditions of 
the member states.7 As Ian Manners notes, the EU’s interpretation of human 
rights must be described as promoting “associative human rights”, where not 
just individual but also collective rights are protected.8 Similarly for Manners, 
the prohibition of the death penalty that derives from the existence of the 
ECHR, which played an important role in the elimination of the death penalty 
                                                 
5 Charles Leben, ‘Is there a European Approach to Human Rights?’, Philip Alston (ed.), The 
European Union and Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 77. 
6 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2003, p. 107. 
7 The EU Charter of Human Rights has expressly included Chapter IV, Solidarity, that enshrines 
the social rights of European Union citizens, such as, for example, the right of collective 
bargaining and action (art. 28), the right to social security and assistance (art. 34), the right to 
health care (art. 35). 
8 Ian Manners, ‘The Constitutive nature of values, images and principles in the European Union’, 
in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.) , Values and Principles. 
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among all the EU member states, has been one of the most significant cases of 
the EU’s contribution to the international human rights regime.9 
2.2.2 Institutions and instruments 
The combination of internal and external factors, which brought about the 
EU’s normative basis and international identity centred on human rights, 
required the EU to deploy concrete efforts to provide substance to the emerging 
rhetoric on its unique role in international affairs. Once again the development 
of appropriate instruments for the promotion of human rights was the outcome 
of the activism of the member states and of the EU institutions.  
The member states introduced human rights as an objective of their foreign 
and development policies. The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands 
included human rights promotion in their foreign policies in the 1970s. 
Similarly, after the end of the Cold War, France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany were among the first Western countries to introduce political 
conditionality to their development assistance.10 In turn these countries, with the 
support of the EU institutions, in particular the European Parliament and the 
Commission, promoted the inclusion of human rights in the early activities of 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and then formalised it in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
The TEU included human rights both as an objective of the newly-
established Common Foreign and Security Policy and as an objective of the 
European Community development policy. As far as the CFSP is concerned, 
Article J.1(2) states that development and consolidation of democracy and the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of 
                                                 
9 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’. 
10 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, p. 105. 
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the principal objectives of the EU’s external relations. Similarly, the TEU 
posited respect for human rights as a general principle of Community law. 
In order to translate these objectives into appropriate policies, the EU has 
developed several traditional and non-traditional instruments. The traditional 
ones include the use of declarations and démarches, the application of negative 
measures, such as commercial embargoes, and political aid. The non-traditional 
ones include the presence of human rights clauses in agreements with third 
countries, the establishment of human rights dialogues and specific budget lines 
for the promotion of human rights, most notably the European Initiative on 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).  
However these instruments are located within all three levels of governance 
in the EU’s external relations, i.e. the CFSP, the EC and the member states’ 
levels. The CFSP level, which can be grosso modo described as the 
intergovernmental level, has allegedly been attributed the role of guiding the 
external relations of the EU, and to some extent those of its member states, 
through the achievement of common positions and joint actions. At the same 
time the CFSP is also in charge of conducting critical human rights dialogue and 
deciding upon sanctions.  
Political dialogues comprise diplomatic contacts among officials and 
governments both at bilateral and regional level. Additionally the EU engages 
some countries in so-called ‘critical’ human rights dialogues. These apply to 
countries with which the EU has not stipulated agreements with human rights 
essential clauses and where particularly blatant violations of democratic 
principles and human rights occur. So far the EU has only entered into critical 
human rights dialogues with China and more discontinuously with Iran. 
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Sanctions fall into the EU’s punitive measures and they mainly include arms 
embargoes and restrictive economic measures. The procedures to suspend arms 
transfers and trade were formalised through the treaties’ provisions, in particular 
Article 301 of the EEC Treaty, and the 1998 Code of Conduct on arms sales.11 
Since then embargoes have been utilised several times by the EU and its 
member states to punish the behaviour of third countries.12 In most cases the 
arms embargoes were applied on security-based considerations to prevent wars 
or situations that could bring regional instability (Argentina, Iran-Iraq war, 
Libya for terrorism, Iraq for the invasion of Kuwait, Yugoslavian war, Sudan, 
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict). Only in fewer other cases were arms embargoes 
declared to punish grave violations of human rights (South Africa, China, 
Nigeria, Indonesia and Zimbabwe). 
The EC is entrusted with the implementation of CFSP positions through the 
instruments of economic sanctions and embargoes. Similarly, the EC can devise 
concrete policies for the promotion of human rights through inclusion of human 
rights clauses in agreements, trade provisions and development assistance. Since 
the mid-1990s, association and cooperation agreements contain political and 
human rights clauses, which allow the EC’s monitoring of and effective 
response to violations, thus translating principled positions in actual policies.13 
At the same time the EC disposes of trade instruments and development 
assistance to promote human rights.  
                                                 
11 Council of the European Union, European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 1998. 
12 Argentina (1982), Iran and Iraq (1984), South Africa (1985), Libya (1986), China (1989), Iraq 
(1990), Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina (1991), 
Azerbaijan and Armenia (1992), Zaire (DRC) and Nigeria (1993), Sudan (1994), Afghanistan 
(1996), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Indonesia (1999), Zimbabwe (2002). 
13  Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. Andrew 
Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
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According to the 2002 Commission, Communication on Trade and 
Development: assisting developing countries to benefit from trade, a trade 
policy must be integrated in such a way that it contributes to the fundamental 
objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development. It should foster 
equitable growth, promote human development, and ensure the proper 
management of natural resources and the protection of the environment.14 In 
order to make it effective for the promotion of human rights the EC uses trade 
concessions, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), special 
incentives as well as technical assistance. 
Development assistance is by far the EU’s preferred approach for the 
promotion of human rights. As argued by Carlos Santiso, the EU privileges a 
constructive engagement. 15  Indeed the EU has always made it clear that it 
prefers a positive approach to political conditionality and thus development 
assistance appears as the most significant instrument at its disposal. Art. 130u of 
the TEU clarifies that “Community policy […] shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to 
that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms”.16  
During the 1990s, new budget lines were created and old ones strengthened 
for human rights promotion both geographically and thematically, following 
proposals advanced by the EP and in line with art. 177 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
In particular the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was 
created in 1994 to gather previously scattered thematic budget lines and ever 
                                                 
14 European Commission, Trade and Development: assisting developing countries to benefit 
from trade, Commission Communication, COM (2002) 513 final, Brussels, 18 September 2002. 
15 Carlos Santiso, ‘Sisyphus in the Castle: Improving European Union Strategies for Democracy 
Promotion and Governance Conditionality’, The European Journal of Development Research, 
Vol. 15, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-28. 
16 European Union, Consolidated versions of the treaty on European Union and of the treaty 
establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, C 321 E/1, 2006. 
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since it has annually financed projects amounting on average to EUR 120 
million. 
However, the complexity of the policy-making procedures, the institutional 
fragmentation of aid programmes and the lack of transparency and 
accountability that are often underlined in analyses of the EC’s development 
assistance also affect the field of political aid.17 It is difficult to verify the 
precise amount disbursed through regional budget lines for human rights 
promotion, given their fragmentation. Yet, it is possible to point out that such 
budget lines have a top-down approach, which privileges institution building 
programmes, while the EIDHR is especially focused on the support of civil 
society in a bottom-up approach. Concentration on civil society is also 
confirmed by the EIDHR’s strategy for 2007-2013. However, it should be noted 
that the overall funds for political aid still represent only a limited part of 
European development assistance.  
In its policies, the EC subscribes to the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights, thus rhetorically upholding all of them. However this does not 
automatically translate into the promotion of all human rights, at least not with 
the same degree of commitment. The EC’s policies have often proven skewed 
towards support for political and civil rights. However the EC contends that it 
pursues socio-economic rights through development and sometimes trade 
policies rather than through political aid.  
The EC’s political aid is only a part of the overall European political aid due 
to the coexistence of significant member states’ activity in the field. The EC 
level has not received exclusive competence in development assistance and the 
                                                 
17 See on this topic Gordon Crawford, ‘European Union Development Cooperation and the 
Promotion of Democracy’, in Peter Burnell (ed.), Democracy Assistance. International 
Cooperation for Democratization, London, Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 90-127. 
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member states carry out their activities parallel to those of the EC. Already in 
1991 because of these reasons a Council Regulation prescribed that “the 
Community and its member states will explicitly introduce the consideration of 
human rights as an element of their relations with developing countries”.18 
Further the member states are involved in bilateral human rights promotion both 
through their own bilateral dialogues and through their activities in multilateral 
fora where they have maintained their seats and voting rights.  
According to a recent survey among the member states Germany is the 
biggest provider of political aid in absolute terms with EUR 200 million a year 
while Sweden is the largest donor in relative terms with 11% of its aid budget 
going to democracy and human rights. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the 
United Kingdom and France also increased their political aid, although France 
remains one of the least committed in this field in the EU. 19 However, there is 
still little coordination among the various development cooperation agencies 
and the EC, despite frequent pledges to increase coordination. 
2.2.3 Consistency and coordination 
The presence of the objective of human rights promotion within the CFSP, 
EC and member states’ levels has been considered problematic for several 
reasons. The first relates to the fact that each level of governance may prioritise 
policy issues in a different way due to the specific procedures involved. Second, 
the presence of several member states with very distinct historical experiences, 
policy preferences and interests complicate the adoption of just a single 
approach to human rights promotion. These aspects can give rise to inconsistent 
                                                 
18 Council of the European Union, ‘Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development’, 
November 1991. 
19  Richard Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies, 2000-2006, 
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2006. 
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and uncoordinated policies.20 Lack of consistency and coordination may in turn 
undermine the possibility to elaborate appropriate strategies for the promotion 
of human rights in a third country.21 
For these reasons throughout the 1990s the EU institutions and the member 
states have often reiterated the necessity of promoting the principles of 
consistency and coordination in the EU’s human rights policy while providing a 
more strategic approach to the promotion of human rights in the European 
Union’s relations with third countries. In 2001 the Commission’s 
Communication on the European Union’s role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries made these points explicit. According to the 
Communication the Commission was entrusted with  
promoting coherent and consistent policies in support of human 
rights and democratisation. This applies both to coherence between 
European Community policies, and between those policies and other 
EU action, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It 
also relates to the promotion of consistent and complementary 
action by the EU and Member States, in particular in the promotion 
and mainstreaming of human rights through development and other 
official assistance.22 
 
As the Communication clearly shows, there is ample awareness that the 
promotion of human rights should be consistently integrated into “all aspects of 
the EU policy decision-making and implementation”. Similarly, the 
Communication points to the necessity of developing coordinated and 
complementary development strategies. 
Secondly the Communication made explicit the need to formulate a more 
strategic approach to human rights promotion 
                                                 
20 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. 
21  Gordon Crawford, ‘European Union Development Cooperation and the Promotion of 
Democracy’.  
22  European Commission, The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries, Commission Communication COM (01) 252, 2001, p. 5.  
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by using the opportunities offered by political dialogue, trade and 
external assistance; [and] by adopting a more strategic approach to 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, matching 
programmes and projects in the field with EU commitments on 
human rights and democracy.23 
 
In particular this commitment reflected the awareness that the EU’s approach 
had previously been merely “ad hoc”, “reactive” to the applicant’s request and 
“limited to a menu approach”, as pointed out by several commentators.24 To this 
end the Communication pointed out that the “most effective way of achieving 
change” was “a positive and constructive partnership […] based on dialogue, 
support and encouragement” with governments that “are genuinely ready to co-
operate” while the use of “negative measures” was appropriate with government 
that did not display such a commitment.25 
These points have been further refined in two recent documents. The 2003 
European Security Strategy (ESS) argues that “the best protection for our 
security is a world of well-governed democratic states”.26 It then goes on to 
declare that “protecting human rights” is among the best means of strengthening 
the international order. For the ESS the joint efforts of the EU institutions and 
the member states could effectively contribute to achieving this goal. As the 
ESS maintains “greater coherence is needed not only among the EU’s 
instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member 
states”.27 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Gordon Crawford, op.cit.. Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘One Size Fits All! EU Policies 
for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, paper presented at the 
Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 4-5 October 2004. 
25  European Commission, The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and 
democratisation in third countries, p. 8. 
26 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security 
Strategy, 2003, p. 10. 
27 Ibid. p. 12. 
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Similarly, in the European Consensus on Development it is affirmed that 
“progress in the protection of human rights, good governance and 
democratisation is fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable 
development”. 28  Again, this objective requires the combination of the EU 
institutions and the member states’ efforts most of all through their development 
activities. For the improvement of its delivery methods the Council agrees that 
“in the spirit of the Treaty, the Community and the Member States will improve 
coordination and complementarity”.29 
From this section it emerges that while the EU and its member states have 
been able to build a common, and to some extent unique, EU identity and 
normative basis and to set up several instruments for the promotion of human 
rights in their external relations, they are still divided and far from socialised on 
the best ways to promote human rights. Consequently they have been unable to 
articulate an actual European human rights policy into a coherent and 
coordinated institutional architecture. This in turn often leads to the elaboration 
of policies which do not reflect a clear strategic approach and are thus often 
inappropriate to the third country. In order to take into account these major 
issues, the next section proposes a liberal intergovernmental approach to study 
human rights promotion in the system of multilevel governance in the EU’s 
external relations. 
2.3 The study of the EU’s external relations 
The previous introduction of the evolution and institutionalisation of human 
rights promotion in the EU’s external relations compels analysts to refrain from 
adopting narrow conceptualisations of external relations in the EU context. To 
                                                 
28 Council of the European Union, The European Consensus on Development, Joint Statement, 
C 46, 2006, p. 13. 
29 Ibid., p. 6. 
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this end this thesis makes use of the notion of multilevel governance in external 
relations. This analytical approach better allows taking into account the issues 
of consistency and coordination that have been described above as critical for 
the formulation and implementation of appropriate strategies for the promotion 
of human rights in the EU’s external relations.  
Similarly, in order to account for and explain the issues of consistency and 
coordination this section proposes a liberal intergovernmental approach, 
because the member states have been shown to still be divided on the best ways 
to promote human rights. Multilevel governance and liberal 
intergovernmentalism offer powerful insights into the issues of consistency and 
coordination in the EU’s promotion of human rights as it will be elaborated in 
the sections below. 
2.3.1 The EU’s system of multilevel governance 
The necessity to consider broad concepts of the EU’s external relations was 
already present in Christopher Hill’s early works. For Hill European external 
relations was “the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international 
relations”.30 This broad conception has been subsequently revived by the work 
of Brian White. White describes Europe as a “unique but also non unitary 
international actor […] constituted for foreign policy purposes by three different 
types of policy”.31  
Differing from other authors who consider the EU as a unitary international 
actor, or that merely focus on the CFSP and the member states’ levels, White’s 
approach appreciates the multiple realities of Europe for which “European 
foreign policy as a whole is conceived as an interacting foreign policy system” 
                                                 
30 Christopher Hill, ‘Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap?’ in John Peterson and Helene 
Sjursen (eds.), A Foreign Policy for Europe?, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 18. 
31 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 24. 
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where “three types of policy are regarded as the subsystems that constitute and 
possibly dominate it”.32 White points out that European governance in external 
relations appears to be carried out on three levels: the European Community, 
which is the most integrated and supranational level and is mainly concerned 
with economic foreign policy, namely trade and development assistance; the 
European Union, which can be roughly identified with the CFSP and has 
recently moved from intergovernmental to more supranational procedures; and 
the member states, which formulate their policies under the increasing influence 
of the EU.  
From this White derives that European international actorness as well as its 
external relations should be seen as the dynamic combination of the three types 
of policy, namely the CFSP, the EC and the member states’ levels, which 
interact within the European system of external relations. White’s 
conceptualisation also finds resonance and further definition in the more recent 
work of Paolo Foradori et al, which explicitly applies a multilevel governance 
approach to the study of European foreign policy. For these authors European 
foreign policy is  
a combination of integrated policies (those regarding the first pillar), 
policies only partially integrated, or to a lesser extent (the sector 
covered by CFSP/ESDP) and finally national foreign policies, which 
despite maintaining a strong state-centred connotation have tended 
to Europeanise themselves in the course of the evolution of the 
EPC/CFSP.33 
 
These authors, along with White, appreciate the importance of embracing broad 
conceptualisations of foreign policy in the European context and avoiding the 
reification of the EU through a single actor approach. In this way they take 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Paolo Foradori et al (eds.), Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: the EU in International 
Affairs, Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2007, pp. 7-8. 
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distance from the majority of works on the EU’s external relations, which either 
focus on the CFSP level or identify the EU as a single international actor. 
Today works merely focusing on the CFSP level have become less frequent 
owing to their obvious limits. First, the focus and interpretations of works 
concentrating on the CFSP have often reflected a limited concept of foreign 
policy, which is the one repeatedly presented by the member states in their 
attempts to distinguish ‘high politics’ from ‘low politics’ and maintain their 
power. Second, studies on CFSP have tended to privilege an understanding of 
foreign policy as limited to the fields of diplomacy, defence and security, 
leaving aside the analysis of the EU’s economic policy. Third, focusing the 
analysis solely on the CFSP level fails to take into account the important level 
of the external relations carried out by the EC. As argued by Ben Tonra and 
Thomas Christiansen “the link between foreign policy, on the one side, and the 
Union’s trade, enlargement, economic assistance and humanitarian aid policies, 
on the other, has been increasingly difficult to ignore”.34 Therefore there is a 
growing consensus that the CFSP and the EC levels must be considered together 
in an analysis of the EU’s external relations. 
This is the interpretation of most contemporary EU studies that concentrate 
on the EU’s international actorness. Contributions to the study of the EU’s 
international actorness range widely from those that are of a neutral character 
and those that intend to define what kind of international actor the EU has 
become. On the one hand broad conceptions of the EU’s external relations allow 
some authors to attest to the increasingly significant role of the EU in 
                                                 
34  Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 2. 
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international affairs both in geographical areas35 and in terms of the instruments 
utilised. 36  On the other hand other authors attempt to define what kind of 
international actor the EU has become. These works can be categorised on the 
basis of the explanatory variables that they choose to take into account for the 
EU’s international actorness. These are mainly: (i) its identity, (ii) its means and 
instruments, and (iii) its political constitution and foreign policy decision-
making system.37 
According to Foradori et al., though, these studies presuppose that  
the practices, rules, and institutions set up by the member states for 
managing European foreign policy have had an unexpected effect, 
which has brought about a redefinition of national identities and 
interests, favouring a process of common foreign policy building.38 
 
For Foradori et al. this assumption does not take in due account the analysis of 
the member states’ internal divergences in the definition of the EU’s external 
relations as well as in the conduct of their own external relations. As has been 
shown in moments of crises such as the Balkans and the Iraq wars, the member 
states are far from being totally socialised within the EU’s system of external 
relations. Similarly, the member states still maintain important prerogatives in 
external relations and their bilateral policies often diverge from those adopted 
by the EU.  
The criticism to CFSP-centred and EU-centred approaches applies even more 
stringently to the case of human rights promotion, which occurs on all three 
levels of governance within the system of the EU’s external relations, as has 
                                                 
35 For an example of a “geo-issue area approach” see Hazel Smith, European Union. What it is 
and what it does, London, Pluto, 2002. 
36 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. 
37  This distinction is proposed by Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, Introduction, in Ole 
Elgström and Michael Smith (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. 
Concepts and Analysis, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 5. 
38 Paolo Foradori et al., Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy, p. 7. 
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been shown in the previous section. Secondly, the appropriateness of a 
multilevel governance approach is further reinforced by recent works on the 
EU’s promotion of norms. These studies identify at least three main actors in 
the EU’s promotion of human rights: the Commission as a “policy 
entrepreneur”, the European Parliament as a “watchdog” and the Council as a 
“pragmatic body”, led by political considerations.39  
To the three actors identified by the recent literature, which broadly 
correspond to the CFSP and the EC levels, the previous section has shown the 
necessity to add the member states as they still guard several prerogatives in 
human rights policy, namely through bilateral dialogues and political aid, and 
they maintain important control powers on the activities of the CFSP and the EC 
levels. Finally, embracing such a broad notion of governance also allows better 
considering the principles of consistency and coordination, which, as has been 
shown above, are two key concepts for human rights promotion in the EU 
context.  
Therefore in order to avoid the main shortcomings of the literature on the 
EU’s external relations and find an appropriate analytical approach to the study 
of human rights in the EU’s external relations, this thesis embraces the concept 
of Europe as a system of multilevel governance in external relations. However 
in order to reflect on how consistency and coordination can be achieved in the 
promotion of human rights within the system of multilevel governance in the 
EU’s external relations it is necessary to identify the independent variable 
through which to analyse the policy output within the three levels of 
governance.  
                                                 
39  Stefania Panebianco, ‘The constraints on EU action as a ‘norm exporter’ in the 
Mediterranean’, in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in 
International Politics. Concepts and Analysis, pp. 143-144.  
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2.3.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism in the EU’s external relations 
An approach that considers the system of multilevel governance in the EU’s 
external relations assumes that each level of governance is characterised by 
specific actors, identities, interests, decision-making rules and policy 
preferences. The combination of these factors generally determines the policy 
output at each level. However, in order to simplify the complexity of this system 
and identify a single independent variable which can be considered for a 
scientific approach, this thesis proposes to concentrate on the member states as 
the unit basis in a liberal intergovernmental perspective. 
The importance of liberal intergovernmentalism in the study of the EU’s 
external relations derives from studies on European integration. Moving away 
from realists’ and neorealists’ insistence on systemic approaches, liberal 
intergovernmentalists, while maintaining the primacy of the member states in 
the integration process, have articulated their explanations by opening the 
member states’ ‘black boxes’. Starting from positivist assumptions on the 
rationality of states, intergovernmentalists describe the European integration 
process as a bargain made between state governments.  
This approach rests on the assumption that state behaviours reflects the 
rational actions of governments constrained at home by societal pressure and 
abroad by their strategic environment. In the importance given to domestic or 
societal pressures on state governments, intergovernmentalists of liberal and 
neoliberal inspiration distance themselves from realist and neorealist accounts. 
They do not consider states as having fixed preferences for wealth, security or 
power, but assume that states formulate their goals and objectives in response to 
shifting pressures from domestic, economic and social groups.  
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If this theoretical assumption concerns the formation of interests and policy 
preferences, the second theoretical assumption that is shared by 
intergovernmentalists is that within an international regime to which the EU can 
be broadly likened, state governments engage in a bargaining process, which 
can be described through the existence of the relative bargaining power of 
governments and the creation of coalitions, issue-linkages and side-payments. 
Therefore what describes this process is a two-level game where national 
governments serve as the crucial link between the domestic and the international 
levels. As clearly explained by Andrew Moravsick, “the primary source of 
integration lies in the interests of the states’ themselves and the relative power 
each brings to Brussels”.40  
In the study of the EU’s external relations, liberal intergovernmentalism is 
largely used to explain the CFSP level. In this perspective the CFSP 
deliberations are predicted to follow the lowest common denominator, given the 
unanimity required. When this does not appear to be the case then the influence 
of the biggest major players in the EU context, such as France, Germany and the 
UK, or the possibility of issue-linkages and side-payments are considered as 
possible variants. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is also applied to analyse the field of the 
European Community policy, which falls into the domain of the Commission. 
Although this level is often referred to as the supranational one, in reality the 
Commission is under the strict supervision of the member states through their 
representatives at the Council and through the possibility of sharing 
competences in certain policy fields not yet supranationalised, such as 
                                                 
40 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, in Robert Kehoane and Stanley 
Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change, 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1991, p. 75. 
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development assistance. What emerges from member state-centred accounts is 
that the Commission’s activities reflect the interests and policy preferences of 
the most influential member states, although the Commission may at times 
strategically use divisions among them to acquire further competences and 
promote its own bureaucratic interests. 
Finally, liberal intergovernmentalism applies to the study of the member 
states’ bilateral activities. Within the system of multilevel governance in the 
EU’s external relations, member states maintain ample room to manoeuvre in 
devising their own external relations as well as in defining their positions within 
the EU institutions. According to liberal intergovernmental perspectives the 
bilateral activities of the member states still respond to long ingrained national, 
rather than European, beliefs, identities and interests. This is testified by the 
little coordination that appears to exist among the member states in the 
formulation and implementation of their external relations.41 
A liberal intergovernmental approach differs from sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches, which highlight the affirmation of 
norms of political cooperation in the EU and have inspired the recent works on 
the EU’s value-driven foreign policy. For these authors, shared European 
identity and norms would reorient the member states towards a logic of 
appropriate behaviour, as opposed to a bargaining style of decision making, in 
the EU’s external relations. In particular, sociological institutionalist approaches 
insist on the socialising effects of institutions in the member states’ elaboration 
of the EU’s external relations, while constructivist approaches tend to explain 
the EU’s behaviour on the basis of its identity and normative basis. 
                                                 
41 See the early works of Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London, 
Routledge, 1996 and the more recent work by Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (eds.), The 
Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
2000.  
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However rather than openly contrasting liberal intergovernmentalism, 
sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches generally accept the 
liberal intergovernmental assumptions on the agency of the member states. 
Sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches do not replace liberal 
intergovernmental approaches but rather add to them the influence that 
institutions and ideas play, as it emerges in the analysis of some specific case 
studies.  
For example, Frank Schimmelfennig’s famous concept of ‘rhetorical 
entrapment’ rests on the assumption that the member states do not share the 
same identities, interests and policy preferences. A rhetorical entrapment only 
occurs when some EU institutions and member states make strategic use of the 
EU’s identity through rhetorical action.42 Similarly, an EU interest does not 
exist tout court, but it is rather the combination of discreet negotiations among 
the member states within the EU institutions. For sociological institutionalists 
and constructivists, the EU’s identity and norms only create an enabling 
environment where the use of rhetorical action by the EU institutions and the 
member states can lead to the adoption of policies in line with such a common 
identity and interest. 
If the agency of the member states is important to explain the policy output at 
CFSP and EC levels, this is also true at the bilateral levels. Sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches have proposed paying more 
attention to processes of Europeanization, which show how national foreign 
                                                 
42 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organizations, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2001, 
p. 59. 
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policies are impacted by the EU’s institutions.43 These may merely refer to 
changes in domestic structures and institutions, as in the case of ministries of 
foreign affairs being reshaped in their bureaucratic structures. But they can also 
touch upon an adaptation, Brusselisation or externalisation of certain foreign 
policy prerogatives to the EU level.  
However these processes largely depend on the issues that are at stake, as is 
often also claimed by sociological institutionalists and constructivists. Historical 
traditions, special relations, specific identities, international role conceptions 
and national economic interests often determine the EU and the member states’ 
positions on specific issues. Similarly, the member states’ adaptation can also 
conceal a strategic calculation. The member states can use the EU level to 
delegate foreign policy responsibilities and to shield themselves from third 
countries’ criticism. Finally the member states can use the EU level to increase 
the impact of their policy preferences and thus reaching politics of scale.  
Therefore, while sociological institutionalism and constructivism can offer 
significant insights for the study of some specific cases and issues, liberal 
intergovernmentalism maintains its broad explanatory power in the study of the 
EU’s external relations. Besides, liberal intergovernmentalism allows for 
considerations of how the EU institutions may contribute to the socialisation of 
negative norms as well as positive norms, depending on the orientations of the 
most influential member states in the elaboration of the policies. This is one of 
the major shortcomings of sociological institutionalist and constructivist 
approaches, which often tend to overlook the cases of negative socialisation, 
                                                 
43 For a discussion of Europeanisation theories see Reuben Wong, ‘The Europeanization of 
Foreign Policy’, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 134-153.  
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where the EU’s normative policies respond more to the strategic and economic 
interests of some member states rather than to the EU’s identity and norms. 
As shown in the previous Chapter, recent studies on the EU’s promotion of 
norms demonstrate that the alleged normative EU policies conceal strategic and 
economic interests. While these policies are difficult to explain by sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches, an intergovernmental approach 
can make sense of them by considering the interaction of the EU institutions and 
the member states’ interests. In a liberal intergovernmental perspective the 
materially-informed approaches of the most influential member states may find 
the support of the EU’s institutions to affirm European normative policies which 
conceal strategic and economic concerns. 
For this reason this thesis employs a liberal intergovernmental approach for 
the analysis of the policy output of the system of multilevel governance in the 
EU’s external relations. A liberal intergovernmental approach allows taking into 
account the complexity of the EU’s external relations system where several, 
often contrasting, identities and interests coexist and interact within a system of 
multilevel governance in the EU’s external relations. The next section discusses 
the application of the theoretical analytical tools developed in this section with 
reference to the concepts of consistency and coordination in the promotion of 
human rights within the system of multilevel governance in the EU’s external 
relations. 
2.4 Key Concepts, Research Strategy and Methodology 
2.4.1 Consistency and coordination 
In Simon Nuttal’s classical study of consistency in the EU’s international 
policy-making three main definitions of consistency can be identified. The first 
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concerns “horizontal consistency” and it implies that “the policies pursued by 
the different part of the EU machine, in pursuit of different objectives, should be 
coherent with each other”.44 The second concerns “institutional consistency” 
and it implies that in the pursuit of a given objective the EU institutions should 
be able to articulate a common, or at least complementary, approach. Finally the 
third definition concerns “vertical consistency”, that is the ability of the EU and 
its member states to coordinate their policies in the pursuit of a given objective.  
For heuristic purposes, in this thesis the term consistency will merge the first 
and the second definitions elaborated by Nuttal, while vertical consistency will 
be referred to as coordination. In the specific case of the analysis of the EU’s 
promotion of human rights, consistency thus refers to how the EU institutions, 
namely the Council and the Commission, and only marginally the European 
Parliament, have devised and implemented economic and development policies 
consistent with the objective to promote human rights.  
Similarly, coordination refers to the ability of the EU institutions and the 
member states to elaborate and implement coherent, or at least complementary, 
policies for the promotion of human rights. This refers to the well-rehearsed 
principle of combining the EU’s actions with those of the member states so that 
they reciprocally support each other to reach a given goal, in this case the 
promotion of human rights.  
An approach that combines the analysis of the system of multilevel 
governance in the EU’s external relations with a liberal intergovernmental 
approach is suitable to analyse the issues of consistency and coordination in the 
promotion of human rights. First, the member states’ existing differences in 
their attitudes towards the promotion of human rights create several problems in 
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International Relations and the European Union, p. 92.  
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devising consistent EU policies. The common positions at CFSP level, which 
follow the intergovernmental practice, may be at odds with the policies devised 
within the EC level, which follows a more integrated process. Similarly, even at 
the more integrated EC level, the different interests of the member states 
towards a third country, and thus their varying influence on specific issues, may 
give rise to EC policies that are inconsistent with one another.  
Second, the member states’ divergences on human rights promotion may 
become even more evident in the formulation of their national policies vis-à-vis 
those of the EU, thus undermining the achievement of coordination. At a 
bilateral level the member states may prioritise different policies on the basis of 
their specific interests. Similarly, they may use the EU level in an instrumental 
way to delegate responsibilities in order to avoid their national constituencies’ 
pressures and invoke European compromises as justifications for their conduct. 
In order to maintain this study within manageable proportions, the issues of 
consistency and coordination which will be investigated have to be further 
delimited. Therefore rather than studying the consistency of the EU’s policies 
that emerge from the CFSP and EC levels, this thesis will only concentrate on 
the latter. Three main reasons explain this choice. They are inspired by the EU’s 
strategy of constructive engagement of China based on economic engagement, 
dialogue, and development assistance, which will be illustrated in Chapter 3.  
First economic engagement and development assistance, allegedly the most 
important tools set in place by the EU to promote human rights in China, belong 
in the EC’s competence and thus it is easier to test consistency within just one 
level of governance. Second, within the strategy of constructive engagement, 
the CFSP level is mostly involved in political dialogue, which is infamously 
known for being secretive and lacking transparency. This hampers a thorough 
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investigation into the issues discussed and the participants’ opinions on them. 
Third, the strategy of constructive engagement abandoned sanctions, such as the 
resolutions at the UNCHR, which are mainly decided at CFSP level. 
Further, drawing on the above discussion, coordination will only be referred 
to the EC and the member states’ development policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China. The EC and its member states can coordinate their 
policies through the joint formulation of declaratory or concrete policies. 
Alternatively the EC and its member states can coordinate their policies through 
the joint implementation of activities. Finally coordination can also be achieved 
when the EC takes the lead and devises policies which complement those of the 
member states. Coordination at the EC and the member states’ levels is an 
important indicator of the actual commitment of the EU and its member states to 
their policies for the promotion of human rights. Conversely, uncoordinated 
policies may be an important signal of a division or delegation of labour 
between the EU institutions and member states, which can also lead to 
contrasting stances. 
This section has shown the suitability of a liberal intergovernmental 
approach to the study of consistency and coordination in the promotion of 
human rights within the EU’s system of multilevel governance in external 
relations. At the same time this section has further delimited the scope of this 
research by identifying the appropriate level of analysis to conduct a rigorous 
research worthy of generalisation. This refers to the EC’s economic and 
development assistance policies and their relation with the member states’ 
policies, in particular in development assistance. The next section will then 
explicit the research strategy and the methodology which will be employed. 
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2.4.2 Research Strategy 
This thesis employs a deductive research strategy as it tests the assumptions 
of liberal intergovernmentalism that the EU and its member states’ promotion of 
human rights largely depends on the latter’s interests and policy preferences, in 
particular on those member states that have the most bargaining power and the 
highest stakes in a specific foreign policy issue.  
Combining the insights of Chapter 1 on EU-China relations with the 
theoretical and analytical framework developed in this Chapter, the specific 
hypothesis of this thesis is that the EU’s constructive engagement of China on 
human rights reflected the prevalence of strategic and economic interests over 
idealistic ones in the attitudes of Germany, France and the UK towards China. 
This hypothesis is addressed by answering two main research questions:  
1. Did the EC elaborate and implement consistent economic and 
development policies to promote human rights in China? 
2. Did the EC and the three selected member states elaborate and implement 
coordinated development policies for the promotion of human rights in 
China? 
The choice of the three country cases serves theoretical and analytical 
purposes. First, the three member states have been from the outset the most 
influential countries in the EU and those with the most significant strategic and 
economic interests towards China. A liberal intergovernmental approach 
expects that these countries’ interests and policy preferences strongly influenced 
the formulation of the EC’s policies as well as their own national policies for 
the promotion of human rights in China. Alternatively, sociological 
institutionalism and constructivism would expect that the policies of the three 
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member states converged with those of the EC through the influence of 
institutions or through socialisation around shared identity and norms.  
Therefore the analysis of these three member states allows for a 
consideration of whether the EU’s policies for the promotion of human rights in 
China were mostly influenced by the three member states’ interests and policy 
preferences, or by the socialising effects of the EU institutions, identity and 
norms. As the three selected member states had stable and long-lasting 
government leaders and coalitions in the decade under scrutiny (from 1995 to 
2006)45 this allows for a testing of the influence of the EU institutions on them 
free from the additional variable of changes to the ruling governments.  
Secondly, Germany, France and the UK were the member states which had 
the largest development assistance in China. Development assistance is one of 
the main tools employed by the EU and its member states to promote human 
rights in developing countries. At the same time the approaches of Germany, 
France and the UK to China’s human rights were broadly representative of the 
EU’s member states, as will be shown in Chapter 3. 
Germany maintained a mildly-critical approach and it privileged practical 
actions, such as projects on the rule of law and dialogue. France’s approach to 
China showed only a faint echo of human rights concerns and it broadly 
delegated their promotion to the EU level, a feature shared with several 
Mediterranean EU member states. Finally, the UK’s approach was more critical 
of China’s human rights record and it employed specific instruments for the 
support of human rights, a position that is largely shared by the EU’s Nordic 
member states. Therefore the analysis of the EC and of the selected member 
                                                 
45 Chancellor Schröder in Germany with his Social Democratic/Green coalition (1998-2002 and 
2002-2005); President Chirac in France with his Neo-Gaullist Party (1995-2002 and 2002-2007); 
and Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom with the Labour Party (1997-2001, 2001-
2005 and 2005-2007). 
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states’ development policies can contribute to assess whether their overall 
efforts to promote human rights in China were coordinated and consequently 
whether the EU achieved a significant promotion of human rights through 
development assistance in China.  
By choosing to focus on the three selected member states’ interests and 
policy preferences in the elaboration and implementation of the overall EU’s 
constructive engagement of China, this thesis would appear to predetermine its 
findings, i.e. the interests and policy preferences of the three selected member 
states drove the EU’s approach to promoting human rights in China and 
determined inconsistent and uncoordinated policies. However this is the very 
point that needs to be addressed through the analysis of the issues of consistency 
and coordination. To this end this thesis will compare and contrast the 
expectations of the liberal intergovernmental approach with those of 
sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches. 
Specifically, to answer research question 1, this thesis investigates whether 
the EC’s economic and development policies towards China have been 
consistent with one another and ultimately with the objective of putting human 
rights at the cornerstone of relations. This would be expected by sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches. Showing the inconsistency of the 
EC’s approach will require searching for an alternative explanation. This can 
reside in the material interests of the member states, in particular those of the 
three selected ones. This point can be illustrated by showing that the EC’s 
policies reflected the interests and policy preferences of the three member 
states. 
Secondly, to answer research question 2, this thesis investigates the specific 
policies that the EC and its member states devised and applied for the promotion 
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of human rights, thus showing the institutional efforts to achieve coordination. 
Sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches would expect an 
increased coordination of the EC and the member states’ policies through the 
modification of the latter’s, i.e. through a top-down process of influence or 
Europeanisation of the member states’ policies. Alternatively, a lack of 
coordination can support the expectations of liberal intergovernmentalism for 
which the member states carry out policies differing or even contrasting with 
those of the EC in order to pursue their national interests.  
In order to analyse the issues of consistency and coordination this thesis 
mostly considers the economic and development policies carried out by the EC 
and the three selected member states in the period between 1995 and 2006. The 
year 1995 represents the inception of the constructive engagement of China 
while 2006 represents the turn towards a strategic partnership, which preludes to 
a formal upgrade of China and thus to an abandonment of any attempts to 
modify its political trajectory. Given the time-frame of the research this thesis 
mostly focuses on the pre-enlargement EU-15. 
In the analysis of the human rights policies employed by the EC and its three 
member states it would be extremely reductive to only focus on some human 
rights. The EU and its member states accept the universality and indivisibility of 
all human rights, as it has been shown above. However, contemporary analyses 
show that today the EU prioritises the promotion of civil and political human 
rights over the promotion of economic and social rights. The latter, though, are 
usually promoted through the use of development assistance.  
The analysis of the promotion of human rights requires taking into 
consideration the promotion of political and civil rights as well as the promotion 
of social and economic rights, which occur through several means. This is even 
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more important given the human rights situation in China as established in 
Chapter 1 and the argument that an appropriate approach to human rights 
promotion in China requires a balance between the promotion of political and 
civil rights and the promotion of social and economic rights. 
Thus this thesis limits the analysis to the policies devised, i.e. economic 
engagement and development projects, rather than to the types of human rights 
promoted. Economic engagement and development projects fall within the 
positive approach, which the EU privileges for fostering the principles of rule of 
law and human rights worldwide. In analysing the economic engagement and 
development projects this thesis investigates which types of human rights were 
generally targeted at the EC and member states levels. Similarly, it considers the 
human rights which were more often promoted or pointed out in the EU and 
member states’ interactions with China.  
With regards to economic engagement this thesis considers two specific case 
studies, i.e. the GSP and the negotiations for China’s accession to the WTO. 
These two case studies are particularly meaningful in assessing how the EC 
included human rights concerns in its economic engagement of China and the 
influence of the three member states. First of all, as shown above, the GSP 
offers the possibility to the EC to impose sanctions and to propose incentives to 
further social and economic rights. Secondly, WTO negotiations offered the EC 
the possibility to link China’s accession to the WTO to the improvement of the 
rule of law and good governance in some specific sectors, while also providing 
technical assistance to support such reforms. Thirdly, while the EC has broad 
competences on the GSP and in the WTO negotiations, it also strongly depends 
on the member states for the approval of its policies. Therefore, these two case 
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studies also offer the possibility to analyse the influence of the three selected 
member states on the EC’s economic policies. 
With regards to development assistance and in particular political aid a 
caveat is necessary at this point: differing from many developing countries, 
China has never been dependent on development assistance both because of its 
sheer size and economic might and because of the level of direct foreign 
investments that from the very beginning of the ‘open-door policy’ it was able 
to attract. Even at the early stages of reform, the ratio of development assistance 
to China was never higher than 1% of its GDP. Thus, influencing China through 
such marginal assistance seems a daunting task, and even more an academic 
futility to focus on it. 
Yet, in the rhetoric of the Commission, the EC’s programmes and projects in 
support of democracy, human rights and good governance were portrayed as 
one of the two pillars, together with economic engagement, of the overall EU’s 
efforts in influencing the trajectory of China’s political development and 
transformation. As throughout the years the EC’s development assistance in this 
sector was the most conspicuous in China, and two of the programmes 
implemented were by far the biggest of their kind in the country, a closer 
analysis seems wholly justifiable, in order to test the EU’s consistency in the 
promotion of human rights.  
At the same time, the EC’s competence in development assistance is also 
under the strong scrutiny of the member states, who have the power to approve 
its programmes and projects. Therefore, the analysis of the EC’s development 
policies also allows considering the influence of the three selected member 
states. Similarly, looking at the development policies of the three member 
states, which were the most conspicuous in China, it is possible to analyse the 
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overall coordination of the EC and member states’ programmes and projects for 
the promotion of human rights in China and assess whether they achieved any 
significant mass. 
In summation, the analysis of consistency and coordination allows discerning 
the actual nature of the EU and its member states’ constructive engagement of 
China, their ability to balance normative and material priorities in their human 
rights policies towards China, and the latter’s appropriateness to the country’s 
situation. In so doing this thesis primarily shows the conditions under which 
normative and material priorities can coexist in the EU’s external relations and 
it secondarily suggests that the EU’s framework may contribute to the 
socialisation of negative norms as well as positive ones, depending on the 
interests and policy preferences of the most influential member states. 
2.4.3 Research Methodology 
In order to analyse the EC and its member states’ policies in support of 
human rights in China, this thesis draws on the analysis of primary documentary 
sources, such as project documents and internal reports. Yet the paucity of these 
sources would not allow achieving the research objectives. Therefore this study 
also makes extensive use of secondary documentary sources such as 
Commission Communications, Council Resolutions and Parliament Reports. 
Finally, this work makes ample use of tertiary documentary sources.  
The research has cross-checked the main documentary sources in order to 
identify the most authoritative authors in EU-China relations. Similarly, in the 
case of sources on human rights in China, this thesis relies on the most-quoted 
authors and human rights specialists in the academia. At the same time it 
complements these sources with international advocacy groups’ reports on 
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human rights. Among them three main organisations can be identified: Amnesty 
International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Human Rights in China 
(HRIC). 
Finally, in order to show the validity of the interpretations, which emerge by 
a combined use of primary, secondary and tertiary documentary sources, this 
research includes élite interviews mostly with European officials and policy 
practitioners. The research draws on interviews with the EU Commission 
officials, member states’ representatives and NGO representatives in China. 
This thesis has only included a few Chinese interviewees, mostly from the 
academia, for two reasons. First Chinese officials are often hesitant to answer 
questions on the issue of human rights. Second, this thesis does not intend to 
assess the impact of policies but it rather investigates them and their rationale. 
Interviews with Chinese academics on EU-China relations and human rights, 
though, have been used to better understand the appropriateness of the EU’s 
policies against the backdrop of the Chinese government’s attitudes to human 
rights and the Chinese citizens’ claims. 
 
Chapter 3 – The long march towards constructive 
engagement 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter has provided the theoretical and analytical building 
blocks and formulated the research strategy which Chapters 4 and 5 will use for 
an empirical analysis of the consistency and coordination in the EC and its 
member states’ promotion of human rights in China through economic 
engagement and development assistance. However before moving on to the 
empirical analysis it is necessary to show in more depth the suitability of the 
theoretical approach and analytical focus embraced for broader EU-China 
relations. 
This Chapter serves this purpose as it first shows the relevance of the 
member states and their economic, and to a lesser extent strategic interests, in 
the elaboration of the EU’s strategy of constructive engagement. In particular it 
shows the prominence of the material interests of Germany, France and the UK 
and how they influenced the abandonment of sanctioning policies at CFSP 
level. Later, it explains the reasons behind the selection of the policies of 
economic engagement and development assistance for the study of the EU and 
its member states’ promotion of human rights in China.  
This Chapter first provides an introduction to the evolution of relations 
between the EU, its member states and China up to the embracement of the 
strategy of constructive engagement in 1995. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 put into focus 
two essential arguments drawn from the main literature. First, the prominence of 
the economic, and to a lesser extent of the strategic and security dimensions 
over the normative one in the approaches of the member states, and in particular 
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of Germany, France and the UK. Second, the deep divisions of the member 
states on how to handle the issue of human rights in their relations with China. 
These two themes underpin the focus on the member states, and in particular on 
the three selected ones, in the analysis of EU-China relations in line with the 
liberal intergovernmental approach elaborated in Chapter 2. 
These two themes are in turn considered in section 3.4, which focuses on the 
three avenues of the constructive engagement on human rights that are often 
considered by the main EU-China literature on human rights, i.e. the member 
states’ positions at the UNCHR, the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and the 
Arms Embargo. Section 3.4 shows how Germany, France and the UK’s 
approaches to human rights in China were representative of those of the other 
EU member states. Then, contrary to most of the literature on the topic, section 
3.4 does not intend to use these cases as evidence of the failure of the EU and its 
member states to constructively engage China. In fact these cases show that the 
EU and its member states have adopted policies in line with the strategy of 
constructive engagement, i.e. they have largely abandoned sanctioning policies 
and adopted positive policies, such as economic engagement, dialogue and 
development assistance to promote human rights in China.  
This latter point supports the validity of the analytical focus on the specific 
cases of economic engagement and development assistance at the EC and 
member states levels. At the same time the abandonment of sanctioning policies 
supports the theoretical validity of the liberal intergovernmental approach, 
because it is shown that the positive approach was mostly influenced by 
Germany, France and the UK. Such a policy output at CFSP level suggests, 
without proving it, a negative socialisation of those member states more prone 
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to sanctioning China in two case studies out of the three considered in this 
Chapter. 
3.2 From opening to Tiananmen 
The EU, at that time the European Economic Community (EEC), and China 
established formal relations in 1975, following the beginning of Washington’s 
trilateral strategy in Asia. The formalisation of diplomatic relations at EEC 
level followed, and sometimes anticipated, the formalisation of China’s 
relations with the individual member states. However, in those years, most 
academics referred to the EEC and its member states’ relations with China as 
“derivative” and “secondary” to those with the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War context.1 Before the establishment of the European 
Union, China’s recovery from the Tiananmen Massacre and Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms in 1992, the EEC, its member states and China remained “distant 
neighbours” as poignantly stated by Harish Kapur.2 
The only field that somewhat escaped the influence of the Cold War 
scheming was the economic one. Most accounts identified the growing 
economic interaction as the most meaningful feature of EEC-China relations 
before the 1990s. In addition, due to the underdeveloped nature of the EEC, 
most accounts show a strong balance between the EEC and the member states 
levels, as the evolution of the EEC’s relations with China was considered 
complementary to the evolution of some member states’ relations with the PRC. 
Within this context the issue of human rights remained marginal and even the 
                                                 
1 David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995 and Michael Yahuda, ‘China and Europe: 
the Significance of a Secondary Relationship’, in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh 
(eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, London, Clarendon Paperback, 1994, pp. 
266-282. 
2 Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe.  
 84 
Tiananmen Massacre only minimally stirred the waters of Europe-China 
relations both at the EEC and at the member states level. 
3.2.1 The Cold War: expanding economic ties 
The PRC was the first Communist country to recognise the EEC. After the 
ravages of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese politicians resumed their efforts to 
find an independent space for China through envisioning a multipolar world. 
Blinded by a dose of wishful thinking, which was compounded by a limited 
knowledge of the EEC and its member states, they saw in the construction of a 
stronger EEC a potential ally and a new pole for the creation of a multipolar 
world.3  
Secondly, the fact that China and the EEC countries were bordering with the 
Soviet Union made China’s officials believe in the possibility of coordinating 
their actions in containing Soviet expansionism. Thirdly, the Chinese leaders 
were quick to underline that, unlike China’s other major partners, the United 
States, the Soviet Union and Japan, neither fundamental conflicts of interests 
nor obstacles existed for the full development of the relational potential between 
China and the EEC. In China these elements were positively interpreted as 
opening possibilities for cooperation and coordination in bringing about stability 
and creating world peace.4 
Yet, during the 1970s and 1980s most observers argued that the EEC and its 
member states’ policies towards China were strategically bound to those of the 
United States. For example the Chinese attempts at undermining the East-West 
détente encountered deaf ears in the member states, willing to push forward 
with it. Similarly, in accounts of the member states’ bilateral relations it clearly 
                                                 
3 Interview 31.  
4 Interview 32. 
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appears that none of them used the ‘China card’ at any specific moment 
throughout the 1980s. Thus, the possibilities offered by the Cold War politics 
conflicted with the actual constraints that it created towards the fully-fledged 
development of the EEC and its member states’ relations with China.  
EEC-China relations could only progress in the less-politicised economic 
domain.5 China and the EEC shared a common interest in the development of 
their economic relations in the early 1980s. On the one hand, Deng Xiaoping’s 
‘open door’ strategy was highly dependent on the acquisition of advanced 
foreign technology. On the other, European businessmen were lured by the 
attractiveness of the Chinese market and its potential, in particular during the 
years of stagnation which characterized the European economy then.  
In 1985 the EEC and China signed the Economic and Cooperation 
Agreement, which still represents the main legal framework for EU-China 
relations. More specifically, the Agreement’s objective was “not only to 
promote and intensify trade but also to encourage the steady expansion of 
economic cooperation”.6 Moreover, the Agreement created a Joint Committee, 
which became “a forum where practically everything non-political that concerns 
the two parties was discussed”.7 
Behind a renewed EEC activism towards China lay the member states’ 
growing economic interests in the country. By 1979 all the EEC member states, 
with the only exception being Ireland, had signed economic cooperation 
agreements with China. Similarly some member states’ trade and investments 
with China had begun to rise as the Cold War confrontation softened following 
                                                 
5 On the relations between the EEC and the People’s Republic of China before 1989 see Harish 
Kapur, China and the EEC: the new connection, Geneva, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986. 
6 Der-Ching Horng, ‘The EU’s New China Policy: The Dimension of Trade Relations’, Issues & 
Studies, Vol. 34, No.7, 1998, pp. 94-95. 
7 Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe, p. 172. 
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the processes of perestroika and glasnost promoted by Gorbachev in the Soviet 
Union. Germany was by far the most active member state, enjoying its first 
‘China boom’, followed by the UK who eased relations with the PRC through 
the signing of the 1984 Joint Statement on the handover of Hong Kong to the 
Mainland, and Italy that increased its investments in the country.  
The economic relations were slower to take off in the field of European 
direct investments in China. With the exception of the United Kingdom, the 
other member states continued to lag far behind the main investors in the 
country. For this reason since 1985 some member states, especially Germany 
and France, have gone to great lengths in supporting their companies’ 
penetration into the Chinese market, through both credit guarantees and the 
provision of concessional loans to China, tied to the acquisition of goods and 
services of European origin. Throughout the 1980s the total EEC member 
states’ contribution in concessional loans to the country stood at more than 20% 
of all European loans to China.  
Following the formalisation of diplomatic relations, the EEC and its member 
states’ relations with China progressed in the economic field throughout the 
1980s but remained very limited at political level. The development of the 
EEC’s China activities reflected and complemented the activities of its member 
states. For Harish Kapur the rising economic interaction between the EEC, its 
member states and China depended on a combination of the Economic and 
Cooperation Agreement and the member states’ bilateral dynamism in China.  
In 1995, David Shambaugh argued that “it must be remembered that the 
EU’s China initiative is in no way a replacement for bilateral relationships and 
policies of the member states, but rather should be seen as a supplement and 
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framework for individual national policies”.8 Thus up to the early 1990s the 
Europe-China literature shows two main themes in the development of the 
relations between the EEC, its member states and China: the progress of the 
economic dimension and the mutual reinforcement of the EEC and member 
states’ activities for the development of economic relations with China. Where 
were human rights then? 
3.2.2 Human rights up to 1989 
Up to 1989 commentators only provide brief digressions on the issues of 
human rights and when they do they often underline the pragmatism and lack of 
missionary zeal of the EEC and its member states compared to the US approach. 
The EEC and its member states never raised Chinese domestic and political 
issues in those years. Little attention seems also to have been paid by European 
officials to China’s internal political situation tout court.  
As it is noted by Baker, between 1985 and 1989 only four documents relating 
to China and human rights can be found among policy statements on European 
foreign policy, and these are all questions in the European Parliament on issues 
as varied as Taiwan, Tibet, mass execution and the situation of Chinese Catholic 
priests. 9  Although a few International Non-Governmental Organisations 
monitored the human rights and democratic situation in China, little heed was 
paid to their reports. 
This reflected the EEC’s lack of any competence in such areas of external 
relations and the divisions of its member states. The EEC’s policy in support of 
human rights and the rule of law acquired a mature shape only in the early 
1990s with their inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, and even more importantly 
                                                 
8 David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995, p. 4. 
9 Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’. 
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in the EC’s development assistance. Similarly, divergences among the member 
states on the best way to deal with China, due to their historical legacies and 
ongoing concerns, must not be underestimated. For example during the 1980s 
the United Kingdom had an outstanding issue with China: the return of Hong 
Kong.  
Besides the institutional shortcomings and the internal divisions between the 
EEC and its member states, another factor cannot be overlooked. Deng’s 
economic reforms were viewed positively in the West and overshadowed 
problems in the field. 10  Interestingly, against the backdrop of future 
developments, the European Parliament was one of the institutions most 
supportive of China’s rise and reform. As has been shown, the Cold War 
constraints led the EEC to see Beijing as leverage over Moscow, therefore 
overlooking any conflictive issue.11 
Things apparently changed in 1989. The Tiananmen massacre woke the 
international community, the EEC and its member states from their quiet 
slumber. Within days, the European Council issued a joint declaration which 
condemned the bloodshed and was immediately followed by the adoption of 
diplomatic and economic measures.12 Most significant were: (i) raising the issue 
of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora; (ii) interruption 
by member states of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with 
China; (iii) suspension of bilateral ministerial and high level contacts; (iv) 
postponement by the EEC and its member states of new cooperation projects. 
                                                 
10 Interview 33. 
11 Ming Wan, Human Rights in Chinese foreign relations: defining and defending national 
interest, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002, p. 67. 
12 The Tiananmen events took place during the French Presidency of the European Community. 
On 6 June the Twelve meeting in Madrid issued a joint statement condemning the violent 
repression and suggesting that the continuation of repressive action would greatly prejudice 
China’s international standing. 
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The politicisation of the human rights issue on the EEC agenda on China was 
not conflict-free. The member states were not all on the same wavelength in 
applying sanctions to China because of their different strategic, economic and 
ethical interests. The UK’s ongoing discussions with China over the Hong Kong 
handover represented a strong motive against the use of harsh sanctions. For 
Germany and Italy it was rather the pressure of business lobbies which hindered 
the pursuit of a critical stance. As for France the arms embargo was damaging 
its arms industry, already badly affected by the end of the Cold War. The 
division was also deep between the Nordic member states, which were 
traditionally in favour of a strong stance on the promotion of human rights and 
the Southern member states, which were more inclined to embrace a softer 
approach.  
These differences were already present during the negotiations for the Joint 
Declaration issued by the Council in 1989 and the sanctions decided against 
China. Some analysts and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) pointed 
to the document as a mildly-worded statement. Similarly, the sanctions adopted 
were criticised for being of a mostly symbolic nature and for not including any 
real material cost to the Chinese government. 13  Strikingly, considering the 
already significant level of EEC-China economic interaction and the leverage 
that the EEC possessed at that time, trade sanctions were not imposed. More 
specifically trade and investments were not even mentioned among the possible 
future sanctions under consideration by the member states.14 
                                                 
13 The document was regarded by many as too timid. In particular Members of the European 
Parliament pointed out that divisions soon emerged on the sanctions to be adopted within the 
Council. See Question no. H-153/89 (EFPB document no. 89/204) as quoted in Philip Baker, 
‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, p. 50. 
14 In fact, most EEC countries’ trade with China did not suffer any setback and in some cases 
even grew. 
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As argued by David Shambaugh “the sanctions were never intended to 
inhibit European businesses from continuing their projects or starting new 
ones”.15  Although most of the sanctions had been lifted by 1991, with the 
notable and thorny exception of the arms embargo, from 1989 the issues 
connected to China’s internal political arrangements, such as human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law, had entered into the EEC’s debate and more 
importantly become a point of concern in the EEC-China relations. However the 
next section will ask how this new concern coexisted with the increasing 
economic interests of some member states and how the divisions were 
composed within the EEC, which was soon to become the EU. 
3.3 The strategy of constructive engagement 
Throughout the 1990s, China and Europe underwent paramount changes. 
The People’s Republic of China received a decisive reformist boost by Deng 
Xiaoping, whose 1992 tour of Southern China opened the way to a thriving 
“socialist market economy”. The PRC’s economy grew at an impressive rate 
and this reinvigorating performance increased its assertiveness as a regional and 
even global actor. As a further sign of a strong reformist will, China’s bid to 
enter a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was convincingly 
pursued in Beijing and the GATT negotiations were resumed in 1992, thus 
mending the 1989 Tiananmen setback.16 
Similarly, changes in the international arena prompted path-breaking 
developments in Europe, leading to the creation of the European Union. The 
early 1990s witnessed the most significant step in the redefinition of the 
                                                 
15 David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995, p. 7. 
16 In this regard, China proposed to slash tariffs and open up its markets for agricultural products 
and services. Hongyi Harry Lai, ‘Behind China’s World Trade Organization agreement with the 
USA’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.22, no. 2, 2001, pp. 237-255.  
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European political and economic integration – the Maastricht Treaty. The 
Treaty was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. Among its 
achievements were the realisation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and the introduction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, a first move 
toward a more integrated European foreign policy. 
The deepening of the process of integration in Europe emboldened the 
newly-created EU to embrace a more proactive strategy in its external relations. 
Similarly, Deng Xiaoping’s successful fight to intensify reform opened up new 
opportunities. The early 1990s were thus the years when the two distant 
neighbours began to come closer, encouraged by a strengthening economic 
relation. However, as the main academic literature shows, it was mostly some 
member states’ economic interests that dominated the relation and determined 
the establishment of the strategy of constructive engagement. 
This was also reflected in the actual constructive engagement embraced. As 
will be shown, there is ample agreement that it prioritised economic issues, gave 
importance to strategic issues broadly identified and only marginally made 
reference to human rights. When it did, though, it was mostly through a positive 
and engaging approach, devoid of any sanctioning policy. 
3.3.1 Towards constructive engagement 
Within two years after the Tiananmen massacre all the sanctions imposed on 
China had been abandoned, the only exception being the arms embargo. The 
end of the Cold War, the revival of reforms in China, and the growing economic 
interaction between the EU and China induced a development of the relation. 
The prominence of some member states’ economic interests towards China 
drove the Commission to take the lead in the EU’s relations with China. 
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Starting from the early 1990s, the Commission began to work on the two 
increasingly pressing issues in the EU’s relations with China, which had begun 
to bedevil officials and member states alike: the EU’s lesser position in the 
Chinese market vis-à-vis the United States and other Asian countries17 and the 
widening trade deficit between the EU and China.18  
Starting already from October 1991, the Joint Committee, established by the 
1985 Cooperation Agreement, resumed its work. High on the agenda was the 
establishment of a working group which would be responsible for studying the 
growing trade imbalances between the two entities and proposing adjustments. 
Although no punitive measures were contemplated, it soon emerged that 
Europeans attributed such a state of affairs to the over-protectionist Chinese 
market and the unfair government subsidies for export. 
As the EU was losing economic opportunities in China, and in order to 
enhance the EU’s presence in the country, the Commission little by little began 
to appreciate the importance of integrating China within the international 
trading system. This aimed at reducing the advantages acquired by the US and 
China’s Asian partners through their prolonged interactions with the country 
and creating a level playing field.  
Accordingly, in the first part of the 1990s, the Commission signalled a new 
supportive attitude towards China’s entry into the GATT/WTO. As far back as 
1992, European leaders and Commission officials began to talk about using 
transitional periods to smooth China’s accession. Although at an early stage 
these proposals were not met with favour by Washington, they nonetheless 
marked the inception of a more flexible European approach towards China and 
                                                 
17 For example in 1993 European investments ranked only fifth behind Hong Kong, Taiwan, the 
US and Japan. 
18 Markus Taube, ‘Economic Relations Between the PRC and the States of Europe’, in The 
China Quarterly, Special Issue, Europe and China, 2002. 
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eventually represented the biggest contribution of the EU to China’s entry into 
the WTO.19 
The necessity to integrate China was justified by the rising fears of some 
member states for their increasing trade deficits with China and their complaints 
about the unfairness of the Chinese business environment. The role of the 
Commission was to promote at EU level the positions of some EU member 
states, i.e. those which had more economic relations with China, in particular 
Germany, France and Italy. Similarly, and with hindsight, it is possible to argue 
that, before that was even the case, the Commission began to present China as a 
growing economic power, a menace to the EU’s market but also an opportunity 
for European businesses (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1: The EEC/EU trade with China (1980-2008) 
Years Export to China from the EU 
China share 
in the EU’s 
export 
Imports 
from China 
China share 
in the EU’s 
import 
Balance 
1980 1.70 0.80% 1.9 0.70% -0.20 
1985 6.50 1.70% 3.8 1% 2.70 
1990 5.30 1.30% 10.6 2.30% -5.30 
1995 14.70 2.60% 26.3 4.80% -11.60 
2000 25.50 2.70% 70.3 6.80% -44.80 
2005 51.80 4.84% 158 13.40% -106.20 
2008 71.50 5.65% 228.7 16.10% -157.20 
Sources: Eurostat, External and Intra-EU Trade 1958-2006, 2006 and Eurostat, External and Intra-EU 
Trade Monthly Statistics, Issue No. 4/2008. Own calculations. ECU/Euro billion.  
Table 2: The EEC/EU FDI to China (1985-2008)  
Years Total FDI EU share of China FDI 
1985 165.33 8.45% 
1990 159.78 4.58% 
1995 2,131.31 5.68% 
2000 4,479.46 11.00% 
2005 7,440.00 10.28% 
2008* 12,120.00 9.00% 
* For the year 2008 the data also include FDI in Hong Kong. Source: National Bureau of Statistics, various 
years. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
                                                 
19 Interview 34. 
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In fact, a different story, which was willingly underplayed by Commission 
officials, explains the commercial and investment issues raised by some 
member states. First the deficit figures were not shocking, in particular if 
compared to the trade deficits of other partners of China. Klaus Rupprecht goes 
so far as to suggest that in Europe the “trade deficit with China has never led to 
political problems, due to the fact that trade with China makes up only a 
relatively small percentage of the overall EU trade”.20 Second, the deterioration 
of the terms of trade for the EU was closely linked to the delocalisation of 
European firms in China. Third, China’s prominence in the GSP also played an 
important role. According to Rupprecht’s calculation “the value of imports to 
the EU member countries that fell under the GSP scheme in 1995 amounted to 
53.6 per cent of the total EU imports from China”.21 
Important historical reasons explain the European delay in investing in 
China. In particular, the developments in Europe after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, which included the speeding up of the process of European integration, 
the German reunification as well as the new possibility to access Eastern 
European markets. These all absorbed substantial amounts of capital and 
management capacity that otherwise might have been allocated to ventures in 
China. 
Therefore it can be maintained that the Commission’s rhetoric and actions 
were mostly supporting the stances of China’s major partners in the EU rather 
than a shared European interest. In particular the story that has been described 
above can easily be interpreted as a story mainly concerning Germany, France, 
the UK, Italy and the Netherlands. The Nordic member states as well as Ireland 
                                                 
20  Klaus Rupprecht, ‘European and American Approaches Towards China as an Emerging 
Power’, China Aktuell, 2001, pp. 170-171. 
21 Klaus Rupprecht, ‘European and American Approaches Towards China’, pp.81-83. 
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and Spain only developed significant economic interests towards China in the 
late 1990s. Similarly, not all the member states had worrying levels of trade 
deficit with China.  
While stressing the economic dimension in order to please the most powerful 
member states and simultaneously increasing its powers, the Commission 
sidelined human rights concerns, embarking on a rhetoric which premised the 
development of human rights as a result of the economic improvements. From 
the very start the Commission’s narrowly focused economic approach 
encountered some resistance from the European Parliament, which asserted a 
more principled position on China in line with its growing involvement in 
human rights and democracy. Commissioners were often called to answer 
Parliamentary questions on China and the whole Commission was sometimes 
criticised by the Parliament for its “soft” approach, which paid little attention to 
human rights and democratic concerns.22  
3.3.2 The strategic dimension of constructive engagement 
The internal debate between sanctioning China or engaging with it which 
confronted the Parliament and the Commission fell within the EU’s internal 
debate over a more strategic projection toward the whole Asian continent which 
began in the early 1990s. Once again the discussion was led by only some 
member states, in particular Germany and France.23 These countries were also 
supported by the Trade Commissioner, Leon Brittan. The growing interest in 
Asia was eventually translated into the EU’s publication of its first Asia Policy 
titled Towards a New Asia Policy, which was endorsed by the Council meeting 
in Essen. 
                                                 
22 Interview 7. 
23 In that same year Germany published its first Asien Konzept, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
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Accordingly, notwithstanding the tension between the Commission and the 
Parliament over the best way to deal with China, the Commission, instructed by 
the Council, began to propose building a more coherent political framework in 
its relations with the PRC, which could somehow synthesise the different 
approaches and interests. This new orientation was formalised in 1994 with the 
creation of a framework for institutional and political exchanges and the 
publication of the first Commission’s Communication on China titled A Long 
Term Policy for China-European Relations, which was adopted by the 
Council’s Conclusions of the same year and has since remained the reference 
policy paper for the subsequent Communications. 
The Communication occurred in the year of the tenth anniversary of the 
signing of the first Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and 
China and it coincided with the 20th anniversary of the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations. The Communication recognised that “China’s rise was 
unmatched among national experiences since the Second World War”. Hence 
the need for Europe to “develop a long-term relationship with China” based on a 
“constructive engagement” and a “result-oriented approach”, which would 
“encourage China to become fully integrated in the international community”, 
“contribute to reform inside China” and “intensify ties [mostly in the business 
sectors] between the European Union and China”.  
Several authors have underlined that the 1995 Communication was mostly 
centred on the prioritisation of commercial relations and the development of 
“business-to-business links”.24 Such dimensions in the Communication appear 
natural considering the developments occurred in the early 1990s. In that period, 
                                                 
24 Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, pp. 166-167. 
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following easing of the Tiananmen sanctions, Shambaugh noted that 
“commerce has taken priority in Europe’s relations with the PRC”.25 
In the Commission Communication China was represented as a growing 
powerhouse, manufacturing enormous amounts of goods, becoming an 
important base for investments and offering opportunities to European 
businesses. Portraying China as an opportunity that European companies were 
losing both in terms of exports and investments led to a tougher and more 
narrowly-focused European approach.  
As Brittan emphatically stated when presenting the Commission Paper “the 
aim of the new policy is to give European industry more access to the Chinese 
economy and to nudge Beijing along on its political reforms through public 
pressure, formal private discussions and practical cooperation”.26 He then went 
on to say “I am convinced that it is in Europe’s vital interest to steer China into 
the world economic and political mainstream away from isolation”.27 
The prioritisation of commercial issues also represented the accomplishment 
of the Commission’s strategy to emphasise the economic dimension of China’s 
growth and relegate its domestic political development. The Communication 
suggested that the integration of China within the international economic system 
would lock its reform process, making it irreversible. Similarly, the PRC’s 
opening to external influences could give rise to a dynamic and reformist 
middle class, thus improving respect for human rights.  
Besides the economic dimension, the Communication should also be 
considered for its strategic scope as for the first time it attempted to establish a 
wide framework for Europe’s China relations. Several authors have underlined 
                                                 
25 David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995, p. 15. 
26 Leon Brittan, ‘Europe, China and East Asia: Growing Closer through Trade’, International 
Herald Tribune, 28 February 1994. 
27Ibid. 
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the broadening of EU-China relations in concurrence with the 1995 
Commission Communication. 28  Since 1995 several topics, spanning 
international terrorism and arms non-proliferation, UN architecture and so forth, 
have entered the EU agenda. These issues were also discussed and to some 
extent institutionalised in several technical dialogues.  
However, only little improvement occurred in these new areas, with most of 
the meetings concluding with great rhetorical emphasis but producing little 
concrete progress.29 For these reasons it is possible to argue that the EU has 
remained a distant neighbour for China on broadly-defined strategic and 
security matters. The lack of an EU military presence in the Asian region and its 
several divisions in multilateral regimes has further hindered such 
developments. For example the security dimension has remained mostly 
bilateral and national in nature and only those member states which have 
significant stakes and capabilities in the security field have achieved meaningful 
bilateral relations with China on these issues. 
3.3.3 The human rights dimension 
While stressing the economic dimension and trying to open a new chapter in 
the strategic and security dimensions, the Communication dealt with the issue of 
human rights. The Communication underlined the importance of China’s 
domestic evolution toward the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
protection of fundamental freedoms. Aware of the shortcomings of a purely 
declaratory policy on these issues, the Communication proposed a three-
pronged approach based on effectiveness: (i) concretely support the opening up 
                                                 
28  See the recent Liu Fei and David Kerr (eds.), The International Politics of EU-China 
Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
29 This opinion also emerged among Chinese observers of EU-China relations. Interviews 30 
and 34. 
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of all sectors of civil life in order to strengthen the infant civil society and 
promote the rule of law, including through development cooperation, (ii) raise 
human rights issues during bilateral dialogues and, (iii) engage the international 
community in the dialogue through multilateral fora. Naturally, all these efforts 
could not be borne by the EU alone but needed wide coordination with member 
states.  
Such an approach somewhat contrasted with that of the US. The 
Communication was unveiled at a time when the United States’ relations with 
China were at their lowest because of Beijing’s fury over Taiwanese President 
Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in June and Washington’s anger over 
the arrest on espionage charges of US human rights activist Harry Wu. The EU 
officials, although reassuring that they did not want to compete against the 
United States, distanced themselves from America’s way of doing business in 
China. Leon Brittan expressed it clearly by saying that Western governments 
should not denounce China’s human rights record just to win “easy popularity at 
home”. In his words “strident Western criticism either dilutes the message or 
leads to knee-jerk reactions from the Chinese government”.30 
In 1995, the EU and its member states seemed poised to face positively the 
challenges of promoting human rights in China. Following the 1995 
Communication, the political dialogue between the EU and China was 
strengthened over a broad range of issues, which also included human rights, on 
which a specific dialogue was initiated in 1996, following a Chinese request 
submitted in 1994. In that same year, the EU member states continued the 
practice of co-sponsoring the resolution on human rights violations against 
China in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and almost passed 
                                                 
30 Leon Brittan, ‘Europe, China and East Asia: Growing Closer through Trade’. 
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it. Finally, discussions between European and Chinese officials began on the 
possibility of financing programmes and projects aimed at improving Chinese 
rule of law and sustaining its infant civil society.  
However, most of the promises of the Communication were doomed to 
failure. In the coming years the UNCHR was abandoned, an EU-China dialogue 
on human rights was restarted but its procedures became highly criticised. 
Finally the arms embargo remained but divisions became deep among the EU 
member states. These shifts had been motivated by the two underlying themes 
in EU-China relations which had been present during the Cold War and became 
even more obvious in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty: the prioritisation 
of economic concerns for those member states with deeper relations with China 
and the deep divisions of member states on how to handle the issue of human 
rights in China.  
The next section highlights such themes in the main sanctioning policies of 
the EU towards China on human rights. It also serves to show that the strategy 
of constructive engagement of China did not rely on sanctions but mostly on 
practical actions in the form of economic engagement, dialogue and 
development assistance. Similarly, it shows that Germany, France and the UK’s 
approaches towards China’s human rights were representative of those of the 
other EU member states. Finally, it supports the expectations of liberal 
intergovernmentalism because it shows that the abandonment of sanctioning 
policies was influenced by Germany, France and the UK. Further, it suggests, 
without proving it, that the member states with more critical stances towards 
China might have been negatively socialised in the CFSP. 
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3.4 UNCHR, Dialogue and Arms Embargo 
The 1995 Commission Communication pointed to the necessity to promote 
human rights in China through a mix of critical stances and engagement 
policies, primarily dialogue and development assistance. However, the brief 
presentation of the evolution of EU-China relations in the 1980s and the early 
1990s shows an increasing focus on the economic dimension and several 
divisions among member states. These two trends were at the basis of the 
evolution of the strategy of constructive engagement in the ensuing years, which 
privileged economic interests, refused sanctioning policies and allowed only 
practical activities for the support of human rights in the country. 
3.4.1 UNCHR 
Among the sanctions decided on in the wake of the Tiananmen events, the 
then twelve members of the EEC, in line with other Western countries, agreed 
to raise the issue of human rights violations in China at the annual meetings of 
the Third Sub-Committee of the UN General Assembly and of the UNCHR. 
Except for the 1991 UNCHR meeting – where a resolution against China was 
not tabled by Western countries in order to garner its support for the war against 
Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait – in the ensuing years the twelve 
maintained a common position on China at the UNCHR.  
As Philip Baker notes, all the draft resolutions tabled against China were co-
sponsored by all the member states taking part in the workings of the UNCHR 
from 1992 to 1996.31  Although the common position presented by the EU 
member states did not lead to the passing of any resolution at the UNCHR due 
to the no-action motions proposed mostly by developing countries, the firm 
                                                 
31 Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, pp. 45-63. 
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stance of the member states represented an important base on which they and 
other UNCHR members built their criticism against China at the UNCHR 
meetings from 1992 to 1996. This was also confirmed by the 1995 Commission 
Communication, which pointed out that as far as the UNCHR was concerned 
“the level of international support attracted for the resolution criticizing the 
situation in China in February 1995 suggests that it is bearing fruit”.32 
However, the approach of the 1995 Commission Communication was soon 
to be changed and the strong united stance of the EU member states frayed in 
the following two years, leading to the eventual disbandment of the common 
position on China at UNCHR in 1997. The Chinese authorities, having escaped 
by one vote the UNCHR resolution of 1995, mounted an even stronger 
campaign against it and in particular towards the EU member states.33 They 
pursued this objective and showed their dissatisfaction with the EU and its 
member states by suspending in 1996 the ECDHR begun a year earlier, and in 
addition, they continued, and ostensibly increased, their attempts to divide 
member states with promises of economic rewards. 
These tactics would probably not have brought about the expected results if it 
were not for the changing conditions in the EU member states. The most 
important was the election of President Jacques Chirac in France in 1995 and 
his stated desire to pursue a closer partnership with China. Chirac’s strategy of 
joining hands with China in the pursuit of a multipolar system and to increase 
French commercial and investment ties with the PRC in an attempt to catch up 
with Germany and the UK made him very attentive to the Chinese offers.  
                                                 
32 European Commission, A long term policy for China-European Relations, p. 6. 
33 The Chinese irritation at the resolutions tabled within the UNCHR has been mentioned in 
several interviews with Chinese scholars. Interviews 23 and 26. 
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The example of France was not missed by its direct European competitor on 
the Chinese market, Helmut Kohl’s Germany, which had begun to pursue a 
more strategic approach towards China as early as 1994 with the publication of 
the Asien Konzept. The limited commitment to the human rights cause in China, 
already demonstrated in the early 1990s with Germany’s quick re-starting of 
ministerial exchanges and development projects, compounded with the 
possibility to reap the economic benefits of such a symbolic gesture, easily 
convinced the German Chancellor to follow the French lead. 
France and Germany were not alone in reconsidering their positions at the 
UNCHR. The importance of penetrating the Chinese market shared by these 
two countries also reflected the opinions of other EU member states’ 
governments, Italy and Spain in particular. In the early 1990s the majority of the 
EU member states had begun to acknowledge that they were losing ground in 
the competition to enter the Chinese market, and that they were being 
outdistanced both by the US and China’s Asian partners. This, among other 
factors, was also attributed to the European confrontational attitude on human 
rights. In fact this situation did not reflect the human rights stance of the EU 
member states but primarily the way they had lagged behind in entering the 
Chinese market, mostly due to geographical and historical reasons as shown in 
the previous section. 
The changing perspective on the tabling of the resolution was obvious in the 
irreconcilable division that appeared at the Council meeting of 1997. The 
Netherlands, a country generally in favour of a strong stance for the promotion 
of human rights, held the Presidency and proposed the tabling of a new 
resolution against China at the following UNCHR meeting. However, the 
division, which emerged between France, Germany and southern European 
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states on the one side and the UK, Sweden and other Nordic countries on the 
other, remained.34  
This division was reflected in the UNCHR meeting of that year where the 
resolution tabled by Denmark was not co-sponsored by all the EU member 
states present, leading to an even clearer defeat of the resolution.35 Ominously 
the Chinese government carried out the threat of sanctions against Denmark, 
which it had issued before the UNCHR meeting, by suspending some economic 
contracts. 
The outcome of the UNCHR meeting sparked outrage among some European 
officials, above all the MEPs, who adopted various resolutions condemning the 
EU member states’ inability to reach a common position. 36  International 
advocacy groups also expressed strong criticism about the EU member states’ 
failure to achieve unanimity at the UNCHR and questioned both the EU’s 
human rights policy and the effectiveness of the newly-constituted CFSP. In 
September 1997 Human Rights Watch wrote an open letter to the members of 
the EP where it stated that the EU should continue to put pressure on China, 
demanding it should keep its promises regarding respect for human rights.37 
However, 1997 proved, at least according to EU officials, a very rewarding 
year for the softer approach maintained in Geneva. At the end of 1997 as 
proposed by Beijing in February of that year the ECDHR resumed, in exchange 
for a softer approach at the UNCHR. Looking for a simple justification, the EU 
                                                 
34 At one point the Dutch Presidency threatened EU Member States that it would not table any 
resolution against any country at the Geneva session of the UNCHR in order not to show 
double-standards towards large, influential countries vs. poor and peripheral ones. Eventually, 
though, the threat did not materialise. Interview 20. 
35 During the April 1997 Meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission France decided not to 
table the resolution drafted by the Netherlands on behalf of the EU and presented by Denmark. 
On the European Union side the resolution was supported by Sweden, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands, whereas Germany, Spain and Italy followed the example of France insisting on 
engaging China through a positive approach. 
36 Interview 7. 
37 Agence Europe, Brussels, 9 September 1997. 
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officials noted that the results of the first ECDHR were very positive as they 
had led to China’s agreement on (i) EC-funded cooperation programmes on 
human rights, (ii) establishment of a bilateral team of experts to deal with issues 
related to the signature and ratification of the two main International Covenants 
on human rights, (iii) a visit of the Troika to Tibet and (iv) an early visit of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to China.38 Confident of such results 
the EU officials and member states in favour of the policy shift felt reassured 
that they could proceed in the direction they had set for themselves.39 
If the disbandment at the UNCHR meeting of 1997 was striking, even more 
so was the Council’s decision in 1998. Ironically, the Council listened to the 
requests of the EP to harmonise member states’ attitudes and speak with a single 
voice on human rights violations in China. Despite criticism, under the 
Presidency of the UK, the Council institutionalised in 1998, the 1997 practice 
and concluded that neither the Presidency nor member states “should table or 
co-sponsor a draft resolution at the UNCHR”.40 So much for proponents of a 
single voice. As Andrew Clapham laconically commented “it is disturbing that 
the first time the Council formalized its position with regard to an impending 
country resolution at the UN, it was to announce that the Union would not be 
acting, and nor would its member states”.41 
In order to justify the new policy, the Council and its member states referred 
to the concept of effectiveness, which had initially been put forward by those 
member states in favour of abandoning the resolution. Although framing it in 
                                                 
38 Leon Brittan quoted in Elena Fierro, The EU’s approach to human rights, p. 204. 
39 Despite all the allegedly positive results obtained by the EU-China Dialogue on Human 
Rights, the year 1998 proved one of the bloodiest in China due to a harsh crackdown over 
political dissidents and Falun Gong members as reported in Amnesty International, Human 
Rights in the World Report 1998, London, Amnesty Publishing House, 1999. 
40 General Affairs and External Relations Council, Council Conclusions, 23 February 1998. 
41 Andrew Clapham, ‘Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How is it 
Manifested in Multilateral Fora?, in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, p. 647. 
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human rights terms, they argued that human rights promotion through the 
UNCHR was not working. This was indirectly confirmed in the 1998 
Commission Communication, which dropped reference to a multilateral 
approach for the promotion of human rights in China.42 The EU and its member 
states agreed that economic engagement, dialogues and development assistance 
would be the most effective means to promote human rights in the country. 
All in all, in the case of the UNCHR the combination of economic motives 
and the divisions among member states led to the abandonment of the 
sanctioning policy embraced after the Tiananmen Massacre. Yet the appeasing 
approach of the EU institutions and the member states that was decided in 1998 
shows that despite differences the member states eventually found a very low 
compromise according to which sanctions towards China would be abandoned 
and concrete policies adopted to promote human rights in the country. Such a 
compromise greatly derived from the influence exerted by the main partners of 
China in the EU, namely France and Germany, and to a lesser extent the UK. 
Considering the previous approaches of the EU’s Nordic countries this also 
suggests that the latter countries might have been negatively socialised into 
abandoning the UNCHR resolution. 
3.4.2 ECDHR 
The importance of promoting human rights in China through a bilateral 
dialogue was included among the policy actions of the 1995 Commission 
Communication. However, as was the case with several other Western 
countries, the Chinese conditioned the inception and continuation of the 
dialogue to the dropping of the UNCHR resolution. The EU’s official stance on 
                                                 
42  European Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, Commission 
Communication COM (1998) 181, 1998. 
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the resumption of the ECDHR in 1997 never pointed to the fact that it was a 
‘reward’ for the dropping of the UNCHR resolution. In fact the 1998 
Commission Communication expressly noted that “the resumption of the EU-
China human rights dialogue [would be accepted] without any precondition”.43 
Yet it is difficult to believe that this was the case in consideration of the 
Chinese manoeuvrings to coerce the EU, its member states and other Western 
countries to move from public shaming to private dialogues. Similarly, in an 
answer to a written question from an MEP, the Council clearly stated that “the 
results of the dialogue will be taken into account when the Union will decide the 
step to follow at the UNCHR”.44 
Since 1997, the ECDHR has been held twice a year between European high 
officials (officials from the country holding the Presidency, representative for 
human rights from COHOM 45  and the political head of the Commission 
Delegation in China) and representatives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs at directorate level.46 According to the EU’s human rights reports, which 
have been issued annually since 1999, the ‘wish list’ of the EU’s areas of 
concern presented at the bilateral dialogue remained broadly the same and 
included (i) freedom of opinion, expression and assembly, (ii) extensive use of 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights, p. 201. 
45  The Agenda for the Dialogue is formulated within the COHOM Committee for Human 
Rights, which is linked to the European Council. The COHOM is presided by the incumbent 
Presidency of the Council but all member states are represented. In China at local level, little 
coordination apart from informal meetings of Political Counsellors takes place. There is an 
exchange of information on the procedures and results of the bilateral dialogues but this is as far 
as it goes. The Agenda is then discussed and agreed with the Chinese counterpart, which is the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
46 Sometimes representatives of Chinese line ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry 
of Public Security and Ministry of Civil Affairs, took part to the meetings. Interestingly no other 
participants from European or Chinese civil society took part in the ECDHR. 
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the death penalty and torture, (iii) arbitrary detention and the use of labour 
camps, and (iv) the treatment of religious and cultural minorities.47  
Interestingly, in light of what Ian Manners refers to as the EU’s commitment 
to second-generation human rights, it is important to notice that labour rights 
were discussed for the first time only in 2007.48 Similarly, the list of the main 
human rights concerns of the EU’s representatives at the ECDHR seems out of 
tune with the societal requests emerging in China for more protection of social 
and economic rights, as underlined in Chapter 1 and also pointed out by several 
Chinese human rights experts.49 
Through the dialogue process, the EU also raised concerns about the lack of 
due process of law in China’s ‘reform through labour’ system, and the broad 
definition of crimes endangering state security, despite the dropping of 
counterrevolutionary crimes in the 1997 criminal law. At the same time, the 
ECDHR was used as a venue for EU officials to convey the EU’s support for 
China’s further involvement in the international human rights mechanisms. 
Noting China’s signing and ratification of the International Covenant for 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1997) and its signing of the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1998), the EU 
established the EU-China Human Rights Network (Network). 
The Network’s over-arching aim was to provide China with human rights 
expertise at the highest academic level in order to support the process of 
ratification of the ICCPR and the implementation of both human rights 
                                                 
47 In the occasion of particularly blatant violations such as national campaigns against minorities 
or religious groups, the EU often expressed specific concerns. These included the situation in 
Tibet, including the ‘patriotic education campaign’, the crackdown on the Uighur minority in 
Xinjiang, which was fanned by the intensification of the ‘strike-hard’ campaign in connection 
with China’s fight against terrorism, and the issue of freedom of religion against the backdrop of 
a growing persecution of Falun Gong’s members, which intensified during the late 1990s, and 
the deteriorating situation of Chinese Christians. 
48 Interview 6. 
49 Interview 26 and Interview 27. 
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covenants.50 In addition to these independent activities, since 2001 the Network 
has also taken over responsibility for the organisation of the biannual seminars 
connected to the ECDHR on behalf of the European Commission, the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of the European Union. 
The seminars had been organised twice a year from 1997 and have received 
the support of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights. Their 
aim was to complement the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue with ad-hoc 
discussions on various issues of concern. The following were covered: women’s 
rights, administration of justice, minor crimes and trade union rights, death 
penalty, prohibition and prevention of torture and right to education, ratification 
and implementation of the ICCPR, right to health and freedom of expression. 
However the decision to move to more private forms of engagement led to 
little information being made public on the real extent, scope and level of the 
discussions that take place, apart from the official press statements, the 
Council’s conclusions and the EU’s annual human rights reports. The 
ambiguous results of the dialogue were underlined by a 2004 Council 
evaluation. Although this document is notable for its absence among all the 
electronic material available on the EU’s website, the Council’s conclusions that 
followed the presentation of the evaluation document affirmed that “the overall 
assessment of developments showed a mixed picture of progress in some areas 
and continuing concerns in others”.51 
A harsher position was expressed by academics as well as practitioners, who 
also pointed out the ineffectiveness of giving up on the sponsoring of the 
                                                 
50  Activities included seminars, researches, development of training materials, delivery of 
training and other follow-up activities, as well as a series of exchanges and internships 
coordinated by the Human Rights Institute in Ireland and the Human Rights Centre established 
within the Chinese Academy of Social Science. 
51  European Council, Council Conclusions on EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, No. 
13216/04, Brussels, 8 October 2004. 
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UNCHR resolution.52 To a certain extent, the negative opinion on the results of 
the ECDHR was indirectly confirmed by the Chinese. In China’s 2003 EU 
Policy Paper it was argued that “[China] stands ready to continue dialogue, 
exchange and cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality 
and mutual respect so as to share information, enhance mutual understanding 
and deepen cooperation”. 53  However, they expressed the wish that such a 
dialogue and exchange could be focused on “protecting citizens’ social and 
cultural rights and the rights of the disadvantaged”, thus forgetting to mention 
civil and political rights, which form the very core of the EU’s objectives for the 
ECDHR. Similarly, while wishing to receive more European aid in such sectors 
as environmental protection, public health, poverty alleviation and education, 
the Chinese authorities once again omitted any reference to projects in support 
of good governance, the rule of law and human rights. 
Another interesting point that seems to confirm the limits of such a platform 
emerged during interviews. Embassy officials referred to the continuous 
requests of the Chinese authorities to eliminate bilateral human rights dialogues 
with the member states because of the presence of the ECDHR.54 This also 
confirms the instrumentality behind the Chinese participation to the ECDHR, as 
expressed by some Chinese commentators.55 
Finally, it should be pointed out that some member states did start bilateral 
dialogues with China on human rights but they were not coordinated and each 
member state seemed to pursue its own national goals.56 For example Germany 
                                                 
52  These concerns have been raised by European participants to the technical dialogues. 
Interviews 21 and 22. 
53 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU White Paper, 2003. 
54 This was in particular the case of Sweden, which has an informal dialogue with China. 
Interview 19. 
55 Interviews 26 and 27. 
56 According to interviews with EU and member states’ embassy officials little coordination, 
apart from sharing of information, exists among the various dialogues. Interviews 2, 6, 8 and 14. 
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started a Rule of Law Dialogue and a Human Rights Dialogue in 1999. 
However from the research it appears that its contents were not shared with 
other member states and the main issues discussed concerned the rule of law.57 
Similarly, the UK started a bilateral dialogue in 1999. However the dialogues 
seemed to be stressing issues of concern for the UK without any connection 
with those pursued at EU level.58  
In summation, from the analysis of the EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights 
and those of the main EU member states with China, it emerges that the 
economic motives and the division among member states made such exercises 
very inefficient. Overall they lacked a real enforcing power, mostly served as 
platforms to exchange information without ensuring any accountability of the 
participants’ promises, and they were badly coordinated, thus granting the 
Chinese an easy way to escape criticism and pressure. It is important to 
underline that the adoption of dialogues created a side venue, where human 
rights could comfortably be discussed without risking any spill-overs into other 
growing fields of the EU and its member states’ relations with China. Despite 
the clear limits of this platform, it emerged during several interviews that 
member states did not request its abandonment or suspension.59 This suggests 
an overall socialisation of all member states into supporting and conducting an 
inefficient EU policy for the promotion of human rights in China.  
3.4.3 Arms Embargo 
The arms embargo is a legacy of the sanctions imposed on China in the wake 
of the Tiananmen massacre. Arms embargoes are part of the restrictive 
measures that the EU has consistently developed in order to take action against 
                                                 
57 Interviews 10.  
58 Interview 14. 
59 Interviews 2, 6 and 20. 
 112 
human rights violations and promote their protection. However, arms 
embargoes are peculiar types of sanctions in terms of their implementation, 
because they have not been ‘unionised’. Thus in the case of the EU’s arms 
embargo towards China, which was adopted following the procedures of EPC, 
the legal foundation is shaky at best. According to Joacquim Kreutz “there is 
not an EU arms embargo in place against China, but rather an EU-wide set of 
national arms embargoes”.60 To complicate matters, the ban does not provide 
for a detailed specification of the arms included.61 
In fact, European arms sales to China have been ongoing for years (see Table 
3 below). For example, in 2006, the EU reported that the member states had 
approved arms sales to China worth EUR 292 million for military list exports, 
which can include weapons and other equipment with possible military 
applications. Among these, France issued 135 licenses worth EUR 251 million, 
the UK issued 348 licences worth EUR 30 million, Germany issued 25 licences 
worth EUR 2.5 million and Italy issued 5 licences worth EUR 1.7 million.62 
These figures represent a four-fold increase compared to 2001 when licences 
were issued worth $72 million. Although licenses do not always translate into 
sales and there is scant information on what is actually delivered, the increase 
suggests that European governments became more inclined to authorise exports 
to China. 
 
 
                                                 
60 Joacquim Kreutz, ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Power?’ Sanctions Policy of the European Union 
1981-2004’, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper 45, 2005, p. 4. 
61 In fact it does not cover dual-use nor non-lethal equipment, therefore leaving EU companies 
quite a broad room for circumventing it and for member states to interpret it. Even with the 
adoption of the 1998 Code of Conduct on Arms Export, several loopholes have remained. 
62 Council of the European Union, ‘Ninth annual report according to operative provision 8 of the 
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, No. 12919, Brussels 25 September 2007. 
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Table 3: Deliveries of major conventional weapons to China (1989-2007) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
France 74 54 68 47 42 85 90 96 59 46 77 52 46 48 44 73 75 49 48 1173
Germany 
(FRG)
12 12 12 12 12 16 12 17 7 12 17 12 13 11 13 25 17 13 5 250
Israel 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 38 38 28 28 350
Italy 5 12 5 10 5 3 10 3 52
Japan 15 30 45
Russia 1098 1077 130 498 1115 628 166 1446 1718 3037 2429 1996 2735 3132 3498 1290 25992
UK 4 8 34 24 34 4 4 30 30 30 30 232
USA 1 14 3 3 31 52
Total 101 209 252 1202 1232 288 641 1274 741 292 1684 1874 3234 2636 2068 2906 3346 3719 1424 29124
Actual deliveries of major conventional weapons  to China, 1989-2007
Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database  
The unanimity behind maintaining the arms embargo began to fray as early 
as 1997 when for the first time French authorities discussed the issue with Jiang 
Zemin. 63  However, after having encountered strong criticism from the EP, 
French officials did not manage to gather consensus among other member states 
to push the discussion further. After 1997, the European internal debates as well 
as Chinese requests were silenced by the more pressing issue of China’s WTO 
accession.  
The debate briefly resurfaced in 2002 but it gained an incredible momentum 
in 2003 with the publication of China’s EU Policy Paper. The paper approached 
the issue in two main ways: the first was that in order to be on an equal footing 
the two partners should iron out divergences through mutual understanding, thus 
implying the symbolic importance of lifting the embargo; the second was that 
lifting the arms embargo would open the door to greater bilateral cooperation, 
i.e. sales, in the defence industry and technologies.64  
                                                 
63 This occurred almost concomitantly with France’s decision not to table the resolution at the 
UNCHR and thus coincided with a more general breaking down of the EU unanimous position 
on China and human rights. 
64 Among Chinese authorities the arms embargo imposed by the EU became a crucial issue in 
the early 2000s according to Chinese academics interviews. Interviews 30 and 31.  
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Attracted by these opportunities French President Jacques Chirac and 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder began an aggressive campaign in favour 
of Beijing’s request starting from the end of 2003. Other member states 
supported their stance by referring to China as a responsible country65 and a 
very important partner for Europe while at the same time justifying the lifting of 
the embargo on the basis of the improvements that had occurred in the Chinese 
human rights record since the Tiananmen Massacre. Notwithstanding the 
pressures and the diplomatic efforts spent by French and German diplomats, the 
EU member states remained split on the issue throughout 2003 and 2004.  
The main proponents of staying the course and maintaining the arms 
embargo against China were the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and 
Ireland. A more difficult situation confronted Prime Minister Blair’s 
government. There the arms lobby – Britain is the EU’s second exporter of arms 
to China - was active in trying to convince the Prime Minister of the advantages 
of lifting the arms embargo. At the same time Blair had to face not only his 
opposition and party members but also the UK’s powerful ally, the US. 
Interestingly, the split was not only at the level of the member states but also 
between the two most powerful figures of the EU: Javier Solana, the European 
Union’s High Representative for Foreign Policy, who wanted the embargo 
lifted, and Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations, who wanted 
it to stay and demanded further concessions on human rights from Beijing.66 
The EP also lobbied strenuously against the lifting.67 
                                                 
65 In December 2003, during a visit to China, Schröder began discussing the issue affirming that 
he believed that China had become a responsible international actor and that consequently most 
European heads of states were in favour of the lifting.  
66 John Power, ‘Don't arm China, for all our sakes’, South China Morning Post, 15 October 
2004.  
67 MEP Coveney, the drafter of an EP report on the issue, noted that “given its lack of progress 
in the area of human rights, I am appalled and very disappointed that both the European 
Commission and Council have once again put trade before human rights, with the 
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Eventually after some hesitancy and numerous set-backs the Council 
achieved some agreement in December 2004, when it declared that it would lift 
the embargo imposed in 1989. At the same time, the Council affirmed that it 
would apply a stronger version of the Code of Conduct introduced in 1998, 
which would provide an even stronger control regime than the existing 
embargo, among other reasons, because it would broaden the range of issues 
relevant to the authorisation of arms sales, including political oppression, threats 
to regional stability and the concerns of partners and allies.68 
While initially it seemed that the position of those member states in favour of 
lifting the arms embargo had got the upper hand, strong external reactions to 
this move and the internal situation of some member states led in 2005 to the 
eventual decision to postpone the lifting. Reactions from the US on the likely 
lifting of the ban were very strong due to the strategic concerns of the US in 
Asia, for which the ‘China threat’ was a very concrete issue, unlike for the EU 
member states. Throughout 2004 and 2005 US pressure against lifting the 
embargo had increased. 
The US initiative certainly played an important role in influencing the final 
decision of the EU member states. Yet another variable should be factored in: 
China’s passing of the ‘anti-secession law’ in 2005, authorising military force 
against Taiwan if it declared formal independence from Beijing. EU officials 
began to feel uneasy faced with such a move and European national parliaments 
in the Scandinavian countries, and also in Germany, became very vocal against 
such an action. 
                                                                                                                                  
announcement that the EU may lift the arms embargo on China. ‘Human Rights: MEPs seeks 
tougher approach’, Europe Information New Neighbours, 11 April 2005 
68 At that time it was believed that before lifting the arms embargo the EU would proceed with 
three political gestures: (i) a political statement that Europe doesn’t desire to sell arms to China, 
(ii) a strengthened EU code of conduct that would continue to proscribe sales of lethal weapons, 
and (iii) strengthened export controls on such items as dual-use technologies.  
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The combination of external events and internal opposition within some 
member states, combined with the attempts of member states to reach consensus 
on the issue, led to the postponement of the lifting of the arms embargo, which 
allowed an important gesture by the EU: closely linking the lifting with 
improvement in human rights. After some internal squabbles, the EU reached a 
new level of unity on the human rights issue, which also earned it the praise of 
AI.69 
In summary, although all member states involved in the debate framed their 
position in human rights terms, it emerges that their policy preferences on the 
arms embargo differed greatly. For Jennifer Erickson this shows that “member 
positions on the China issue in particular do not seem to emerge from 
socialisation into the EU’s norms”.70  
All in all, the issue of the arms embargo shows that the economic interests of 
some member states and the divisions among member states on how to deal 
with human rights in China once again led to a compromise of a very low 
common denominator. This also implied the defusing of the sanctioning power 
of the arms embargo towards China. In several interviews it has emerged that 
the Chinese authorities are convinced that the EU maintains the embargo due to 
its inefficient decision-making procedures, rather than because of a real 
commitment to the human rights cause.71 Similarly, arms exchanges continue 
despite the embargo. 
                                                 
69 After more than a year of internal debate, the EU and its member states reached a common 
position on the lifting of the arms embargo towards China, which was linked to the Chinese 
compliance with four main requirements: (i) the need for Chinese authorities to release citizens 
imprisoned in connection with the suppression of the 1989 pro-democracy movement; (ii) the 
need to ease media censorship; (iii) the need for reform of China’s “Re-education through 
Labour” (RTL) system; and (iv) the need for the PRC to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
70 Jennifer Erickson, ‘Market Imperative Meets Normative Power’, p. 34. 
71 Interviews 32 and 33. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter has shown that there has been a clear development in EU-China 
relations since the Maastricht Treaty. What throughout the 1980s was a mostly 
economic relation matured into acquiring new strategic and political 
dimensions, although the latter have remained rather underdeveloped. The 
embracing of such a broad approach was strongly supported by the efforts of 
Germany and France, and to a lesser extent of the UK. These efforts were also 
compounded by the activities of the Commission. This is reflected in the 
adoption of the strategy of constructive engagement proposed by the 1995 
Commission Communication. 
The analysis of the strategy of constructive engagement shows two major 
themes. First, the importance of the economic dimension in EU-China relations. 
Despite the 1995 Commission Communication attempting to create a broad 
framework for the institutionalisation of EU-China relations, academics agree 
that it was mostly focused on the rising economic concerns of some EU member 
states towards China. Second, the divisions of the member states. The 
Commission Communication represents a clear attempt to Europeanise the 
positions of those member states that had deeper relations with China. 
The prevalence of economic interests and the member states’ divisions were 
at the basis of the end of the sanctioning policy on human rights in two out of 
the three cases shown above. Due to their differing interests the member states 
split on the best way to promote human rights in China. On one side those 
member states privileging their strategic and economic interests argued on the 
basis of effectiveness and highlighted the improvements occurring on the 
ground. On the other side those member states with more radical positions and 
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normative interests highlighted little improvements in the country’s human 
rights situation and the necessity to apply negative measures.  
Germany, France and the UK were representative of the overall EU member 
states’ approaches towards human rights in China. Germany mildly criticised 
China in public and privileged a positive approach combining dialogue and 
projects. France did little to maintain public pressure on China’s human rights 
situation and preferred to delegate responsibilities to the EU, a position shared 
by other Mediterranean EU member states, such as Italy and Spain. The UK 
maintained a balanced critical public position on human rights in China, as 
testified by the support of the UNCHR resolution in 1997 and of the arms 
embargo, but it also proved ready to start practical activities, such as a human 
rights dialogue and specific human rights projects, a position shared by the 
Netherlands and the Nordic EU member states. These divergences show that 
little socialisation occurred around the issue of human rights promotion towards 
China, thus showing the pertinence of applying a liberal intergovernmental 
approach to the study of the topic.  
However, the three cases show that despite different interests and policy 
preferences the EU managed to maintain a common position in all the three 
issues of the UNCHR resolution, the ECDHR and the arms embargo. Such 
positions though were of a very low common denominator and signalled the end 
of the sanctioning policy of the EU and its member states towards China within 
their strategy of constructive engagement. The latter was largely influenced by 
the interests and policy preferences of the main partners of China in the EU, 
most notably France and Germany. This supports the validity of the liberal 
intergovernmental approach. In turn it contrasts the expectations of sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches, which would have predicted more 
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socialisation of the member states around the importance of promoting human 
rights in China.  
Finally, the achievement of compromises of very low common denominators 
even suggests, without yet proving it, that the EU institutions may have 
contributed to the socialisation of negative norms, somehow making even the 
more critical member states accept the end of the sanctioning policy, as in the 
cases of the UNCHR resolution and of the ECDHR. 
The end of the sanctioning policy is an aspect often overlooked by the 
literature on EU-China relations and the issue of human rights. However it is 
essential to consider it, because the analysis of consistency and coordination in 
the EU and its member states’ promotion of human rights in China should be 
premised on such an aspect. For this reason the next two Chapters analyse the 
consistency and coordination of the economic engagement and development 
assistance devised by the EC and its member states to promote human rights in 
China. These were the main policies put in place to promote human rights in 
China within the EU’s strategy of constructive engagement.  
In order to analyse the consistency and coordination of these policies the next 
two Chapters will apply the framework elaborated in Chapter 2, whose 
explanatory power has been illustrated in this Chapter. It has shown the 
importance of Germany, France and the UK’s strategic and economic interests 
in the development of the EU’s strategy of constructive engagement towards 
China and the broad divisions of the member states on the best way to deal with 
human rights in China at CFSP level. 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Consistency in the promotion of human 
rights 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter has shown that the EU’s strategy of constructive 
engagement emerged in response to a growing interest in the economic potential 
of China. Such interest was particularly strong in some of the member states, 
namely Germany, France, Italy and the UK. These member states joined with 
the European Commission to impose a strategy of constructive engagement at 
EU level, somehow also negatively socialising those member states with a more 
critical stance towards China’s human rights situation. This has been illustrated 
in two out of the three CFSP cases analysed in the previous Chapter. 
The strategy that emerged was not limited to the economic field but it also 
had the ambitious goal of expanding relations in other strategic and security 
fields. However, since the European institutions were lacking the relevant 
competences and there was also a lack of will by the member states to cede 
them further powers in external relations, the full development of relations in 
these sectors was hindered. 
The rising economic interest of some member states, the attempts to broaden 
the EU-China relations into new fields, and the divisions existing among the 
member states on the best way to deal with human rights in China sidelined 
criticism on the issue of human rights in most high level and public venues in 
EU-China relations. In fact high-level political meetings between the EU and 
Chinese representatives continued to focus on human rights but this mostly 
occurred behind closed doors in the ECDHR. This created a side venue, where 
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human rights could be comfortably discussed without risking spill-overs 
affecting the development of relations in other fields.  
The sidelining of human rights from high-level political and public 
exchanges compelled the EU and the member states’ officials to push for more 
practical actions on the ground. The rhetoric of the Commission’s constructive 
engagement focused on the significance of its economic engagement and 
development assistance to support and contribute to the evolution of China 
towards a more free society. Similarly the member states’ officials pointed at 
their bilateral development assistance to prove their commitment to promoting 
human rights in China in an effective way. 
Chapters 4 and 5 intend to put such claims under analysis. The present 
Chapter tests the consistency of the EC’s economic engagement and 
development policies with the objective of promoting human rights. Chapter 5 
analyses the policies of China’s three main partners in the EU in order to assess 
the coordination of their efforts and those of the EC to promote human rights in 
China through development assistance.  
In line with the analytical approach developed in Chapter 2, the present and 
following Chapter distinguish between the two selected levels of governance in 
the EU’s external relations: the EC and the member states. At each level great 
attention is paid to assess whether the policy output was mostly influenced by 
the specific interests and policy preferences of the three member states, as 
expected by the liberal intergovernmental perspective elaborated in Chapter 2, 
or alternatively by the EU institutions’ identity and norms, as expected by 
sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches. 
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4.2 Economic engagement for the promotion of human rights 
EU-China relations have been mostly centred on the economic dimension. 
Throughout the thirty years of relations between the EU and China significant 
progress has occurred in the economic field, making the EU China’s single 
largest trading partner, and China the EU’s second largest. Further, the EU has 
become China’s fourth biggest investor.1  
Yet little attention has been paid to whether within the economic dimension 
political concerns linked with human rights and the rule of law were ever 
pursued. As argued in Chapter 1, the Chinese authorities are rhetorically more 
concerned with economic and social rights. These are also the fields where 
major concerns emerge in the Chinese civil society. Similarly, in Chapter 2, it 
has been shown that the EU often portrays itself as a promoter of second-
generation human rights, i.e. social and economic rights. Therefore focusing on 
the economic relation allows analysing whether in this dimension the EC was 
able to deploy consistent and appropriate policies to promote human rights 
through economic engagement.  
These are the issues that this section addresses against the backdrop of the 
evolving economic relations. In particular this section focuses on the concession 
of the GSP and the negotiations for China’s accession to the WTO, which were 
the two main instruments and venues in which the EC had the power and 
competence to set in place meaningful policies to economically engage China 
and promote human rights consistently. Furthermore, since these competences 
are under the strong control of the member states, these cases also allow 
                                                 
1 Robert Ash, ‘Europe’s commercial relations with China’, in David Shambaugh et al., China-
Europe Relations. Perceptions, policies and prospects, p.190. 
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considering the influence of the member states in the elaboration of the EC’s 
policies. 
4.2.1 The General System of Preferences 
The earliest element of conditionality linking trade and human rights in EU-
China relations can be traced back to the decision to include China within the 
GSP in the early 1980s. Although it has been clearly stated that up to 1989 little 
attention to the issues of human rights and rule of law was paid by the EU 
officials and member states in their relation with China, the GSP provides an 
instrument of conditionality: the so-called social clause, which can be used in 
case of blatant violations of workers’ rights in order to suspend commercial 
preferences. 
China greatly benefited from the GSP and by the mid-1990s China’s share in 
the GSP reached 29%, which translated into 53.6% of the total EU imports from 
China covered by the GSP in 1995. Even more interesting is to point out that the 
GSP provided a significant instrument through which the EC could wield 
conditionality on the country, at least in some of the sectors it covered. Since 
the 1990s the GSP has gradually begun to include punitive measures and special 
incentive arrangements related to the observance and improvement of 
democracy, human rights and good governance conditions in selected countries. 
Similarly, technical assistance was offered to promote these principles. 
However, in the 1980s, the clause was not used in the case of China, not even 
in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre, when all political contacts were 
suspended. Subsequently, with the reinforcement of the conditionality applied to 
the GSP, the EP began to call upon the Commission to start enquiries into 
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forced labour and prison labour in China in accordance with Article 9 of the 
GSP regulations.2  
A similar position was shared by the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), which became more and more vocal in the mid-1990s in its support of 
the GSP clause to promote respect for worker’s rights in China. With the 
inclusion of further clauses, such as those on the suspension of preferences for 
goods produced with slave labour and the penalisation of those countries 
withholding the right to freedom of association, further requests were made. Yet 
they fell on deaf ears. 
The Commission never embarked on any of the potential investigations that 
were requested by the EP and the ETUC nor proposed to the Council the 
suspension of special measures. This attitude is motivated by the fact that at 
Council level, most member states were against sanctioning China on the issue 
of human rights. This has been shown in Chapter 3 in relation to the three case 
studies analysed. The Commission reflected the positions of the member states 
which were against negative conditionality towards China.3 The most influential 
among them were Germany, France and the UK, as shown in Chapter 3. 
The extension of the GSP to China slowly began to fade only in the late 
1990s. Yet this was not motivated by principled reasons but rather by the 
commercial interests of the member states that wanted to protect the European 
market from being flooded by Chinese goods. Paradoxically, one is forced to 
point out that there was only one instance of trade sanctions over human rights 
in the relations between China and the EU. This occurred when China imposed 
sanctions against Denmark – and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Ireland –  
                                                 
2 Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights, p. 191. 
3 The attitudes of the member states against economic sanctions towards China to promote 
human rights respect has emerged during interviews with member states’ embassy officials. 
Interviews 8, 12, 16, 19 and 20. 
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after they tabled and sponsored the resolution against the PRC at the UNCHR 
meeting of 1997. An unusual case of trade sanctions in defence of human rights 
indeed. But certainly a proof of the symmetric conditionality between China and 
the EU, and of the latter’s weakness due to its internal divisions. 
4.2.2 EC-China negotiations for WTO 
Another important venue worth considering in order to appreciate the EC’s 
commitment to the promotion of human rights through economic engagement is 
the negotiations for China’s WTO accession. The EC often portrays its 
negotiations with China as shaped by constructive engagement. However, as 
will appear from the discussion below, this was neither the case in the strictly-
defined economic negotiations which will be analysed in this section nor in the 
efforts to put in place concrete policies for the promotion of the rule of law and 
human rights which will be analysed in the next section.4  
At WTO level the EC’s requests did not significantly differ from those of 
other Western countries. Similarly to those countries, the EU had two 
outstanding issues with China: the trade deficit and the desire to increase its 
direct investments in the country. In the 1990s the commercial relations 
between the EU and the PRC were strongly favourable to the latter. Ever since 
the early 1990s, Europe’s commercial balance with China had entered into a 
deficit. In 1993, the European trade deficit was at EUR 8.76 billion. In 2001, the 
deficit had reached EUR 45.1 billion. Accordingly, the trade deficit was an 
important issue in the EC’s negotiations with China for its accession to the 
WTO.  
                                                 
4 The negative opinion on the EC constructive engagement of China in the strictly economic 
negotiations for accession into the WTO is generally shared by Chinese academics and officials. 
Interviews 28, 29, 31, and 33. 
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First of all, throughout the 1990s, China was the country most accused of 
dumping by the EC.5 Secondly, the EC often complained about the unfairness of 
the trading relations with the PRC, as the three Commission Communications 
on China have subsequently pointed out. The following passage of the 1998 
Communication is representative of the European objectives in trade with 
China:  
The EU’s trade deficit with China reached 20 billion ECU in 1997, reflecting 
China’s growing export capacity as well as the obstructive effect of market 
barriers in China itself. The EU should use all available channels, notably 
China’s WTO accession process and the EU’s bilateral trade negotiations, to 
iron out such barriers and help create an open Chinese economy that benefits 
European and global interests alike. Improving the climate for European 
investment in China should also be one of the EU’s top objectives.6 
 
As illustrated in the previous Chapter trade deficit levels were not worrying in 
most EU member states, but they were in France, Germany and Italy. Therefore 
it is not difficult to see the hands of these countries behind the EC’s insistence 
on this policy issue. 
The second major issue in the EC’s negotiations for China’s accession into 
the WTO was the growing interests of the member states to enter the Chinese 
market for its investment potential. This was particularly the case of Germany 
and France, as will also be illustrated in Chapter 5. While the EU appears to 
have contributed a relevant transfer of technology, the European FDIs trailed far 
behind those of the biggest investors in China, namely Hong Kong, Japan and 
the US.7 It was only after the second half of the 1990s that the EU member 
states became more aware of the investment potential in China, whose foreign 
                                                 
5 Xiang Liu and Hylke Vandenbussche, ‘European Union Anti-Dumping Cases Against China’, 
Journal of World Trade, Vol. 36, No. 6, 2002, p.1125.  
6 European Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, p. 6. 
7  Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Wei Qian, ‘Technology Transfer: A Mode of 
Collaboration Between the European Union and China’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 203-222. 
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investment regime was further opened with the sweeping changes following 
Deng Xiaoping’s Tour of Southern China. 
European companies began to appreciate the opportunities of the Chinese 
market and a new European policy towards FDIs was set down in the 1995 
Commission Communication on China. This led to increased European 
investments, followed by an important shift in the type of investments, which 
moved from being markedly “resource seeking” to “market seeking”. Yet, the 
EU continued to remain a minor investor in China. Today, for example, the EU 
is still only the fourth biggest investor in China. 
On the basis of the bilateral economic structure and of the European 
economic concerns towards China it is possible to understand the European 
interest to see China join the WTO. Apart from meeting the key principles of 
the WTO, namely the transparency requirement, the national treatment and the 
most-favoured-nation treatment, the EC insisted that China: 
• Offer real market access for industrial and agricultural goods by 
cutting tariffs significantly – including the removal of tariff "peaks" 
(duties of 15% and higher) and adherence to the Information 
Technology Agreement –  and by removing all quotas, unjustified 
technical barriers to trade and other non-tariff measures. 
• Rapidly remove the current monopolies on foreign trade so that all 
Chinese or foreign nationals in China can engage in import and 
export.  
• Provide substantial opening of China’s services market in 
distribution, telecoms, financial services, professional services, 
tourism, travel and medical services.  
• Improve the conditions for foreign companies establishing in China. 
This includes removing all restrictions on the legal form of 
establishment (whether as a joint venture or a wholly-owned 
company), lifting geographic restrictions and those on the scope of 
permitted activity, and removing pre-establishment conditions. It also 
includes the removal of export performance requirements and export 
subsidies.  
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• Rapid implementation of the WTO TRIPS Agreement and full 
enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights.8 
In light of the above desiderata, the Commission’s rhetoric of a constructive 
engagement through economic engagement in WTO negotiations is easy to 
dismiss in the strictly economic negotiations. Besides, in support of this 
opinion, it is important to underline two other elements that the EC imposed on 
China for its accession to the WTO: the safeguards measures and the further 
requests advanced after the US’s conclusion of negotiations with the PRC.  
Due to its concerns with the trade deficit, the Commission was firm in 
introducing safeguards and antidumping measures. In the negotiations, the EC 
supported restrictions, which even went against WTO regulations, in order to 
preserve its internal market from Chinese competition. This was further 
compounded by the non-extension of the market-economy status, which enables 
the EC to maintain some protectionist measures, as is demonstrated by the 
numerous antidumping cases against China still occurring in recent years. 
After China concluded the WTO deal with the United States the Commission 
embarked on very tough negotiations with China, which led to the obtainment 
of numerous concessions in the interest of the main EU partners with China. 
The EC’s additional conditions related mainly to access in sectors of greater 
importance to European companies (mostly French, German and British), such 
as automobiles, telecommunications, retail chains and financial services. 
The EC’s requests for China’s accession to the WTO and the further 
requirements imposed on China in its bilateral negotiations for entry into the 
WTO show that the EC’s constructive engagement towards China’s accession 
was only so on paper. Besides, and perhaps more importantly for this study, in 
                                                 
8 European Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, p. 15. 
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its strictly economic negotiations the EC never paid attention to the negative 
effects that the liberalisation of the Chinese market might have had on the socio-
economic rights of its citizens. Finally, the EC’s WTO negotiations strongly 
reflected the interests of those member states which had deeper economic 
relations with China, i.e. Germany, France and the UK. Where then were the 
alleged claims that through economic engagement and concrete policies the EC 
promoted the rule of law, good governance and human rights in China during its 
negotiations for China’s entry into the WTO? 
4.2.3 The EC’s promotion of human rights through WTO? 
It is certainly true that the WTO is not a venue to talk about human rights. 
When the EC and the US tried to include social clauses during the last WTO 
round they failed blatantly. In fact some analysts fear that the WTO prevents the 
punishment of human rights violations.9 At the same time the importance of 
trade for emerging countries is undeniable. Therefore China’s entry into the 
WTO could have been used to apply conditionality related to certain human 
rights standards, while at the same time pushing for the acceptance of practical 
activities to promote the administrative and economic reforms in the rule of law. 
This requires analysing whether the EC put forward any discussion on 
human rights and the rule of law in the run up to China’s entry into the WTO. 
The topic can be addressed along two lines: whether the Commission ever 
linked China’s accession to WTO with concrete improvements of human rights 
and the rule of law, and whether specific concessions and projects were agreed 
on during the WTO negotiations. 
                                                 
9 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, ‘Trade Sanctions and Human Rights. Past, Present and Future’, 
Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2003, pp. 797-839. 
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As far as the first line of inquiry is concerned, one is forced to admit that the 
WTO does not cover any issue of human rights and the rule of law, nor is there 
any mention of them in any of the 14 agreements that are necessary to join the 
Organization. Therefore it would have been rather difficult for the Commission 
to place any specific request before admitting China to the club.  
There is yet another important issue that must not be overlooked and which 
pertains to the Commission’s real competences. Unlike the US negotiators, 
European officials did not have a trade policy to refer to in order to link human 
rights with trade. As argued by Marina Eglin with reference to the EC 
negotiations for China’s entry into the WTO,  
the fact that the European Union does not face the handicap of a 
unified supranational trade legislation has enabled its trade 
commissioner to concentrate on furthering commercial and business 
interests and on improving trade relations with China in a 
multilateral context without the baggage of human rights and anti-
communist lobbies. Critical statements on China’s human rights 
policy are issued by the Parliament but as a rule they do not figure 
in the Commission trade policy objectives.10 
 
As far as the EC’s request for specific improvements in human rights are 
concerned, since the preparatory works for the 1995 Commission 
Communication, the ETUC intensively lobbied Trade Commissioner Brittan for 
more references to the practices in labour camps and “special economic areas”, 
which exploited prisoners and workers to produce cheap goods for the European 
market.  
Similarly, the ETUC argued that China’s entry into the WTO should be made 
conditional on respect for human rights. Specifically, it put forward that the EC 
should insist that China must comply with working standards as set by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ETUC pointed out the issues of 
                                                 
10 Marina Eglin, ‘China’s Entry into the WTO with a little help from the EU’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, 1997, pp. 496-497. 
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fundamental workers’ rights to freedom of association and the rights to organise 
and to bargain collectively, as they are subject to serious violations in China. 
Similarly it noted the substantial evidence of the existence of child and forced 
labour .11  
Against such criticism and requests Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan 
acknowledged that human rights violations “continue to be a part of everyday 
life in China”. However, in Brittan’s opinion, these concerns should not get in 
the way of future cooperation because political reform would become 
increasingly irresistible as China’s economy opens up to the rest of the world. 
Consequently, he maintained “what we can do is encourage economic 
liberalization”.12 
The rhetoric and actions of the then Trade Commissioner are important to 
underline in light of the EU’s rhetorical commitment to promote second-
generation rights. From the analysis, though, it appears that the Commission, on 
behalf of its main member states, never used the WTO negotiations to promote 
respect for such rights. This is also strikingly out of tune with the actual requests 
of the Chinese civil society as well as with the Chinese government’s efforts to 
promote such rights, as shown in Chapter 1.  
The only concession that the EC made to the requests coming from the EP, 
ETUC and European civil society was the elaboration and implementation of 
specific projects for the support of China’s reforms in preparation for its entry 
into the WTO. In this sense the EC was quick to respond to China’s request for 
support through projects on the ground. 
The EC set up several projects in support of China’s administrative and 
economic reforms, mostly in the sectors of public administration, intellectual 
                                                 
11 Quoted in Inter Press Service, 10 October 1995. 
12 Quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1995 
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property rights and commercial law. Although these initiatives represented a 
significant portion of the EC’s development assistance to China, it appears that 
they were narrowly focused on technical aspects.13  
Even the EC’s delegation officials interviewed on this topic indirectly 
support this interpretation. When asked whether the EC intends to promote 
social and economic rights through its projects in support of China’s accession 
to the WTO, they provided elusive answers, mostly focused on the improvement 
of administrative and economic laws.14 
From the above analysis it emerges that the EC did not use its proposal 
power to apply GSP conditionality to promote human rights. Similarly, lacking 
competences to link human rights with trade negotiations, the EC’s negotiators 
never had to confront China on these issues while negotiating China’s entry into 
the WTO. If this was not enough, the so-called ‘constructive engagement’ 
through trade did not deserve its name. In fact the Commission bargained 
strongly to obtain several concessions from China, particularly in the interests 
of some member states, such as France, Germany and the UK. Finally, it only 
put forward very narrowly-focused and technical projects in support of 
administrative and economic reforms, which are hard to consider positive 
evidence for the improvement of human rights in the country.  
Therefore it can be maintained that the EC was not able to formulate and 
implement economic policies consistent with the objective of promoting human 
rights and the rule of law in China. This was mostly due to the influence of the 
member states which had deeper and more significant economic relations with 
China, i.e. Germany, France and the UK. First these member states influenced 
                                                 
13 This opinion is expressed by Richard Youngs in Richard Youngs, The European Union and 
the Promotion of Democracy.  
14 Interviews 1 and 3. 
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the EC to refrain from applying economic sanctions on China for its human 
rights abuses. Second they supported the EC in the negotiation of very harsh 
conditions for China’s accession into the WTO. Third they restricted the EC’s 
projects in support of China’s economic reform to very narrowly-focused 
administrative and commercial issues in connection to WTO requests and 
without any reference to human rights. It is interesting to note that these projects 
reflected those carried out by the three member states in China, as will be shown 
in the next Chapter, thus further suggesting their influence on the EC. 
4.3 The EC’s promotion of human rights through development 
In the mid-1990s Chinese authorities proved more willing to accept projects 
on the ground. These projects reflected the shift to constructive engagement 
adopted by most Western countries and international organisations in those 
years and together with the bilateral dialogues can be seen as the Chinese 
‘reward’ for those countries’ softer attitudes at UN level.15 
The EC’s efforts in China reflected the growing interests of the EU to 
collaborate with China in the field of human rights, good governance and the 
rule of law, following the inception of the strategy of constructive engagement. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, the Commission began to consider such types of 
projects with the Chinese authorities. As was stated during interviews, at that 
time Commissioners and other officials were eager to start such projects to 
counter-act the end of the sanctioning policy on human rights towards China.16  
This section considers how the EC attempted to promote human rights 
through its development assistance. It also shows that the EC’s development 
                                                 
15 One of the most active organisations in the development of good governance, the rule of law 
and human rights projects in China at that time was the UNDP. The fact that it does not 
represent any specific countries’ interests allowed the UNDP more freedom to operate in such 
sectors, as emerged during interview. Interview 25. 
16 Interview 5. 
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assistance evolved alongside the first Commission Communication on China in 
order to reflect the increasing desire of EC officials to promote human rights 
and the rule of law through projects on the ground. To what extent this 
evolution reflected a consistent commitment to promote human rights in the 
country is considered in the sections below. 
4.3.1 The EC’s development assistance in China 
The EC’s development assistance in China began in 1984 but it only took off 
in the wake of the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement, when an increase in 
size and scope of development assistance can be discerned. Then, between 1991 
and 1994, under the basic budget lines for development aid and economic 
cooperation in Asia, about ECU 20 million were set aside each year for China. 
Mirroring the lack of any involvement and attention to the domestic situation 
of China which characterised the EC and the member states’ approach to the 
country in the 1980s, during those years and up to 1995 the EC’s development 
assistance to the PRC did not cover concerns for principles of democracy, 
human rights and good governance but was concentrated on infrastructure, 
agricultural and rural projects.17 
Although the Asian and Latin America (ALA) Regulation, which governs 
development assistance activities of the EC with China, provided an extensive 
human rights clause incorporating to a large extent positive conditionality, it is 
interesting to note that from the beginning of the development activities in the 
country and up to 1994, the EC’s development assistance to China was not 
significantly affected by events occurring in the PRC, including the Tiananmen 
                                                 
17 The projects centred on the rural sector in its broadest sense, covering varied fields such as 
soil and water conservation, food processing and storage, as well as the improvement of crop 
yields. In parallel with the programme of technical and financial assistance a programme of 
economic cooperation developed in the 1980s. 
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Massacre. Apart from a brief suspension in the aftermath of the June 4th events, 
the previously agreed development assistance activities continued unhindered. 
The EC’s approach began to change with the 1995 Commission 
Communication, which reflected China’s graduation from a traditional 
‘developing country’ to an ‘economy in transition’.18 At the same time the EC’s 
budgetary resources tripled reaching EUR 70 million per year up to 1999. 
Accordingly the Commission and China’s Ministry of Technology and 
Commerce (now Ministry of Commerce – MOFCOM) took a strategic decision: 
to move away from individual infrastructure and rural development projects, to 
a broader range of projects aimed at supporting the overall reform process.  
In particular, the 1995 Communication stated that development assistance 
should be aimed at underpinning the Chinese government’s strategy to 
accelerate economic, social and administrative reform and China’s integration 
into the world economy. From the mid-1990s China also became a beneficiary 
of a number of the EC’s regional programmes, such as Asia Invest (China was 
the biggest recipient), Asia Urbs, Asia Pro ECO I, Asia IT&C, Asia Link, as 
well as EC thematic programmes, such as the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights. Yet, notwithstanding the web of different 
budget lines, Richard Youngs notes that “even if community aid to China 
increased significantly in the first half of the decade, it was by a lesser 
proportionate amount than development assistance to most other Asian states”.19 
Reflecting the institutionalisation of political and economic dialogues and the 
Commission’s stated objectives of supporting China’s reform as well as its 
integration into the international system, the subsequent Communications 
prescribed that EC-funded cooperation programmes needed to be even more 
                                                 
18 Interview 1. 
19 Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, p.167. 
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closely linked with the EU’s broader China policy. The Communications called 
for the EC to seize the chance to underscore its policies with concrete assistance 
projects.20 
Negotiations progressed slowly due to the reluctance of Chinese officials to 
open up new and, most importantly, sensitive sectors of collaboration. At the 
same time the negotiations closely followed the trajectory of the ECDHR, thus 
being suspended in 1996 and resumed the next year as a ‘reward’ for the EU 
member states’ policy shift at the UNCHR.  
Subsequently, the 2001 Communication suggested and defined concrete and 
practical short- and medium-term actions for the EC’s policy to progress more 
effectively towards the long-term aims defined in 1998. It also prescribed 
making better use of the EC’s cooperation programmes with China by 
reinforcing long-term programming, agreeing on a Country Strategy Paper 
(CSP) and focusing the EC’s assistance activities in three main areas. These 
were (i) the promotion of sustainable development, (ii) the encouragement of 
good governance initiatives and the promotion of the rule of law, and (iii) 
support for economic and social reform. 21  In 2001 these three areas were 
incorporated in the CSP for China. 
                                                 
20 Up to 1998 the EC had tended to concentrate on high-budget programmes spread over several 
years in order to maximise the impact of a limited cooperation budget. However the 1998 
Communication proposed five important refinements: (i) facilitate rapid funding of small, short-
term projects requested by Beijing; (ii) increase synergy between the EU’s China policy 
objectives and cooperation programmes; (iii) improve synergy with EU member states; (iv) 
cooperate with the EIB to expand EIB activities in China within existing mandates; (v) 
strengthen regular dialogue with China on programming and project cycles. 
21  The budget for the EU-China cooperation programme 2001-2005 was around EUR 250 
million (grant form). In 2000 the annual EU-China Joint Committee meeting agreed that 
cooperation priorities for the near future (2001-2003) would include assistance in support of 
WTO accession, the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, social 
security reform, the telecommunication/information society, environment, energy, and human 
resource development. It was also agreed that Western provinces should benefit more from EU 
assistance and that China should be more involved with future planning and programming 
(ownership). 
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In a recent review of the EC’s China development cooperation it emerged 
that since 1998 the EC has allocated EUR 456 million, which were mostly 
distributed as follows: EUR 195 million to economic and social reform, EUR 
138 to environment and EUR 70 million to human rights, the rule of law and 
good governance.22 It is worth noting once again the limited value of the EC’s 
co-operation budget, which represented only 1% of net ODA devoted to China. 
With regard to grant aid, the figure stood at 2% (see Table 4). 
Table 4: The EC’s ODA to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total ODA ODA share (DAC) 
1985 0.9 0.10% 
1990 41.2 1.98% 
1995 32.7 0.93% 
2000 27.44 2.18% 
2005 66.87 3.95% 
2008 42.07 3.58% 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
Similarly, in the case of the activities undertaken it is worth pointing to the 
fact that only one of the three objectives included human rights promotion. In 
addition, the sector of socio-economic development was merely concerned with 
support to administrative, financial and economic reforms, in particular with 
reference to China’s entry into the WTO, as has been shown in the previous 
section. Thus little space was left to promote social and economic rights through 
this budget line. The next sections specifically analyse the main projects set in 
place for the promotion of the rule of law and human rights through the specific 
budget lines set out by the Commission. 
                                                 
22  European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation and 
Partnership with the People’s Republic of China, Country Level Evaluation, 2nd Draft Final 
Synthesis Report, March 2007. 
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4.3.2 The EC’s support of political reform in China 
After long drawn-out discussions and negotiations, China agreed on 
cooperation programmes designed to strengthen the rule of law and promote 
civil, political, economic and social rights. Among these initiatives, two 
Programmes, the EU-China Legal and Judicial Cooperation Programme (LJC) 
and the EU-China Village Governance Training (VGT) Programme, became the 
largest foreign cooperation initiatives in China in the fields of social 
development and governance and they will be detailed in the next sections. At 
the same time the EC started the implementation of several EIDHR projects, 
which will be considered in this section. 
These projects claimed to tackle human rights issues primarily by promoting 
the rule of law through the support of legal reforms and village governance, 
sectors where most foreign observers believed they saw inklings of democracy 
in China.23 The engagement in the support of the rule of law was motivated by 
two factors. First the rule of law was a more neutral field than that of human 
rights, although a broader concept of the rule of law could clearly include a 
human rights dimension. Second, the Chinese authorities were certainly less 
sensitive to activities in this sector, as the implementation of the principles of 
the rule of law had become a priority of President Jiang Zemin since 1997.24  
However, the rule of law is a highly contested concept, which even in the 
West can give rise to hot debates depending on the legal traditions of each 
country. In China the blurriness of the rule of law is further complicated by the 
                                                 
23 The study of Suzanne Ogden comprehensively explores the democratic potentials behind the 
institutionalisation of procedural democracy through village and township elections. Suzanne 
Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Asian 
Centre, Harvard University Press, 2002. 
24 After his rise to power, in 1997, during the XVI CCP Congress, Jiang endorsed the idea of 
“ruling the country in accordance with the law and establishing a socialist rule of law state”, 
which was later enshrined in the Chinese constitution in 1999. 
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Chinese communist ideology, which has often referred to the Party’s “rule by 
law”.25 The dichotomy between rule of law and rule by law dominated the 
Chinese debate as well as that among internal and external observers, without 
yet leading to a clear interpretation of the Chinese political reform since the 
1990s.26 The EC’s activities in this sector faced a similar lack of clarity and 
consequently of purpose. 
In the specific sector of human rights promotion, China had been a focus 
country for the EIDHR since its creation in 1994. Country-specific priorities 
included: (i) freedom of association, (ii) freedom of expression and independent 
media, (iii) strengthening of civil society organisations, and (iv) protection of 
ethnic minorities. The EIDHR funded micro as well as macro projects: the 
micro projects, whose value was within EUR 100 thousand were open to 
Chinese institutions and were awarded by the Commission’s Delegation in 
Beijing; the macro projects were open to European NGOs, which were required 
to create consortia with Chinese local NGOs, and were generally awarded in 
Brussels. 
Overall EIDHR macro projects were focused on the following issues: 
strengthening the defence for death penalty cases, making torture accountable, 
removing the death penalty, minority rights in Xinjiang and democratic 
processes and public participation. The EIDHR micro-projects instead focused 
on rights education and dissemination, research on international human rights 
                                                 
25 See on this point Joseph Fewsmith’s discussion of Mao’s former secretary, Li Rui, and his 
approach to political reform in the wake of Jiang Zemin’s adoption of the rule of law at the XVI 
CCP Congress. Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: the Politics of Transition, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 127-128.  
26 Main contributions to this debate include Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Towards 
the Rule of Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006 and the special issue of the 
Journal of Contemporary China, where various authors discussed Pan Wei’s argument of a 
consultative rule of law regime in China. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34, 
2003. 
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practice, training of police and various other initiatives in defence of minorities, 
women, children and workers’ rights (see Table 5).  
Once again, in the light of the discussion of the Chinese government rhetoric 
and practice of human rights in Chapter 1, it is important to note that none of 
these projects was centred on the promotion of social and economic rights. As it 
appears the EIDHR was only focused on the promotion of political and civil 
rights. This point is important to underline. On the one hand the insistence on 
these types of projects was negatively interpreted by the Chinese authorities, 
which would have been more prone to accept projects in favour of social and 
economic rights.27 This point emerged during interviews with representatives of 
MOFCOM and of the Chinese Ministry of Finance. As the two Ministries are 
delegated to deal with foreign cooperation, this is an important point, which 
appears to have been overlooked by the EU officials. On the other hand, the EC 
seemed oblivious of the Chinese societal requests that were emerging in those 
years and that were mostly centred on the improvement of social and economic 
rights, as has been shown in Chapter 1. 
In China EIDHR projects encountered several difficulties. First and foremost 
the Chinese authorities always made the projects subject to their approval, 
although this was openly infringing the principles of EIDHR. For example in 
2004 no grant was allocated within that year’s Call for Proposal for micro 
projects because of disagreement between the Chinese government and the 
Commission’s Delegation in Beijing.28 Second, the nature of NGOs in China, 
often better described as Government-Operated Non Governmental 
Organisations (GONGO), and the registration requirements imposed on them, 
                                                 
27 Interviews 28 and 29. 
28 Interview 3. 
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complicated the selection of the most suitable NGOs in line with the EIDHR 
requirements for independence and non-commercial purpose.29 
Table 5: The EC’s projects in the rule of law and human rights in China 
Year Project Title/Description
Amount 
grant/loan
(in million euro)
MS Agency 
responsible Chinese Agency/Partner
Category 
1999-2005
EU-China Legal and Judicial Co-operation 
Programme
13.20 EC Delegation Ministry of Justice 
Training and Exchange 
Programme
2001-2007
EU-China Intellectual Property Rights Co-
operation Programme
5.60 EC Delegation
Chinese Patent Office, 
State Intellectual Property 
Office, Chinese 
Trademark Office and 
National Copyright 
Administration of China
Training and Exchange 
Programme
2001-2008
EU-China Village Governance Training 
Programme
10.67 EC Delegation
Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MoCA); Ministry of 
Commerce
Training Programme
2002-2004 Human Rights Training of Police in Hunan 0.09
Danish Center for 
Human Rights
Training Programme
2003
Human Rights Law Training for University 
Teachers
0.07 EC Delegation
Human Rights Center 
China University of 
Political Science and 
Law
Training Programme
2003-2007
China Europe Public Administration 
Programme (CEPA)
5.70 EC Delegation
MOFCOM, 
China National School of 
Administration
Training and Exchange 
Programme
2002-2004
Cooperation in the field of economic, social and 
cultural rights (Macro-EIDHR)
0.70 EC Delegation MOFCOM
Human Rights 
Promotion
2004-2005
EU-China Human Rights Network (Macro-
EIDHR)
0.80
Irish Center for 
Human Rights
MOFCOM Technical Assistance
2003-2006
Strengthening the defence of death penalty 
cases in the PRC (Macro-EIDHR)
0.50
Great Britain China 
Center
MOFCOM Training Programme
EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROJECTS IN RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Source: Overview of European Union Ongoing Projects in China, Various Years 1995-
2008, EC Delegation in China, Own Calculations. 
 
Against this backdrop and considering the limited amount of money 
available for EIDHR projects worldwide, the EC’s officials often debated 
whether or not to continue with EIDHR funded projects in the PRC.30 This 
debate was also compounded by the Chinese government not showing any sign 
of interest in continuing such activities, as indirectly pointed out in its 2003 EU 
Policy Paper. It appears that in the 2007-2013 EIDHR funding, no project will 
be financed in China.31  
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 The debate has been underlined in various interviews with EC officials in Beijing. Interviews 
1 and 2.  
31 European Commission, China - Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, European Commission, 
2006. 
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4.3.3 The Legal and Judicial Cooperation Programme 
The EU-China Legal and Judicial Cooperation Programme originated from 
the 1995 Communication, which had as one of its objectives the contribution to 
the development in China of a civil society and institutions based on the rule of 
law. The Communication’s section on human rights stressed the necessity to 
link the bilateral dialogue to practical actions, the importance of the EC’s 
support to establish the rule of law in the country, and the necessity to 
coordinate member states’ efforts in the field. 
A 1995 EC internal identification report pointed to a historic moment for 
legislative reform in China, both in terms of quantity (number of reforms) and 
quality (depth of reforms), and a widespread interest among Chinese authorities 
to learn from the EU and its member states’ experience.32 It was also pointed 
out that the support and interest from Chinese authorities had a lot to do with 
China’s intention to cooperate with the EC in an attempt to distance itself from 
the mounting American activism in such sectors in China.33 The report thus 
suggested the strategic importance of setting up such a programme for the EC, 
also in consideration of the fact that no similar European programme existed at 
that time and the member states were running “uncoordinated and patchy” 
projects in the field of legal cooperation. 
However, several years had to pass before the LJC Programme could 
materialise, due in particular to the 1995 set-back caused by the member states’ 
insistence on tabling and supporting a resolution against China at the UNCHR, 
                                                 
32 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘Report on a Mission to China on Co-operation between the EU and 
China in the Legal Field’, European University Institute, Florence and Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels, 1995. 
33 Interview 5. 
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which had led to the suspension of the newly-started ECDHR. Only after the 
European policy shift at the UNCHR in 1997 did negotiations resume.34 
In 1997 an EC formulation report justified the LJC Programme on the basis 
of three main reasons: (i) the reluctance by many Chinese government officials 
to accept the concept of the rule of law; (ii) the rapid proliferation of laws and 
regulations; and (iii) the problematic implementation and enforcement of laws 
and regulations.35 The report suggested a five-year programme for the training 
of legal and judicial professionals in administrative, civil and commercial law as 
well as relevant areas of public and international law. 
It is important at this point to stress the narrow technical and economic focus 
of the LJC Programme, the areas of civil and commercial law being so 
preponderant. Similarly the report did not make any reference to concerns for 
human rights, although this was justified by the alleged risk of incurring 
Chinese criticism. Apparently only after the first mid-term evaluation report of 
the LJC Programme were human rights concerns included into the training 
courses.36 
Besides the thematic focus, it should be noted that no reference was made to 
institution-strengthening, arguably an essential objective for the overall 
improvement of the rule of law in the country. From an interview it emerged 
that institution building was deliberately avoided because “sometimes you 
should not strengthen institutions which are part of the problem”.37  
The LJC Programme’s focus was on key officials, professionals and 
academics for their high potential to be promoters of change through their future 
                                                 
34 The connection between the abandonment of the UNCHR resolution and the inception of 
these projects has been made by Michael Palmer. Interview 5. 
35 Bernard Dewit and Michael Palmer, ‘Legal and Judicial Cooperation Between the European 
Union and the People’s Republic of China’, December 1997. 
36 Interview 5. 
37 Ibid. 
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actions. The insistence on training key figures contrasted with the selection 
procedure, which was closely monitored and influenced by the Chinese 
government, thus lowering expectations on reformist attitudes of these alleged 
‘promoters of change’. 
When the LJC Programme eventually took off in 2000 it was structured 
along the following components: training components, which included the 
exchanges of lawyers (nine-month course in Europe), training for judges and 
prosecutors (three-month exposure to European practice in the legal process), 
the visitors’ programme for key legal officials focusing on various themes (four-
week study tour in Europe), and the Directors’ facility, a small grant component 
(EUR 1.8 million) supporting a wide range of small but high impact co-
operation activities in the legal field. 
Notwithstanding the initial delays the LJC Programme ran for five years and 
was positively evaluated by its implementers, external reviewers and the 
Chinese authorities for its efficient management as well as for the impact it 
achieved.38 For the first the LJC Programme’s “impact has been especially, 
although not exclusively, among legal professionals and it has greatly 
encouraged Chinese legal professionals to look to Europe for models of best 
legal practice”.39 The stress on Europe is of some interest because it points to 
the fact that rather than international best practices, the LJC Programme focused 
on introducing European ones, as if it somehow tended to introduce a rule of 
law more familiar to Europeans. 
                                                 
38 At the end of the Programme 75 lawyers were trained and 78 prosecutors were instructed in 
Europe. The term lawyers is to be interpreted in a broad sense, indicating not just private sector 
practitioners but also judges, prosecutors, legislators, notaries, legal academics and lawyers in 
government service. As for the prosecutors, the term refers to judges and procurators. These two 
categories of professionals had been bundled together with the intention of reaching cost-
effectiveness but have in practice received different training based on their official duties. 
39 Interview 3. 
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In 2007 an evaluation of EC-China development cooperation initiatives 
carried out by external evaluators also referred to the LJC Programme as an 
“eye opener” for legal professionals, academics and senior governmental 
officials. 40  However, it was noted that the LJC Programme lacked any 
dissemination component, thus making it only relevant to the various 
participants. How the latter have then disseminated their new understanding of 
the rule of law remains to be researched. 
Finally, a positive assessment was provided by Chinese authorities and 
participants, who reportedly expressed their appreciation in several official 
meetings. 41  Perhaps even more important was the request that the Chinese 
government put forward for the creation of a European Law School. This is 
certainly a sign of what some interviewees have interpreted as the Chinese 
desire to distance themselves from American cooperation in favour of European 
support. 
The rosy picture painted by the EC’s officials, external evaluators, LJC 
Programme beneficiaries and Chinese authorities, should not conceal perhaps 
the biggest flaw of the LJC Programme. Mirroring somehow the technical and 
economic approach of the Commission, the LJC Programme mostly stressed 
civil, commercial and administrative law, paying very little attention to issues of 
human rights such as the criminal code, due process of law, protection of 
minorities etc. Besides, the LJC Programme was limited to training of officials, 
professionals and academics. 
Second, training in best practices belongs to a very soft attempt to influence 
the improvements of existing institutions or even their transformation. The lack 
                                                 
40  European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation and 
Partnership with the People’s Republic of China, Country Level Evaluation. 
41 Interview 28. 
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of any practical research activity on new institutional reform plans was a major 
shortcoming. Besides, the fact that the best practices were European does not 
bode well for the support of the international human rights regime.  
Third, training in itself does not automatically translate into sustainability, 
which is a key criterion for any good development cooperation project. This 
latter point was never mentioned in the formulation of the Programme and 
during interviews it emerged that it was never a concern for anyone involved in 
the Programme.42 Finally, coordination with the member states was completely 
absent, as each member state continued with its legal and judicial cooperation 
projects without trying to coordinate or complement activities.43 It is important 
to underline that this type of programme strongly resembled those of Germany, 
France and to a lesser extent the UK, as will be shown in the next Chapter. 
It therefore appears that rather than being substantive, the LJC Programme 
resembled more a display window. On the one hand the EC’s officials could 
show their concrete commitment to improving the course of Chinese reform. On 
the other hand Chinese officials could use such a Programme as a sign of good 
will in cooperating with the EC, while at the same time sending a strong signal 
to the US attempts, mostly through its foundations, to finance similar projects in 
China. While the actual impact of such a programme remains difficult to assess, 
the shortcomings highlighted point to a lack of strategic vision on the side of the 
EC to push the Chinese government towards more concrete and focused 
activities in support of human rights protection and promotion.  
                                                 
42 Interview 5. 
43 The lack of coordination emerged during interviews with representatives of member states 
which had similar projects in China. Interviews 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20 and 21. 
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4.3.4 The Village Governance Training Programme 
The fact that Chinese officials were interested in working in the rule of law 
sector without any spill-over into more politically sensitive areas such as human 
rights, was also reflected in the other EC’s flagship initiative, the EU-China 
Village Governance Training Programme. Similarly to the LJC Programme, the 
VGT Programme was also internally approved in 1996 but took around five 
years to start up and this coincided with a visit of Commissioner Patten to China 
in 2001. 
In China village elections restarted in 1987, allegedly in order to respond to 
the growing discontent arising in the countryside. There the introduction of the 
‘household responsibility scheme’ had led to a deterioration of the overall 
welfare of farmers and villagers, corresponding to the shift in focus of reform 
from the countryside to the urban centres. For many foreign observers village 
elections appeared to be an important entry point for the democratisation of the 
country.44 
The VGT Programme should be read in connection with the 1998 
Commission Communication, which stated that “the EU should aim to 
strengthen those practices which make up the fabric of a strong civil society”. 
The Communication went on to point out that the EU “should promote civil and 
political rights through initiatives such as support for a training centre in China 
for officials engaged in the implementation of the village governance law”.45 
According to an EU official, by its very nature the VGT Programme was 
politically sensitive since for the Chinese it implied having foreigners working 
                                                 
44 Suzanne Ogden, Inklings of Democracy.  
45  The Project received a European Commission contribution equal to EUR 10.67 million. 
European Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China. 
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on one of China’s most sensitive reforms. 46  Therefore, at the time of 
negotiations the Chinese side expressly requested the Programme to be focused 
on village elections training without any attempt to reach higher levels such as 
township elections. Similarly, the Chinese side did not see, nor wanted 
Europeans to see, the VGT Programme in connection with human rights.47  
Chinese suspicions towards the VGT Programme were also strong within the 
Programme executing agency itself, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MOCA), where differing opinions existed on the opportunity of receiving the 
support of the EC in the field. During an interview it was pointed that, in the 
end, it was financial necessity that won over the more reluctant among Chinese 
officials rather than any real conviction. MOCA was in dire need of funding to 
sustain and improve the electoral system.48  
Another strong limitation of the VGT Programme was the Chinese 
unwillingness to make village elections accountable or at least open to the 
scrutiny of independent entities such as non-governmental organisations. An 
early reference to NGOs in a draft logical framework for the Programme was 
dropped during negotiations due to Chinese insistence that village elections 
were already submitted to the scrutiny of several organisations. Yet the latter’s 
level of independence remained debatable.  
The Programme formally took off only in 2001 but further delays in the 
implementation phase occurred due to misunderstandings on how to implement 
it. Once the VGT Programme took off the contents were disseminated and then 
                                                 
46 Interview 4. 
47 This point emerged during interviews with both European officials and Chinese academics. 
Interview s 4 and 23. 
48  Although it seems secondary, the financial issue should not be underestimated, because 
trainings and materials are very costly and the government allocations to the MOCA for such 
activities are not very high when compared to their geographical scope. For example MOCA 
had made an appeal to receive international support for training activities since 1995 but before 
2001 only UNDP had positively replied. However it should be noted that compared to the EU 
financial commitment the UNDP was much smaller, circa EUR 1.6 million. Interview 4. 
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several provinces applied. Eventually seven pilot provinces were identified and 
selected through open calls: Yunnan, Helongjiang, Gansu, Shandong, Liaoning, 
Henan, Jiangxi. At each pilot project collaborations were established with the 
local department of MOCA. Provincial trainers were educated in approaches, 
methodologies and contents. 
In the opinion of the European official in charge of the Programme this was 
one of the best performing EC initiatives worldwide in terms of results and 
output: 11 books were published after being reviewed and revised by MOCA 
officials; 100 trainers at central and local level were trained in teaching and 
developing textbooks. Four study tours were also provided in Europe and one in 
India and Korea. Finally the Programme did not miss the dissemination 
component and was good at public communication, not least thanks to the 
support of the Chinese authorities, which proposed a follow-up.49 
Overall, it appears that the VGT Programme achieved its stated goals and 
served to build an important base with all the material prepared, people trained 
and applied research carried out. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the impact 
of the Programme was only localised in the few pilot provinces or had a 
national impact. This is a problem also stressed in the recent report on the EC’s 
development activities in China.50  
4.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has analysed the consistency of the EC’s economic engagement 
and development assistance policies towards China with its objective of 
promoting human rights in the country. What emerges from the Chapter is that 
the EC was not consistent in its policies because it imposed a harsh economic 
                                                 
49 Interview 4. 
50  European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation and 
Partnership with the People’s Republic of China, Country Level Evaluation. 
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treatment on China without linking it with respect for human rights. Similarly, it 
did not put in place meaningful policies to concretely promote human rights and 
the rule of law. Third, the development projects that it implemented were 
strongly skewed towards the support of administrative and economic reforms in 
the rule of law. Finally, little attention was paid to human rights tout court, 
because most of the projects had a very technical nature and never crossed the 
strict limits imposed by the Chinese authorities. 
The story that emerges is a story of missed opportunities. In trade the 
Commission never exerted any of the powers it was entrusted with by the 
treaties. In the case of GSP its sensitivity to the Council’s ‘mood’ led it neither 
to start any investigations nor to propose any suspension in the face of grave 
violations. At the same time the Commission could carry on trade negotiations 
for China’s entry into the WTO almost unencumbered by human rights issues 
because of its lack of competences and powers to link trade with human rights. 
Even more strikingly it never even used any such opportunities to push forward 
more concrete projects in support of reforms in the field of social and economic 
human rights, which would have been easier to implement due to the Chinese 
government’s openness in this field and the support of the Chinese civil society.  
It thus appears that in its economic engagement of China, the EC closely 
followed the interests and preferences of the three selected member states by 
avoiding sanctioning policies, pushing for harsh conditions on China’s entry 
into the WTO, and putting in place projects of a very technical and 
administrative nature, in line with the economic priorities of the member states. 
In the case of development assistance it has been shown that the EC’s 
officials were eager to carry out projects in support of reform in China in order 
to compensate for the end of the sanctioning policy. However, despite having 
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carried out some of the largest programmes and projects in the country, the 
EC’s activities all had a rather technical and economic character and little 
attention was paid to human rights promotion apart from the troubled 
experience of the EIDHR projects. Finally the EC never tried to set in place 
policies or projects for the promotion of social and economic rights in China, 
which would have found more support among Chinese authorities and civil 
society, as maintained in Chapter 1 and as emerged in interviews.  
Accordingly it is possible to argue that even in the case of development 
policies the strategic and economic interests of the member states had a strong 
influence. Such policies were largely non-confrontational and they did not 
prioritise human rights promotion but rather the “domestication” of the Chinese 
administrative and judicial reforms, two features which also emerge in the 
member states’ development policies analysed in the next Chapter. 
To sum up, despite the expectations raised by the EU officials on the EC’s 
ability to practice positive conditionality towards China through economic 
engagement and development assistance, it has emerged that these claims 
cannot be confirmed. This is mostly due to a lack of consistency, which derives 
from the narrow economic focus of the Commission, largely influenced by the 
member states’ interests. This implied that the EC’s activities mostly promoted 
the economic objectives of the most influential member states through its 
commercial negotiations and through its activities in development assistance.  
This result is in line with the predictions of the framework developed in 
Chapter 2. Contrary to sociological institutionalist and constructivist 
expectations, even the so-called supranational level of the EC was strongly and 
negatively affected by the contrasting interests and policy preferences of the 
member states. In particular, the EC’s activities reflected the narrowly-focused 
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and technical approaches of Germany and France, which will be shown in the 
next Chapter. This also suggests, without proving it, that the socialisation 
expected by sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches may have 
been negative, because all the member states approved the EC’s narrowly-
focused and technical approach. To what extent the several, yet inconsistent, 
activities of the EC for the promotion of human rights in China were 
coordinated with those of the main partners of China in the EU is the topic of 
the next Chapter. 
 Chapter 5 – Coordination in the promotion of human 
rights 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter critically analyses the China policies of the three member states 
selected for the case studies, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, and 
their bilateral activities in the promotion of human rights in the PRC, especially 
from the mid-1990s. This Chapter aims at establishing the level of coordination 
between their development policies and those of the EC, which were analysed in 
the previous Chapter, in order to assess the extent to which the EC and its 
member states have tried to promote human rights in a coordinated way in 
China. This should assess whether the member states’ development policies 
were influenced by the EU institutions, identity and norms, as expected by 
sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches, or whether they 
remained a function of the member states’ national interests and policy 
preferences. 
It primarily emerges that each member state, despite differing historical 
relations with China, increasingly viewed the PRC as an important economic 
partner to strengthen its national economy. To this end each member state 
adopted ad hoc strategies to enter the Chinese market and exploit its investment 
potentials, often in competition not only with China’s main international 
economic partners but also with other EU member states. Secondly, in line with 
each member state’s identity and interests in world affairs, it emerges that 
Germany interpreted China’s rise mostly in terms of economic opportunities, 
that France viewed China as a natural ally for the creation of a multipolar world, 
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and the UK appreciated the importance of partnering with the PRC over a broad 
range of international issues. 
As far as each member state’s approach to the promotion of human rights in 
China is concerned, the story that emerges points to a sidelining of concerns for 
human rights in the pursuit of strategic and economic interests. This tendency 
was exacerbated by their membership of the EU and it became even clearer with 
the inception of the EU strategy of constructive engagement in China in 1995. 
In the case of Germany and France, the two main promoters of the EU 
strategy of constructive engagement, it is possible to note a clear delegation of 
responsibilities for the promotion of human rights in China to the EU level. Yet, 
while France delegated almost all responsibilities to promote political reform in 
China, Germany at least maintained practical activities in the support of the rule 
of law, although of a very narrow economic nature. In the case of Tony Blair’s 
UK, his initial leaning towards an ethical foreign policy, which was soon put 
aside, only superficially emerged and his several failures in human rights 
promotion in the PRC were shielded from internal criticism through reference to 
membership of the EU.  
These tendencies point to a limited coordination among the three main China 
partners in the EU with the EC’s activities for the promotion of human rights. 
Considering that these countries’ development assistance to China were the 
most conspicuous it suggests that the EU’s overall policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China through development assistance may not have reached 
any significant weight. Finally, the lack of coordination also illustrates the little 
influence exerted by the EU institutions, identity and norms in the formulation 
of the three selected member states’ national policies. On the contrary, the 
delegation of responsibilities to conduct normative policies from the member 
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states to the EC suggests that membership of the EU may even have had a 
negative influence, as it may have allowed member states to further dilute their 
commitments to norms promotion.  
5.2 Germany – China relations and human rights 
5.2.1 Evolution of Germany’s relations with China 
The main literature on Germany-China bilateral relations agrees on 
distinguishing a pre- and post- early 1990s period as these years represented a 
watershed from a traditional to a ‘special relationship’ between the two 
countries. 1  Naturally the Cold War calculations and Beijing’s rather timid 
attempts at economic reform in the 1980s did play an important role in 
preventing the fully-fledged development of bilateral relations before the early 
1990s. However, in the case of Germany, the division between East and West 
Germany forced the relations with Beijing towards an even more unstructured 
and ad-hoc path than it was the case with Beijing’s relations with other EEC 
member states at that time. In particular, the Chinese attempts to undermine 
East-West détente complicated West Germany and China’s strategic and 
political relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
With the softening of the Cold War confrontation and the reunification of 
East and West Germany, Germany’s relations with China matured, in particular 
in the economic dimension. Germany asserted its primacy over other EU 
member states both in trade and direct investments in China. At the same time 
the late 1990s also represented a new era for an independent and mature foreign 
                                                 
1 Karen Möller, ‘Germany and China: A continental temptation’, The China Quarterly, No. 147, 
1996, pp. 706-725; Markus Taube, ‘Economic relations between Germany and Mainland China 
1979-2000’, Duisburg Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 59, 2001; Joern-Carsten 
Gottwald, ‘Germany’s China Policy: Trade Promotion, Human Rights and European Disunity’, 
in Mark Overhaus et al. (eds.) German Chinese Relations: Trade Promotion Plus Something 
Else?, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol. 6, No. 16, 2005, pp. 7-13. 
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policy for Germany, which maintained its preference to conduct foreign policy 
at EU level but combined it with bolder and more independent activities 
internationally. Strengthening political and economic relation with China 
became one of the main foreign policy objectives of such a strategy. 
China’s rise in West Germany’s foreign policy thinking was formalised after 
its reunification with East Germany. In 1994 the landmark Asien Konzept was 
released and it became the reference for the subsequent German policy towards 
China. The document stressed the prominence of China for Germany’s Asian 
policy in particular for its economic potential.2 It acknowledged the healthy 
conditions of bilateral trade but at the same time it also recognised that 
Germany was still lagging behind other Chinese partners, including EU member 
states in terms of foreign direct investments. 
This prompted Germany’s more dynamic and consistent approach to 
business promotion in the country. This is illustrated by the high-level official 
visits paid by Chancellor Kohl and the return visits paid by Premier Li Peng and 
President Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s, which were all accompanied by the 
signing of business deals. Such visits triggered competition among the EU 
member states, especially France and the UK, and their leaders began to 
conduct similar business trips to promote the entry of their national champions 
in the country as well as facilitate the business environment for their companies. 
Despite the internal competition ignited by the renewed German dynamism, 
the Asien Konzept also constituted an important example for the EU, where the 
activism of Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand, supported by the 
European Commission, promoted the elaboration of the 1994 Commission 
Communication Towards a New Asia Policy followed the next year by the first 
                                                 
2 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, ‘Asien Konzept der Bundesregierung’, 1994. 
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Commission Communication on China: A Long Term Policy for China- Europe 
Relations. 
Kohl’s approach to China was upheld and strengthened by his successor 
Gerhard Schröder. Schröder made China a priority of his foreign policy, visiting 
it more than any other non-EU country. This was part of the Chancellor’s 
willingness to leave Germany’s Cold War secondary role behind and assert its 
influence worldwide.3 During such visits Chancellor Kohl’s practice of bringing 
with him large business delegations continued unabated and more business 
deals were signed each time. Joern-Carsten Gottwald even refers to the 
establishment of a “division of labour” between Chancellor Schröder as trade 
promoter and other members of the executive as occasional moral hawks.4 
It is interesting to note that during its installation in 1998 the new German 
administration had affirmed that it would conduct an ethical foreign policy.5 
Yet, this concern was blatantly sidelined by Chancellor Schröder’s realistic 
approach to China, which led to mixed results and strong criticism levelled 
against his soft stance towards moral and ethical issues in the PRC. According 
to Richard Youngs, “Schröder’s policy towards China was the most heavily 
criticized area of policy after 2000”.6 Interestingly the harshest criticism came 
from his own coalition party, the Greens, and his Foreign Minister, Joschka 
Fischer, who had previously directed their criticism against Chancellor Kohl’s 
                                                 
3 According to Der Spiegel “when Schröder took office, Germany was ready to assert a new, 
post-reunification self-confidence. More than that, the country was also ready to leave its days 
of cowering in the corner of the international political stage behind.” ‘A Cheat Sheet to 
Schröder’s Memoirs’, Der Spiegel (English Version), October 25, 2006. 
4 Joern-Carsten Gottwald, ‘Germany’s China Policy’, p. 7. 
5  Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann, ‘The German-Chinese “Rule of Law” Dialogue: Substantial 
Interaction or Political Delusion’, in Mark Overhaus et al. (eds.), German -Chinese Relations: 
Trade Promotion Plus Something Else?, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, No. 16, 2005, pp. 
30-37. 
6 Richard Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, p. 124. 
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administration and promised to follow an ethical path in Germany’s relation 
with China.7 
The divisions and contrasts between the Chancellor and his Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, as well as between the Chancellor and his parliamentary 
majority, led to confrontations among executive members as well as open 
dissent in the Bundestag. For example, in 2003 and then again in 2004, the 
Bundestag conditioned the lifting of the arms embargo, staunchly promoted by 
Chancellor Schröder, to the improvements of human rights in China. 8  Yet, 
notwithstanding these tensions, the second Asien Konzept published in 2002 
proved that the Chancellor’s approach had got the upper hand and that his 
predecessor’s strategy to put trade and investment first had been upheld.9 
Indeed, the focus on the economic dimension did lead to the strengthening of 
economic relations between the two countries: after 2002, China became 
Germany’s most important trading partner in Asia and its second largest partner 
outside Europe. In 2007 China was Germany’s sixth largest foreign supplier and 
was particularly important in information and communication technologies as 
well as textiles. In turn, Germany became China’s first export market in the EU 
as well as its second, and at times even the first, direct investor among the EU 
member states (see Tables 6 and 7). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For example, during the first election campaign in 1997, Joschka Fischer, Schröder’s Green 
Foreign Ministry, had stated that there would be “no further kowtow towards the Beijing 
dictatorship”. Joern-Carsten Gottwald, ‘Germany’s China Policy’, p. 8. 
8  ‘German minister links lifting of China arms embargo to human rights’, BBC European 
Monitoring, 10 December 2003. ‘Ruling German coalition opposes lifting of EU’s China arms 
embargo’, Agence France Press, 28 October 2004. 
9 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Asien Konzept der Bundesregierung, 2002. 
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Table 6: Germany’s trade with China (1995-2008) 
Years Export to China 
Export share 
EU-25 
Import from 
China 
Import share 
EU-25 Balance 
1995 5,756.00 39.16% 8,066.00 30.67% -2,310.00 
2001 12,118.00 39.60% 18,110.00 22.19% -5,992.00 
2005 21,210.00 40.95% 34,721.00 21.98% -13,511.00 
2008 29,874.00 41.78% 47,877.00 20.93% -18,003.00 
Sources: Eurostat, External and Intra-EU Trade 1958-2006, 2006 and Eurostat, External and Intra-EU 
Trade Monthly Statistics, Issue No. 4/2008. Own calculations. Million ECU/EUR. 
Table 7: Germany’s FDI to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total FDI FDI share (EU) 
1985 24.14 14.60% 
1990 64.25 40.21% 
1995 386.35 18.13% 
2000 1,041.49 23.25% 
2005 1,530.04 27.11% 
2008* 3,032.10 25.02% 
* For the year 2008 the data also include FDI in Hong Kong. Source: National Bureau of Statistics, various 
years. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
5.2.2 Germany’s promotion of the rule of law in business  
While bringing home the positive economic results of his personal friendship 
with Beijing’s authorities, Schröder continued to maintain that democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law and the reform of the Chinese political system 
remained a priority for his government. This rhetoric was trumpeted in support 
of his government’s initiatives in these sectors. In fact they lacked any concrete 
substance and were merely concentrated on the rule of law. This was 
compounded by a narrow and mostly administrative interpretation of China’s 
governance reform. In a sense even these activities can be read through the 
prism of trade and investment promotion as they were aimed at ‘exporting’ 
practices to which German businesses were more familiar. 
By far, the German government’s most-preferred instrument for the 
promotion of human rights and the rule of law in China was development 
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assistance, in particular technical cooperation in the judicial and legal field.10 
German development assistance to China began in the 1980s and since then 
Germany has become the second largest donor to China after Japan.11 In 2007 
China was Germany’s first recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and it was classified as an “Anchor Country” by the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 12  This created internal 
tensions between the Development and Foreign Affairs ministries in Germany 
over who should have primary responsibility for development cooperation in 
China.13 
Table 8: Germany’s ODA to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total ODA to China China’s ODA (DAC) 
1985 6.5 0.69% 
1990 97.6 4.70% 
1995 684.1 19.36% 
2000 212.8 16.94% 
2005 255.11 15.07% 
2008 244.85 20.86% 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
Given that this assistance was in no small part intended to ease the way for 
German commercial activities in China, the bulk of German development 
assistance was channelled through concessional loans, which were managed by 
the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Entwicklungsbank (KfW). By 2005 KfW 
had provided more than EUR 2 billion in concessional and market-condition 
loans to China.14 The focus of this financial cooperation was mostly on the 
                                                 
10 Interview 10. 
11 Kristof Rostoski, ‘Development cooperation between Germany and China: does China still 
need development aid?’, Asia-Europe Journal, No. 4, 2006, pp. 539-544. 
12 According to the 2004 BMZ Position Paper on Anchor Countries, these are countries that 
“have a key role to play with regard to reducing human poverty, working for globally 
sustainable development, securing peace and stability, as well as for issues relating to global 
governance and the protection of global public goods”. BMZ, Position Paper on Anchor 
Countries, 2004, p. 3. 
13 Interview 8. 
14 Interview 9. 
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construction of infrastructures.15 Yet, this form of development assistance was 
often criticised for its focus on business promotion be it in the form of market 
entry for German companies, in particular Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME), or in the form of the introduction of new technologies, such as high-
speed trains, nuclear power plants and the like.16 In this regard it is interesting to 
note that Germany’s concessional loans served to compete with other EU 
member states, especially France and the UK, to establish Germany’s 
prominence in key strategic sectors such as transportation and energy 
production. 
German development assistance to China also featured a significant grant 
contribution, which by 2005 had reached around EUR 600 million and was 
mostly managed by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ), Germany’s semi-official agency for development cooperation. 17 
Through grant contributions German development assistance mainly covered 
the sectors of sustainable economic development and environment where it 
provided support at policy level. 
It is within the technical assistance offered through grants and managed by 
GTZ that Germany carried out several projects in the legal and judicial field.18 
Such projects were financed by the German Ministry of Justice but were 
managed by GTZ within the framework provided by BMZ. Such initiatives 
started as early as 1984 with a project on intellectual property law but they 
really took off only in the mid-1990s with a project in cooperation with the 
Chinese Ministry of Labour and Social Security on the establishment of a 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 According to Katrinka Barysh, “Germany’s commercial success has been underpinned by 
large amounts of government aid and preferential loans”. Katrinka Barish, Embracing the 
Dragon. The EU’s Partnership with China, London, Centre for European Reform, 2005, p. 16.  
17 Interviews 8 and 11. 
18 Interview 11. 
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unified social security law, and two projects on commercial and administrative 
law.19 Other initiatives such as training of judges and lawyers and support for 
civil, property and tort law formulation and enforcement also took off in the late 
1990s and early 2000s with the coming to power of Chancellor Schröder (see 
Table 9). 
Table 9: Germany’s projects in the rule of law and human rights in China 
Year Project Title/Description
Amount 
grant/loan
(in million euro)
MS Agency 
responsible Chinese Agency/Partner
Category 
1984 Advisory services for the improvement of the 
Intellectual Property Law
n.a. German Patent 
Office
Chinese Patent Office Advisory for Law 
Drafting
1994-2004
Advisory services for the drafting of new laws 
in the fields of labour and social security 5.5 GTZ
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security
Advisory for Law 
Drafting
1997-2004 Training activities in commercial law 3.3 GTZ Legal Department of 
MOFCOM
Training Programme
1997-2004
Advisory services for the drafting of economic 
laws to create a legal system based on 
market economics.
4 GTZ
Financial and Economic 
Committee of the NPC
Advisory for Law 
Drafting
2000-2006 Advisory services for the elaboration of new 
administrative and civil legislation
2.99 GTZ
Legislative Affairs 
Commission of the 
Standing Committee of 
the NPC
Advisory for Law 
Drafting
2004-2007 Advisory services 2 GTZ
Budget Commission of 
the Standing 
Committee of the NPC
Advisory for Law 
Drafting
1997-1999
Projects to foster rule of law, social, 
economic and cultural rights with particular 
focus on trade and labour issues
0.26 Friederick Ebert 
Foundation
Various organizations 
among which the All 
China Trade Union 
Federation
Advisory and Training 
Programme
1998-2000
Projects to foster rule of law, social, 
economic and cultural rights 2.1
Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation
Various organizations 
and universities
Advisory and Training 
Programme
GERMANY PROJECTS IN RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Source: Overview of European Union Ongoing Projects in China, Various Years 1995-
2008, EC Delegation in China, Own Calculations. 
 
Most of these initiatives began under Chancellor Schröder’s government. 
Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann notes that in those years “Schröder was eager to start 
such activities in response to criticism of his China policy”.20 Similarly, the 
Chinese authorities were interested in receiving foreign support in restructuring 
                                                 
19 Interview 10. 
20  Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann, ‘The German-Chinese “Rule of Law Dialogue”: Substantial 
Interaction or Political Delusion’, in Mark Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch 
(eds.) German-Chinese Relations: Trade Promotion Plus Something Else?, German Foreign 
Policy in Dialogue, Vol. 6, No. 16, 2005, p. 31. 
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China’s legal and judicial systems in order to align the country with 
international standards and in particular make it ready for accession to the 
WTO. Yet, the fact that these projects all merely concentrated on ‘economic’ or 
‘business’ sectors cannot be overlooked. It was only with the second agreement 
on legal cooperation in 2000 that a human rights dimension was added.21  
As far as coordination and complementarity with the EC’s development 
projects are concerned, it should be noted that none of these projects were 
designed or implemented with the contribution of the EC authorities. 
Interestingly, when German officials were made to note that similar projects 
were also carried out by other EU donors as well as by the EC, they reaffirmed 
the importance of the German contribution and expertise.22 Behind this rhetoric 
it is not difficult to suspect the attempt to ‘domesticate’ the business 
environment according to the practices most familiar to German companies.  
In the case of Germany it is also important to make reference to the activities 
of its major political foundations (Stiftungen), which have a unique role in 
Germany’s worldwide support and promotion of human rights and the rule of 
law. Generally German Stiftungen concentrate their work on non-governmental 
organisations in the sectors of social justice, decentralisation, social market 
economy, federalism and the rule of law. Besides, when they cooperate with 
state actors their projects focus on constitutional advice, support of legislature 
and judiciary as well as decentralisation. Finally all Stiftungen consider civic 
education a top priority for their democracy programmes. For this reason in the 
early 1990s with Germany’s growing involvement in democracy promotion, 
                                                 
21 Interview 10. 
22 Interview 8. 
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GTZ and Stiftungen agreed to share responsibilities, with political foundations 
being given the task of promoting civil society abroad.23 
The biggest German foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
(KAS) and Friederich Ebert Stiftung (FES) were all active in China (see Table 
9).24 While the two foundations do not directly work for any political party, 
KAS is inspired by Christian Democratic values and FES by Social Democratic 
values.25 Both foundations were concerned with and active in the promotion of 
the rule of law as a substitute for the Chinese rule by law. Yet, their initiatives 
appeared timid at best and only involved seminars, exchanges and training.  
It is interesting to point out that while KAS attempted to work in the human 
rights sector with its involvement in legal reforms, the efforts of FES, which is 
affiliated to Schröder’s party, were almost negligible in this sector, apart from 
the conduct of a Human Rights Dialogue with China. Therefore it is possible to 
argue that the activities of German Stiftungen in China reflected not only the 
German overall policy towards human rights and the rule of law promotion in 
the country but also their political affiliations. In this sense it can be maintained 
that the financing of the activities of the Stiftungen served to delegate 
responsibilities from Schröder’s government to official but non-governmental 
organisations to avoid the direct involvement of the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in the human rights field. 
                                                 
23 Stefan Mair, ‘Germany’s Stiftungen and Democracy Assistance: Comparative Advantages, 
New Challenges’, in Peter Burnell (ed), Democracy Assistance. International Cooperation for 
Democratization, London, Frank Cass, 2000, p. 146. 
24 The only exception is the Friederich Neumann Stiftung (FNS), which was expelled in 1996 
after it organised the Second International Conference on Tibet in Bonn with the participation of 
the Dalai Lama. 
25  Stefan Friedrich and Carl Poljner, ‘Beyond Official Diplomacy: the role of political 
foundations in German-Chinese relations. The Case of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’, in 
Mark Overhaus et al. (eds.), German-Chinese Relations: Trade Promotion Plus Something 
Else?, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol. 6 No. 16, 2005. 
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All in all it appears that Germany’s strong emphasis on the economic 
dimension of its relations with China also shaped its promotion of human rights 
and the rule of law in the country. In particular Germany did not make any 
serious effort to tackle human rights issues on the ground thus limiting its 
activities to the promotion of an economic rule of law with mainly German 
characteristics. The inception of the EU’s strategy of constructive engagement, 
strongly supported by Chancellor Kohl’s government, allowed subsequent 
German governments to avoid confronting China on the issue of human rights, 
delegating such a responsibility to the EU level in order to pursue trade and 
investment interests unencumbered by human rights issues. 
5.3 France – China relations and human rights 
5.3.1 Evolution of France’s relations with China 
When it comes to France-China bilateral relations in an historical perspective 
the main literature on the topic agrees in defining it through the prism of 
Gaullism. 26  De Gaulle was the first European leader to acknowledge and 
somehow play the ‘China card’ in his quest for a foreign policy independent 
from the two superpowers when he recognised China in 1964. This fact was not 
missed by the Chinese authorities who welcomed France’s overture and 
considered it a natural ally for China’s anti-hegemonic fight against Washington 
and Moscow. 
Yet De Gaulle’s approach to China did not consistently re-emerge until the 
coming to power of Chirac in 1995. French Presidents conducted incoherent 
policies towards China. On one hand the ad-hoc and patchy relations, which 
                                                 
26 François Mengin, ‘La politique chinoise de la France: du mythe de la relation privilegiée au 
syndrome de la normalisation’, Critique Internationale, No. 12, 2001; Jean Pierre Cabestan, 
‘Relations between France and China: Towards a Paris-Beijing Axis?’, China: an international 
journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, pp. 327-340.  
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characterised the 1980s, translated in an underdeveloped economic interaction.27 
On the other hand President Mitterrand’s France took the lead among European 
and Western countries in sanctioning China both at a material and, perhaps even 
more annoyingly for Beijing, at a symbolic level. Similarly in 1992 the sale of 
60 Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircrafts and frigates to Taiwan plunged China-France 
relations to their nadir.  
Eventually tensions were put aside in 1994, on the occasion of the 
commemoration of 30 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
when France capitulated to Chinese pressures, committing itself to the ‘one 
China policy’ and the non-sale of weapons to Taiwan. In 1994 the then French 
Minister Gérard Longuet also launched a new French strategy called ‘Ten 
Initiatives for Asia’. This was at the basis of France’s Foreign Minister Hervé 
de la Charette’s announcement that Asia would receive new attention as the 
“nouvelle frontière” of French foreign policy.28  
The French move reflected the attempt to follow in the footsteps of 
Germany’s activism in Asia and its increasing competition in trade and 
investments in China. While bilaterally competing for the Chinese market, 
Germany and France were on the same wavelength concerning the necessity to 
provide the EU with a strategic outlook for Asia. This became the hallmark of 
Chirac’s era and the revival of De Gaulle’s legacy in France-China relations. 
President Chirac’s willingness to tread De Gaulle’s path towards China did 
not take long to mature and within two years what initially seemed a ‘personal 
curiosity’ towards the rise of Asia, and China in particular, was formalised into 
                                                 
27 Markus Taube, ‘Economic Relations Between the PRC and the States of Europe’, The China 
Quarterly, Special Issue, Europe and China, 2002, p. 83. 
28  Nicola Casarini, ‘The evolution of the EU-China Relationship: from Constructive 
Engagement to Strategic Partnership’, Occasional Paper No. 64, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 2006, p. 10. 
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a ‘Comprehensive Partnership Agreement’ during his first visit to the country in 
May 1997.29 
At that time France was the second country after Russia and the first Western 
one to sign such an agreement with China. The parallel with President De 
Gaulle’s overture to China was all too clear. The Partnership Agreement 
encapsulated principles and objectives that would characterise President 
Chirac’s entire era of France’s China policy: multipolarity and economic 
concerns.  
The Agreement put forward the concepts of multipolarity and an independent 
foreign policy for peace, signalling to the US that the two partners would 
“oppose any attempt at domination in international affairs”. In order to prove its 
good will France expressed its support for China’s accession to the WTO while 
showing an accommodating approach to the issue of human rights. In particular 
it acknowledged historical, cultural, economic and philosophical differences 
both as reasons to promote “equality and mutual respect” in the discussion of 
human rights and as means to “enrich the common assets of mankind”. 
Fashioning themselves as leading powers within their regional areas of 
influence, France and China proposed to work on strengthening Europe-Asia 
cooperation and at the same time to promote a constructive dialogue between 
China and the EU on human rights. The importance of this point is hard to 
overlook as just a couple of months earlier, France had led some of the EU 
member states to abandon the UNCHR resolution and it was ‘rewarded’ with 
the restart of the EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights, as shown in Chapter 3. 
If these were the main lines of France and China’s bilateral relations against 
the global political framework, more mundane objectives were also agreed upon 
                                                 
29 Joint Sino-French Declaration on the establishment of a comprehensive partnership, Beijing 
Review, May 16, 1997. 
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at the bilateral economic level, where the two countries congratulated each other 
on signing profitable agreements and deals between them for cooperation in 
nuclear energy, environmental protection and health, or the purchase of Airbus 
aircrafts and the entry of French insurance companies in China. The 
strengthening of trade relations was also envisaged and the removal of obstacles 
to their reciprocal markets was agreed on. 
After the 1997 Agreement the relations between the two countries 
consistently improved although the French peculiarity of President and Prime 
Minister sometimes ‘cohabiting’ determined slowdowns and accelerations. 
Starting from President Chirac’s re-election in 2002 and the instauration of a 
parliamentary majority for his Gaullist party, relations accelerated consistently. 
culminating in the signing of an upgraded Partnership Agreement in 2002, this 
time with the inclusion of a “Strategic” dimension.30 
However, President Chirac’s softer stance towards China does not seem to 
have brought the same fruits as that of Chancellor Schröder. Despite Chirac 
often being criticised for playing ‘sales representative’ in China, most authors 
and analysts agree on the fact that trade relations and investments are still 
disappointing.31 The figures support such an assessment and show that France-
China trade was a third of Germany-China trade in 2008. Besides, the 
composition of trade still reflected the French preference for the so-called 
grands contrats, best exemplified by the sale of Airbus aircrafts or nuclear 
power stations (see Table 10).32 
                                                 
30 Joint Sino-French Declaration on the establishment of a strategic partnership, New China 
News Agency, October 13, 2002. 
31 See among others Jean-Pierre Cabestan, ‘Relations between France and China’, pp. 327-340. 
32 It is interesting to note that even when France’s exports to China increases this does not 
always translate in a real increase in trade but rather in the sale of big companies’ products, 
most notably the sale of Airbus aircrafts. In some years, notably 1994, it has been recorded that 
Airbus sales could contribute up to one third of France’s exports. Francois Mengin, ‘La 
politique Chinoise de la France’, p. 102. 
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Table 10: France’s trade with China (1995-2008) 
Years 
Export to 
China  
Export share 
EU-25 
Import from 
China  
Import share 
EU-25 Balance 
1995 2,028.00 13.80% 3,094.00 11.76% -1,066.00 
2001 3,552.00 11.61% 8,343.00 10.22% -4,791.00 
2005 6,489.00 12.53% 14,464.00 9.15% -7,975.00 
2008 9,016.00 12.61% 17,985.00 7.86% -8,969.00 
Sources: Eurostat, External and Intra-EU Trade 1958-2006, 2006 and Eurostat, External and Intra-EU 
Trade Monthly Statistics, Issue No. 4/2008. Own calculations. Million ECU/EUR. 
Table 11: France’s FDI to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total FDI FDI share (EU) 
1985 32.54 19.68% 
1990 21.06 13.18% 
1995 287.02 13.47% 
2000 853.16 19.05% 
2005 615.06 10.09% 
2008* 2,363.85 19.50% 
* For the year 2008 the data also include FDI in Hong Kong. Source: National Bureau of Statistics, various 
years. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
Finally, notwithstanding President Chirac’s practice of leading big 
delegations of entrepreneurs during his frequent visits to China, similar to 
Chancellor Schröder’s habits, and the signing of profitable deals for France’s 
major conglomerates such as Airbus, Alstom, or Parisbas, French direct 
investments in China lagged far behind those of other major investors and 
France was only the fourth investor among the EU member states in 2007. 
Interestingly, not even the WTO negotiations carried out by the Commission in 
key sectors for the French economy such as telecommunications, insurance, and 
market chains, helped change France’s limited presence on the Chinese market 
(see Table 11). 
5.3.2 France’s promotion of human rights through culture 
The inception of President Chirac’s era of France’s China policy and the 
growing interaction at political and economic level did not lead to a further 
engagement on human rights and rule of law issues. In fact France was the most 
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eager EU member state to abandon the practice of tabling a resolution against 
China at the UNCHR. Its defection in 1997 coincided with the beginning of the 
new ‘Comprehensive Partnership Agreement’, which, while paying lip-service 
to the cause of human rights, watered down any potential conflict making 
appeal to mutual respect, understanding and cultural, historical and political 
differences. Similarly, almost concomitantly with the stance at the UNCHR, 
France began to campaign for the lifting of the EU arms embargo on the PRC.  
As argued by Richard Youngs, France is “one of the Western governments 
least enthused by the democracy promotion agenda”. 33  Notwithstanding 
President Mitterrand’s ostensible watershed La Baulle speech in 1990, where he 
stated that France’s development aid would become conditional on democratic 
performance, France is described as “one of Europe’s ‘back-markers’ on 
investing democracy policies with meaningful substance”. 34  The coming to 
power of President Chirac, his centralisation of foreign policy prerogatives and 
his Gaullist interpretation of international relations, left little trace of any timid 
commitment to the democratic cause and human rights promotion. 
This general trend is also reflected in France’s China policy since 1989. The 
initial harsh response to the Tiananmen Massacre was slowly and steadily 
diluted by more realist foreign policy motives. Up until 1992 a shadow of an 
approach concerned with human rights lingered on. For example in 1991 a 
delegation of French judges was sent to China to assess the situation on the 
ground and their negative report triggered President Mitterrand’s critical and 
confrontational approach to Beijing. 
                                                 
33 Richard Youngs, Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, p. 82. 
34 Ibid., p. 82. Mitterrand’s intention to place democracy at the centre of France’s development 
policy almost fell on deaf ears and it took ten years to formalise some timid commitments to 
democracy promotion in France’s development policy with the publication of a strategy 
document titled ‘For Democratic Governance’. 
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Yet, after the crisis over Taiwan, the relâchement of the pressure of public 
opinion and the pressure of French industry, a more appeasing policy can be 
discerned. This was also motivated by the successful example provided by 
Germany’s soft stance towards China, which had been ‘rewarded’ with 
profitable deals, as in the case of the automobile sector. The culmination of such 
a process coincided with the inception of President Chirac’s ‘Comprehensive 
Partnership Agreement’ with China, which was anticipated by the abandonment 
of the tabling of the UNCHR resolution against China’s human rights record. 
Interestingly though, the decision to abandon public shaming did not even 
translate into a behind-the-door approach to human rights and the rule of law, as 
France did not make any effort to establish a formal human rights dialogue. As 
indicated in the ‘Comprehensive Partnership Agreement’, France pointed to the 
EU as the most suitable level to discuss the human rights issue with China, thus 
delegating the responsibilities of a normative foreign policy to EU level while 
untying its hands from such a burden. The only appearance of human rights 
concerns is represented by the intermittent reference to some political refugees 
and the request for their liberation, which sometimes featured in President 
Chirac’s statements during his visits in China. This was laconically dubbed “la 
diplomatie des listes”. 
The situation on the ground paralleled the diplomatic and political relations. 
Similarly to Germany’s development assistance to China, France’s aid was 
consistently concentrated on infrastructure projects, which represented the bulk 
of France’s commitments to China (see Table 12).35 Further, it is also to be 
noted that as was the case with Germany, France’s development assistance 
provided concessional loans to projects that were financially viable, thus 
                                                 
35 Interview 12. 
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contravening one of the main internationally-agreed requirements for the 
disbursement of ODA. Interestingly this was often discussed within the 
Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the OECD, where French projects in 
the railway sector in China were frequently scrutinised and criticised.36 
Table 12: France’s ODA to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total ODA ODA share (DAC) 
1985 6.3 0.67% 
1990 88 4.24% 
1995 91.2 2.58% 
2000 45.99 3.66% 
2005 153.56 9.07% 
2008 142.8 12.17% 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
Assistance in grant form also played an important role, in particular in the 
technical and cultural sectors. In the technical field the main cooperation sectors 
were: agronomy, industrial technology, energy (in particular the nuclear 
branch), and environment; in the cultural field the activities focused on 
architecture, urban planning, exchange and training of students, and cultural 
heritage preservation. Besides, French cultural diplomacy benefited greatly 
from the organisation of the Chinese Culture Year in France in 2003 and France 
Culture Year in China in 2004, during which numerous events were organised. 
It is probably through the prism of culture that it is also possible to interpret 
French efforts in the legal and judicial field, as it was pointed out both in 
interviews and in official publications, and as is testified by the conspicuous 
involvement of French academic institutions in the implementation of such 
initiatives.37 
France began to support legal activities in China in the early 1980s through 
academic exchanges and the allocation of scholarships to Chinese students. 
                                                 
36 Interview 24. 
37 Interviews 12 and 13. 
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These activities were interrupted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre 
and only resumed in 1993, gaining momentum in 1996. Since then activities 
have concentrated on five main sectors: (i) human resources development in 
public administration 38 , (ii) cooperation between French and Chinese 
universities, (iii) cooperation between French and Chinese judicial courts, (iv) 
cooperation between judicial professions and (v) judges programme (see Table 
13).39 
Differently from other donors’ activities in the field of human rights and the 
rule of law, France’s initiatives did not concentrate on either support for law 
drafting and enforcement, or protection of human rights and fundamental 
liberties through, for example, activities carried out by NGOs. 40  French 
activities fell within a mostly training- and academic exchange-focused 
approach. What is even more surprising is that they all had a French flavour 
attached, as if rather than the support of human rights and the rule of law and 
their best practices, it was the approach to French culture that really mattered. 
Interestingly, it emerged during interviews that while the French authorities 
stressed the comparative approach of their projects and tried to make Chinese 
beneficiaries familiar with the French legal system, Chinese officials were 
reportedly much more interested in learning about European law and often 
requested to include a period of internship at the EU institutions within the 
academic exchange programmes.41 
 
                                                 
38 Given the relevance and significance of France’s National School of Administration and 
Chinese keen interest for administrative reform, this was one of the most successful and sought 
for programme for Chinese authorities. 
39 In the field of legal cooperation, an ambitious programme was launched in 2003 and it aimed 
at training 50 judges and 50 prosecutors through a preliminary 8-month language training in 
China and a 6-month internship period in French courts or law firms. Interview 10.  
40 Interview 12. 
41 Ibid. 
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Table 13: France’s projects in the rule of law and human rights in China 
Year Project Title/Description
Amount 
grant/loan
(in million euro)
MS Agency 
responsible Chinese Agency/Partner
Category 
1994
Adaptation of Chinese law to the market 
economy n.a.
Aix-Marseille 
University of Law, 
Economics and 
Science
China's People's 
University and 
Southwest University of 
Politics and Law.
Academic exchange
1997-ongoing Law in Europe: comparative, commercial, 
criminal and human rights law
n.a. Panthèon-Sorbonne 
University
People's University of 
Beijing
Academic exchange
1999-ongoing Human resources development in public 
administration
n.a.
French National 
School of 
Administration
Ministry of Personnel Training programme
1999-ongoing
Scholarship programme for PhD in public 
administration n.a.
Various French 
Schools of 
Administration
Various Chinese 
Schools of 
Administration
Academic exchange
2001 Intellectual Property Rights n.a. French National 
Judges College
National Prosecutors 
College
Academic exchange
2003-ongoing
100 Judges and Prosecutors Training 
Programme 4
French National 
School for Judges
Chinese National 
Judges College and 
Chinese National 
Prosecutor College
Training programme
FRANCE PROJECTS IN RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Source: Overview of European Union Ongoing Projects in China, Various Years 1995-
2008, EC Delegation in China, Own Calculations. 
 
The involvement of French academic institutions can be interpreted as an 
attempt to not only avoid the conduct of sensitive projects on the ground but 
also as an attempt to delegate the responsibilities for these projects away from 
Chirac’s executive. A similar attitude is traceable towards the EC and its 
development activities. Rather than trying to reach better coordination and 
envisaging projects with broader breath including other EU countries for 
example in the training of judges and lawyers, French assistance was only 
limited to the reinforcement of institutional and academic exchanges between 
the two countries. At the same time, the lack of any projects on human rights 
raises the suspicion that this field was indirectly delegated to EC responsibility. 
Finally those projects that somehow escaped the cultural flavour were centred 
on a narrow economic and administrative interpretation of the rule of law, as in 
the case of Germany. 
To sum up, President de Gaulle’s legacy in France-China relations 
consistently emerged starting from Chirac’s first presidential mandate. President 
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Chirac’s realistic approach mirrored the French national identity and interests in 
two main ways: it tried to create a power balancing alliance with China to resist 
a unipolar world and it strived to enhance France’s material capabilities through 
diplomatic initiatives to develop bilateral commercial relations and investments, 
often in competition with other EU member states. This diluted France’s ability 
to promote human rights in China. On the ground France pursued a sort of 
cultural human rights policy, which reinforced contacts among French and 
Chinese legal and judicial institutions. At the same time, the EU’s strategy of 
constructive engagement strongly promoted by French officials allowed a 
delegation of responsibilities to the EU to deal with any real divisive issue 
concerning human rights both in terms of dialogue and projects. 
5.4 UK – China relations and human rights 
5.4.1 Evolution of the UK’s relations with China 
When discussing the UK’s relations with China, one is often forced to 
confront Peter Ferdinand’s argument that “it would not be a major exaggeration 
to say that until 1 July 1997, British relations with China were always coloured 
by Hong Kong”.42 While it is difficult to counter such a statement for the UK’s 
relations with China since the inception of China’s ‘open-door policy’ in 1978, 
a more nuanced picture appears if the focus is shifted to the pre-1978 era. In 
fact, the Hong Kong issue did not merely provide headaches to British officials. 
It put the UK in a better position to exploit the Chinese market, initially during 
the Cold War period and then during the opening phase, through direct 
investments. 
                                                 
42 Peter Ferdinand, ‘UK Policy towards China’, in Miguel Santos Neves and Brian Bridges 
(eds.), Europe, China and the Two SARs, p. 29. 
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The realism and pragmatism shown in handling Hong Kong during the Cold 
War was somehow reflected in the overall UK-China relation. Until the early 
1980s, UK-China relations were characterised by a compromising approach and 
any ideational motive – be it in terms of Chinese revanchism over Hong Kong 
or British patronising attitude towards reform and human rights – was left aside. 
Throughout alternating periods of highs and lows due mostly to the Korean 
War, the Indochina confrontation and the Cultural Revolution, economic 
relations, particularly in the form of investments, progressed pushed by the 
lobbying of the British unofficial 48 Group. The latter was composed of 
businessmen that pooled their resources in order to press British authorities to 
support and protect their activities in the PRC. 
The Hong Kong issue became highly politicised only at the end of the 1970s 
and it was then echoed in all the official exchanges between the two countries. 
A first step towards solving the conflictive charge of the Hong Kong issue was 
represented by the 1984 Joint Declaration, which was the product of attitudes of 
compromise from both parties. 43  The signing of the Joint Declaration was 
followed by the strengthening of economic relations. 44  Interestingly, this 
accommodating approach contrasted with the British uncompromising position 
over the Falklands islands with Argentina in the same years. 
Two serious set-backs, inherently correlated, slowed down the flowering of 
UK-China relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, the Tiananmen 
Massacre, to which the UK attributed a much more ominous relevance due to 
the shock of Hong Kong’s population to the June 4 events. Second, the 
                                                 
43 The Joint Declaration sanctioned the return of Hong Kong to mainland China in 1997 but at 
the same time it stated that for the next fifty years the city-island would maintain its “traditional 
way of life”. 
44 Beijing ‘rewarded’ London with several profitable deals such as the purchase of ten British 
airliners. In addition, new agreements for economic cooperation were signed and the penetration 
of British investments in China was favoured. 
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promulgation of democratic reforms in Hong Kong under the new governor, 
Christopher Patten. 45  Relations between the two countries were only fully 
mended with the creation of a more compromise-prone Joint Liaison Group that 
ironed out the last tensions before the return of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. 
Interestingly, 1997 did not only witness the return of Hong Kong to 
Mainland China and thus the disappearance of the biggest obstacle in the UK-
China relations. It also brought back to power the Labour Party under Prime 
Minister Tony Blair after the Conservative years of Margaret Thatcher and John 
Major. According to the precepts of the ‘Third Way’ inaugurated by Prime 
Minister Blair in 1997, the overall UK foreign policy would be characterised by 
a mixture of idealism and pragmatism, pursued through a combination of hard 
and soft power. The idealistic commitment was stressed by the then Secretary of 
State Robin Cook in his famous announcement of a foreign policy with an 
“ethical dimension” and “human rights at its heart”.46  
A similar approach was stated for the UK’s relations with China. On 10 June 
1997, Derek Fatchett, the then Minister of State at the Foreign Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), told the House of Commons that his government wanted “to open 
a new chapter of more constructive relations across the board, addressing both 
trade and more difficult issues such as human rights”.47 
However reality proved different. Prime Minister Blair’s first visit to China 
in 1998 was aimed at opening a “new chapter” in Britain-China relations. Yet 
                                                 
45 The Tiananmen events had changed the attitude of both sides towards the Hong Kong issue: 
on the one hand the Chinese authorities were alarmed over the danger of having a breeding 
centre for opposition in Hong Kong, as demonstrations there had amply shown; on the other 
hand, British rulers feared the fate of the island after 1997 and grew suspicious of Beijing’s 
intention in the aftermath of the handover. During these years reciprocal distrusts thus led to 
open tensions and eventually to the promulgation in 1995 of democratic reform of the 
Legislative Council election system, which deeply irritated the Chinese authorities. 
46 The integral speech was reported in The Guardian, 12 May 1997.  
47 Quoted in House of Common, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tenth Report on the 
UK’s relations with China, London, HMSO, 1999. 
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the “new chapter” did not resonate any ethical concerns but rather economic 
ones. This is testified by the Sino-British Joint Declaration on a 
‘Comprehensive Partnership Agreement’ which was signed by the two parties 
and that resembled President Chirac’s Partnership Agreement signed a year 
earlier, although notably missing the multipolar dimension.48 
Having failed one of the first tests for his ethical foreign policy, Blair’s 
Government began to stress the ‘constructive’ side of Fatchett’s earlier 
statement, interpreting more constructive relations with China as those that 
would firmly lock it into the international system. To this purpose, as mentioned 
in the Partnership Agreement, Blair’s Government began to pursue the 
objectives of creating closer economic and trade relations with the country, 
establishing more frequent consultations over global issues, and engaging China 
on human rights through multilateral and bilateral channels as well as through 
projects. 
At an international level Prime Minister Blair’s dynamism could not miss the 
importance of China for the construction of a new international architecture. 
Since his early days in power he had stressed the importance of engaging China 
on a varied range of global issues among which environment and Africa became 
perhaps the most significant. For this reason, with the signing of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership in May 2004, the two 
countries committed themselves to further high-level political dialogues and 
consultations on sustainable development, strategic security, development and 
non-proliferation.49 
Along with ideational motives, the hard facts of trade and investment 
remained high on the British agenda. Despite the presence of Hong Kong and 
                                                 
48 ‘Sino-British Comprehensive Partnership Agreement’, Beijing Review, October 6, 1998. 
49 ‘Sino-British Strategic Partnership Agreement’, Beijing Review, May 10, 2004. 
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Britain’s strong mercantile tradition, trade had never been a defining feature of 
Britain’s relations with China. Even the presence of such powerful institutions 
as the 48 Group and the Sino-British Trade Council, which later merged to form 
the China-Britain Trade Group (CBTG), did not significantly change the pattern 
of exchanges with China. For a long time the UK lagged behind European 
major trading partners with China such as Germany and France (see Table 14). 
Table 14: UK’s trade with China (1995-2008) 
Years 
Export to 
China  
Export share 
EU-25 
Import from 
China  
Import share 
EU-25 Balance 
1995 979.00 6.66% 4,551.00 17.30% -3,572.00 
2001 2,744.00 8.97% 15,530.00 19.03% -12,786.00 
2005 4,081.00 7.88% 24,667.00 15.61% -20,586.00 
2008 5,489.00 7.68% 33,201.00 14.52% -27,712.00 
Sources: Eurostat, External and Intra-EU Trade 1958-2006, 2006 and Eurostat, External and Intra-EU 
Trade Monthly Statistics, Issue No. 4/2008. Own calculations. Million ECU/EUR. 
Table 15: UK’s FDI to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total FDI FDI share (EU) 
1985 71.35 43.16% 
1990 13.33 8.34% 
1995 914.14 42.89% 
2000 1,164.05 25.99% 
2005 964.75 17.10% 
2008* 4,639.95 38.28% 
* For the year 2008 the data also include FDI in Hong Kong. Source: National Bureau of Statistics, various 
years. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
Although in 2008 the UK was China’s second biggest European trading 
partner after Germany, this was mostly due to imports of Chinese products 
rather than exports of British goods. Where Britain yet surpassed China’s other 
EU partners was in its direct investments in the PRC, in which it had occupied a 
leading position since the early 1960s, although it was eventually surpassed for 
some years by Germany in the 2000s (see Table 15). 
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5.4.2 The UK’s promotion of human rights in China 
It is fair to argue that until 1989 mention of human rights and the rule of law 
did not appear in the British policy towards China if one excludes reference to 
the issue of Hong Kong. In those years, though, it is hardly possible to consider 
the dialogue on the democratic form of Hong Kong as the meddling of an 
outside country into China’s internal affairs. Yet, starting from the early 1990s, 
the UK’s attitude changed and the rule of law and human rights made their 
appearance in the diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.  
However, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre the outstanding issue 
of Hong Kong led to the UK endorsing a positive approach based on dialogue 
and cooperation rather than mere megaphone diplomacy. This position was 
reinforced by Lord Howe’s visit to China in 1992 and the report which ensued 
pointed to the need to increase exchanges and programmes on the ground.50 
Therefore in 1993 the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) could state, among 
its four objectives for British China’s policy, “encouraging China to continue 
more open economic policies and through frank dialogue and increased 
exchanges to promote greater respect for universal human rights by the Chinese 
authorities”.51 
Yet, little of this rhetoric translated in concrete actions at the dialogue level. 
Apart from the support for the UNCHR resolution, until 1997 the political 
dialogue between Britain and China on human rights was only limited to the 
usual handing over of name lists of detainees. Similarly, only timid activities 
were embarked upon on the ground, mostly consisting of exchanges of lawyers 
and judges. 
                                                 
50 Lord Howe, Report on China and Human Rights, HMSO, December 1992. 
51 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Report on Relations between the United 
Kingdom and China in the Period up to and beyond 1997, London, HMSO, 1994. 
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The arrival of Prime Minister Blair with his ethical foreign policy infused 
some hope of a different handling of China. This perception among the media 
was reinforced by the Prime Minister’s famous 1999 Chicago speech where he 
expounded his doctrine of the ‘international community’. It pointed out that 
democracy promotion would be a legitimate objective to be supported also 
through military actions, since the spread and establishment of the values of 
liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society were presented as 
supporting the UK’s national interests. 
Yet, as it has been shown above, Prime Minister Blair’s ethical foreign 
policy failed its baptism of fire with his first visit to China in 1998. Occurring in 
the gloomiest year of Chinese repression against political and religious 
dissidents after Tiananmen, Blair’s visit to China did little to prove his 
commitment to human rights in the country. Rather, Blair’s orientation followed 
his predecessor’s footsteps, publicly confirming that he favoured dialogue over 
hectoring on human rights and reform, a line that he held despite domestic 
criticism. 
On the ground, different from the other major EU member states, the UK’s 
development assistance to China never featured high in the UK’s priority list 
(see Table 16). The only time it did so was during the mid-1990s when China 
briefly became one of the top recipients of British aid.52 Two thirds of these 
commitments were in the form of Aid and Trade Provision, mainly focused at 
supporting British companies’ penetration into the Chinese market. However, 
with the coming to office of Prime Minister Blair, the Aid and Trade Provision 
was abolished.  
                                                 
52 Peter Ferdinand, ‘UK Policy Towards China’, p. 50. 
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In order to compensate for the end of the Aid and Trade Provision, which 
eventually terminated in 2001, and to maintain what Blair had promised in the 
1998 Joint Declaration 53 , the newly-formed Department for International 
Development (DfID) began non-conditional technical assistance activities. 
According to the first DfID Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for China (1998-
2001) activities were mostly centred on poverty reduction and sustainable 
growth programmes.54 
Table 16: UK’s ODA to China (1985-2008) 
Years Total ODA ODA share (DAC) 
1985 1.6 0.17% 
1990 4.8 0.23% 
1995 47.8 1.35% 
2000 83.44 6.64% 
2005 55.48 3.28% 
2008 52.28 4.45% 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org. Own calculations. US$ million. 
 
This implied a focus on human development (education and health), 
economic, social and administrative reform (with particular emphasis on SOE 
reform) and the environment. Such an approach was maintained until 2005 as 
testified by the subsequent CSP.55 In 2007 the UK’s development activities 
were significantly reduced, as part of DfID ‘exit strategy’ from China, and they 
                                                 
53 The joint declaration had made clear that cooperation would be strengthened in “development 
and restructuring of State-owned enterprises; the provision of training and small business 
creation for unemployed workers; the provision of financial sector training, including in the 
field of regulation; poverty elimination and promotion of development of the interior 
provinces.” Joint Declaration, 1998. 
54 According to the DfID China Country Strategy Paper for 1998-2001, since the early 1990s 
UK development assistance to China has averaged £35 million per annum. At that time 
technical assistance only accounted for £ 7-10 million of the total while the remaining part was 
composed of Aid and Trade Provision. In the peak year for ATP expenditure (1997-1998), 
China was the fifth largest recipient of British development assistance.  
55 According to the DfID China Country Strategy Paper for 2002-2005 the following amounts 
had been allocated: £38 million for 2002-03 and 2003-04 and £60 million for 2004-05. The 
Strategy proposed an even more specific focus on poverty reduction identifying the following 
three outcomes: people with productive and sustainable livelihoods, educated and literate people 
and healthy people. 
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were mostly centred on supporting the dialogue with the PRC on African 
development issues.56 
As it appears from the above discussion, notwithstanding DfID’s 2001 
‘conversion’ to the good governance cause with the release of the White Paper 
on ‘Promoting Effective Governments and Efficient Markets’, this did not 
directly produce any changes in DfID projects in China. 57 The sensitive fields 
of promotion of human rights and the rule of law were left to other public 
organisations, namely the Great Britain-China Centre (GBCC) and the British 
Council (BC). 
Differently from the German Stiftungen the GBCC and the BC are two public 
bodies. These organisations greatly benefited from the funding offered by the 
Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), which, starting from the mid-1990s 
provided financial means in grant form initially through the Human Rights 
Project Fund and more recently through its offspring the Global Opportunity 
Fund (GOF).58 As in the case of Germany, the use of these public but non-
governmental organisations appears instrumental in delegating responsibilities 
in the promotion of human rights away from the executive branch of 
government.59 
China was not a priority country for FCO activities in democratisation and 
human rights promotion worldwide, yet its sheer size made it one of the biggest 
recipients.60 The projects carried out in China through this funding were small 
in value (less than 150 thousand pounds) and for this reason were narrowly-
                                                 
56 Interview 15. 
57 During interviews it was argued that good governance and human rights are included in any 
DfID activity in the country. The only notable exception is the recent inception of DfID annual 
dialogues with China on Good Governance and Africa. Interview 15. 
58 Interview 16. 
59 Opinion shared by GBCC representatives. Interviews 17 and 18. 
60 Interview 14. 
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centred around five main priorities: (i) abolition of death penalty, (ii) combating 
torture, (iii) freedom of expression, (iv) the rule of law and (v) children’s rights.  
Another important channel of funding was the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs that set up a Young Lawyer Training scheme, which was managed by 
the British Council and a Judges Training Scheme, which was followed by the 
GBCC (see Table 17). 
Table 17: UK’s projects in the rule of law and human rights in China 
Year Project Title/Description
Amount 
grant/loan
(in million euro)
MS Agency 
responsible Chinese Agency/Partner
Category 
1993-ongoing
Training and Exchange Programme on 
Judicial Administration, Criminal Justice, 
Juvenile Justice (various activities)
n.a.
GBCC on behalf of 
FCO Ministry of Justice Training Programme
1998-2003 Judges Training Programme 0.7 GBCC on behalf of 
DfID
Intermediate, High and 
Supreme Courts
Training Programme
2002-2004 Criminal Justice Programme n.a. GBCC on behalf of 
DfID
Supreme People's 
Procurate
Training Programme
2001-ongoing The Lord Chancellor's Training Scheme for 
Young Chinese Lawyers
n.a. British Council on 
behalf of FCO
Ministry of Justice Training Programme
2003-2005 Senior Police Training Programme n.a. British Council on 
behalf of FCO
Ministry of Public 
Security 
Training Programme
2004-2006 Reform of re-eductation through labour n.a. British Council on 
behalf of FCO
Legislative Affairs 
Commission of NPC
Advisory for Law 
Drafting
2005-2007 Reform of death penalty reviewing procedure n.a. British Council on 
behalf of FCO
Legislative Affairs 
Commission of NPC
Training Programme
2005-2008
Enhancing Human Rights in Prisons through 
Training Prison Staff and Reforming Prison 
Management
n.a. British Council on 
behalf of FCO
Ministry of Justice Training Programme
UNITED KINGDOM PROJECTS IN RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Source: Overview of European Union Ongoing Projects in China, Various Years 1995-
2008, EC Delegation in China, Own Calculations. 
 
Although timid and limited in their efforts these projects showed a certain 
level of attention for human rights issues in China from the British side. 
However, it should be noted that they represented only a very small part of the 
UK’s grant contribution to China, and the DfID’s lack of any projects in the 
field of human rights is symptomatic of a certain negligence and delegation of 
responsibilities to non-governmental organisations. Similarly, the fact that the 
UK’s bulk of ODA funds in China was channelled to other fields points to a 
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limited commitment, which also confirms the shift on the ground from the 
initial aspiration to an ethical foreign policy. 
To sum up: the coming to power of Prime Minister Blair with his 
internationalist attitude and ethical foreign policy led the UK to engage China 
on a variety of international issues. Among these, human rights probably 
suffered the most as the UK was only able to articulate limited projects. In its 
policy the UK embraced the constructive engagement of the EU. Similarly, its 
membership of the EU led on the one hand to stronger competition for China’s 
market with its EU economic competitors and on the other hand to a more 
pragmatic approach towards China’s human rights situation, as testified by the 
UK’s leadership of the European Council that ratified the abandoning of the 
UNCHR resolution in 1998 as shown in the previous Chapter. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The three sections above have critically analysed the China policies of the 
three member states selected. It has emerged that the three major member states, 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom, fiercely competed for the Chinese 
market. At the same time each of them engaged China in accordance to its own 
identity and interests in world affairs, with Germany privileging economic 
power, France multipolarity and the UK China’s engagement in international 
issues. 
Commercial and investment competition, together with the role that each 
member states attributed to China for its own foreign policy, determined a 
dilution of human rights concerns in the bilateral relations. These concerns were 
often masked behind very non-confrontational projects on the rule of law. It is 
interesting to note that very few efforts were spent by all the three member 
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states in the support of human rights. It is even more interesting to underline 
that when some projects were devised and implemented none of them was 
concentrated on socio-economic rights, but mostly on civil and political ones. 
At the same time membership of the EU created an important incentive for the 
member states to pursue their economic and strategic interests with China 
bilaterally, while delegating the divisive issues of human rights to the EU level. 
Besides the delegation of responsibilities in human rights promotion from 
member states to the EU, all three member states have shown the tendency of 
the executives in power to delegate the carrying out of sensitive activities on the 
ground to non-governmental organisations, in particular political foundations, 
public bodies and academic institutions. Although this could be justified on the 
basis of the expertise and competence of such organisations, it is impossible to 
rule out that such a delegation hides the willingness of the executives to leave 
the conflictive issues of human rights promotion to non-governmental 
organisations, thus limiting their direct involvement to sheer financing. 
All in all this Chapter has thus shown that the bilateral policies of the three 
selected member states for the promotion of human rights in China were mostly 
influenced by their specific identities, interests and policy preferences and only 
partly by their membership of the EU. The latter allowed these three member 
states to largely delegate the responsibility to promote human rights to the EC 
level. For the purposes of this work it is necessary to point out that the 
combination of differing national interests and delegation of responsibilities to 
the EC level did not enable any coordination with the policies put in place by 
the EC for the promotion of human rights in China. Rather, the EC’s policies 
often replaced those of the three member states, leaving their hands free to 
pursue their national interests. In this perspective the EU’s overall policies for 
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the promotion of human rights in China through development assistance did not 
achieve any significant weight. 
The research findings support the predictions of the theoretical approach 
developed in Chapter 2, according to which the member states’ interests and 
policy preferences are primarily formed within their national borders and little 
socialisation occurs through the EU level in the definition of their human rights 
policies. These findings are at odds with the expectations of sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches, which would have predicted a 
convergence of such policies around the EU’s identity and norms in human 
rights promotion.  
In fact, it is interesting to note that it was rather the member states’ 
approaches which were reflected in the EC’s policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China. Similarly, the delegation of responsibilities suggests, 
without proving it, another potential finding that challenges sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist approaches: i.e. membership of the EU may 
have negatively socialised the three selected member countries into abandoning 
normative policies at bilateral level and delegating them to the EU. 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has aimed to contribute originally to the literature on the EU’s 
normative policy, which has increasingly characterised studies of the EU’s 
external relations since the early 1990s. It has done so through the analysis of 
the policies devised by the EU and its member states to promote human rights in 
China. In particular this thesis has investigated whether the EC and three 
selected member states, Germany, France and the UK, have been able to 
articulate consistent and coordinated economic and development policies to 
promote human rights in China within their strategy of constructive 
engagement. This has offered the possibility to assess to what extent the EU and 
its member states have been able to balance normative and material priorities in 
their external relations towards China. 
In order to analyse the ability of the EU and its member states to balance 
normative and material priorities this thesis has relied on a liberal 
intergovernmental approach to explain the policy output within the various 
levels of governance considered in the EU’s external relations with China. The 
suitability of this approach against the prevalent sociological institutionalist and 
constructivist approaches has been discussed in Chapter 2.  
The analysis of the evolution of the EU’s policies for the promotion of 
human rights worldwide has shown the need to frame the discussion in terms of 
the EU’s system of multilevel governance in external relations. The theoretical 
discussion has shown the need to focus on the prominence of member states in 
the EU’s promotion of human rights because they can heavily influence the 
EU’s policies at CFSP and EC levels and still conduct significant bilateral 
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policies in this field. Similarly, the liberal intergovernmental approach has been 
shown suitable to make sense of the multilevel governance analytical approach, 
as it offers the possibility to explain the policy output at the various levels of 
governance in the EU’s promotion of human rights.  
Finally, the suitability of the liberal intergovernmental approach has also 
been illustrated in the broader study of EU-China relations. Chapter 3 has 
shown that the interests and policy preferences of the EU’s three main partners 
with China strongly influenced the elaboration and implementation of the EU’s 
policies towards the country. In particular Chapter 3 has shown that these 
member states had growing economic interests in China, but they were divided 
by their national economic objectives and did not share a common approach to 
human rights in the country. Besides, such approaches have been shown to be 
representative of the approaches of the other member states. The combination of 
the growing economic interests of the three selected member states and their 
divisions on the issue of human rights in China heavily influenced the EU’s 
strategy of constructive engagement of China. 
The combination of the insights of Chapters 2 and 3 has supported the 
elaboration of the specific hypothesis of this thesis: that the EU’s constructive 
engagement of China on human rights reflected the prevalence of strategic and 
economic interests over ideational ones in the attitudes of Germany, France and 
the UK towards China. This thesis has thus clearly embraced a rationalist 
approach as it has analysed the relevance of material interests in the policies of 
the EU and its member states towards China.  
In order to address the specific hypothesis this thesis has delimited the 
research to only two levels of governance in the EU’s external relations, i.e. the 
EC and the member states, and it has singled out for analysis the most 
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appropriate policies, i.e. economic engagement and development assistance. 
The suitability of this focus has been supported by the analysis of the EU and its 
member states’ strategy of constructive engagement of China carried out in 
Chapter 3. Similarly, this thesis has concentrated the analysis on the 
coordination of the development policies of the EC, Germany, France and the 
UK. The three member states are representative of the EU member states’ 
approaches towards human rights in China as specified in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 has shown that the EU’s strategy of constructive engagement was 
mostly based on economic engagement, dialogue and development assistance. 
Chapter 3 has, in addition, shown that the strategy of constructive engagement 
privileged an approach that sidelined sanctioning policies. The abandonment of 
sanctioning policies, which were formulated at CFSP level, has shown the 
necessity to concentrate on the EC and the member states’ levels of governance. 
Similarly, since two out of the three main policies of constructive engagement 
of China, i.e. economic engagement and development assistance, came under 
the EC’s competence, a focus on these two has been shown to be appropriate. 
Chapter 3 has then shown that in the definition of the EU’s constructive 
engagement, Germany, France and the UK were not only the most influential 
member states but they were also representative of the other EU member states’ 
approaches towards human rights in China.  
For these reasons in order to address the specific hypothesis, this thesis has 
considered whether the EC’s economic engagement and development assistance 
policies towards China have been consistent with the objective of putting human 
rights at the cornerstone of relations with the country. Secondly, this thesis has 
asked what specific policies the EC and the three selected member states 
devised and applied for the promotion of human rights, thus showing the 
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institutional efforts at achieving coordination. These aspects have been summed 
up in two research questions, whose answers are discussed in the sections 
below. 
6.2 Research question 1: EC consistency? 
Did the EC elaborate and implement consistent economic and development 
policies to promote human rights in China? 
Chapter 3 has shown that until 1989, and to a lesser extent also until 1995, 
member states’ interests and policy preferences towards China differed greatly. 
In particular while Germany, France and the UK began to consider the 
economic and strategic possibilities that had been offered by China since the 
mid-1980s, and some other member states, Italy and the Netherlands, saw its 
rising importance for their commercial and investment interests, the majority of 
the other member states did not pay much attention to China until the middle 
and late 1990s. 
However, the activism of Germany, France and to a lesser extent the UK, 
which received the support of the Commission, imposed their positions at EU 
level. The affirmation of these member states’ positions on China at EU level 
implied a rise of the PRC in the strategic thinking of the EU as well as a 
growing attention to the economic menace and opportunity that China 
represented for the EU and its member states. These strategic and economic 
calculations led to the embracing of the strategy of constructive engagement, 
which has featured in the EU’s policy towards China ever since. 
With reference to human rights, the constructive engagement prescribed 
dealing with China in such a way as to open it to external influence, in 
particular through trade, and to engage it in multilateral fora in order to make it 
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a more responsible international player. At the same time a mix of critical 
discursive approaches, mostly private rather than public, and positive actions 
would complement the integration of the PRC in the international human rights 
regime. 
However, the strategy of constructive engagement soon proved that 
sanctioning policies should be sidelined, if not eliminated tout court. This has 
been shown in Chapter 3 in the discussions of the member states’ positions at 
the UNCHR, the evolution of the ECDHR and the case of the arms embargo. 
Therefore the strategy of constructive engagement of China on human rights 
greatly depended on positive policies implemented by the EC through economic 
engagement and development assistance. 
Chapter 4 has analysed these two major policies elaborated and implemented 
at EC level. It has emerged that the EC’s economic engagement and 
development assistance policies were broadly inconsistent with the objective of 
promoting human rights in China. The EC’s economic engagement of China in 
the two case studies analysed, i.e. the GSP and the WTO negotiations, did not 
reflect the rhetoric of constructive engagement put forward by the Commission.  
The latter did not use its proposal power to suspend GSP in order to take 
action against abuses of social and economic rights in China nor did it use the 
WTO negotiations to request China to improve some basic rights. In fact the 
Commission followed the strict mandate of the three member states and on their 
behalf negotiated commercial and investment concessions often detrimental for 
China. Moreover, the Commission did not make use of its power to negotiate 
development projects to assist China’s reform of its human rights regime. The 
only projects that it put forward in connection with China’s negotiations to enter 
the WTO all had a mainly administrative and economic focus. 
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A similar story emerges from the development programmes and projects that 
the EC pursued in China. The EC was certainly one of the biggest donors. It 
financed some of the largest programmes in the judicial field and in support of 
village elections. At the same time it also made China one of the main recipients 
of the EIDHR facility for the promotion of human rights through macro and 
micro projects. 
However Chapter 4 has shown that all these activities did not have a strategic 
thrust but were mostly ad hoc. The lack of a strategic thrust found its raison 
d’être in the member states’ interests and policy preferences towards China on 
human rights. The member states remained divided on the best way to promote 
human rights in the country and provided an ambiguous mandate to the 
Commission. The latter, in turn, did not have the power to bargain strongly with 
the Chinese authorities and its projects remained confined to the small technical 
areas opened by the Chinese government. 
For these reasons the programmes and projects that emerged appeared 
heavily influenced by a narrowly-focused approach centred on technical and 
administrative issues. Little attention was paid to specific human rights projects 
and the bulk of funds went into highly visible activities but with an unclear ad 
hoc strategy. Even more importantly the EC did not manage to use the 
opportunities offered by the Chinese government to operate on social and 
economic rights nor to support the request of the Chinese civil society in these 
sectors. As mentioned in Chapter 1 more focus on these fields was also strongly 
recommended by international advocacy groups.  
Overall it appears that at the EC level the policies elaborated and 
implemented by the Commission were heavily influenced by the economic 
interests of Germany, France and the UK and by the overall divisions of the 
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member states on the best way to handle human rights in China. This gave rise 
to inconsistent policies, which lacked an appropriate strategic outlook and were 
mostly ad hoc. Finally, such policies were strongly confined within the limits 
imposed by the Chinese authorities, which maintained a strong control over 
them and were often reluctant to collaborate on the civil and political issues 
raised by the EC. 
These findings support the expectations of the liberal intergovernmental 
approach elaborated for the analysis. The EC’s policies for the promotion of 
human rights in China were mostly influenced by the strategic and economic 
interests of the three selected member states, which had the most bargaining 
power and highest stakes on China. At the same time this contrasts the 
expectations of sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches, 
because the EU institutions did not socialise the three member states into 
supporting EC policies in line with the identity and norms of the EU. In fact, the 
findings suggest, without yet proving it, that the influence of the interests of the 
three member states may have led the EU institutions to contribute to the 
socialisation of negative norms at EC level, since the policy output may not 
have reflected the normative interests of those member states more prone to 
concretely engage China on human rights. 
6.3 Research question 2: EC and member states’ coordination? 
Did the EC and the three member states elaborate and implement coordinated 
development policies for the promotion of human rights in China? 
Notwithstanding the mixed results of the EC’s development cooperation 
initiatives in the human rights and rule of law sectors, Chapter 4 has shown that 
the EC emerged as one of the most significant donors to China in these fields. 
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However, little complementarity seemed to exist with the three member states 
selected for analysis. In this perspective the EC’s activities may have resembled 
those of a sixteenth member state (now it would be a twenty-eighth member 
state) rather than being complementary to those of its member states. 
On the one hand all the three member states had some exchanges of lawyers 
and judges, which they carried out without trying to find any synergies with the 
LJC Programme. On the other hand no member state was supportive of the 
VGT Programme through the funding of similar initiatives or attempts to build 
on it. So the two Programmes, although rather successful, seemed more a 
convenient justification for the selected member states to abandon the field of 
political aid. 
Similarly little coordination existed. The necessity of coordinating activities 
and applying them in a consistent way is even more stringent in light of the oft-
reiterated suggestions of international advocacy groups as well as scholars, 
which have often pointed at the necessity of pooling forces to reach results in 
China.1 Yet, despite the numerous steps undertaken to make European aid more 
effective, such as meetings between representatives of member states and the 
EC delegation, exchange of information, joint studies, analyses and evaluations, 
and joint programmes, formal and substantive coordination was absent up until 
the elaboration of the CSP in 2000. 
A new impetus for improving the level of coordination between the EC and 
its member states’ activities in the country was brought about by the reform of 
the Commission in 2000 and the necessity to prepare a Country Strategy Paper 
                                                 
1 Human Rights in China and the Open Society, Promoting Human Rights in China, Report of 
the China Human Rights Strategy Study Group, 2001. 
 196 
for each developing country.2 Yet, even the inception of the CSP, the more 
frequent development counsellors’ meetings and their sharing information do 
not seem to have changed much in development cooperation activities, even less 
so in those connected to the rule of law and human rights. Similarly, up to 2006, 
the Commission Delegation in the country did not institutionalise any meetings 
in the rule of law and human rights fields.3  
Lack of coordination and complementarity reinforces the idea that the EC 
played the role of a sixteenth member state. This was confirmed indirectly by an 
internal report. The document reports that coordination between EC and 
member states is strong in form but weak in substance:  
Donor coordination within the democratic governance sector is a 
challenge. There is no evidence that, apart from sharing information 
with the EU’s member states, the EC has made efforts to take a lead 
role in political and policy dialogue processes on democratic 
governance (or HR and rule of law).4 
 
The lack of coordination and complementarity supports the validity of the 
liberal intergovernmental expectations that in the formulation of their national 
policies for the promotion of human rights, the member states followed their 
own interests and policy preferences and they were not influenced by the EU’s 
identity and norms. In addition, the delegation of responsibilities of the three 
member states to the EC level supports a further negative assessment of the 
interaction of the EC and member states’ levels of governance on the issue of 
human rights promotion in China. This even suggests that membership of the 
                                                 
2 By its nature the CSP had to include all the member states’ activities and, taking stock of their 
involvement, elaborate the most suitable field of intervention for the EC. To this purpose the 
CSP also included a matrix for EU donor co-ordination and stressed the necessity for EC 
activities and MS to coordinate their activities. European Commission, China – Country 
Strategy Paper 2001-2005, European Commission, 2001. 
3 Only in 2007 following the input of a Dutch proposal was the first Coordination meeting of 
donors involved in the field of human rights and the rule of law set up. 
4  European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation and 
Partnership with the People’s Republic of China, p. 88. 
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EU may have contributed to the socialisation of negative norms in the form of 
delegation of responsibilities. 
6.4 The nature of the EU’s constructive engagement 
Answering the two research questions above has allowed testing the specific 
hypothesis of this thesis, which in turn helps to clarify the actual nature of the 
EU and its member states’ constructive engagement of China in terms of 
normative and material priorities. 
From the above discussion it has emerged that the EC and its three member 
states elaborated and implemented inconsistent and uncoordinated policies for 
the promotion of human rights in China. It has been shown that this outcome 
was strongly influenced by Germany, France and the UK’s economic interests 
towards China and their divisions on the best way to deal with human rights in 
the country. 
This aspect supports the validity of the central hypothesis of this thesis. The 
EU and its member states’ strategy of constructive engagement towards China 
on human rights was indeed highly influenced by the material priorities of the 
three selected member states. Therefore it is possible to argue that the actual 
nature of the EU and its member states’ constructive engagement in China 
privileged material interests over ideational ones. This was also reflected by the 
little attention paid to socio-economic rights in China. Generally, the strategy of 
constructive engagement adopted in 1995 did not greatly differ from the 
engagement of China on human rights in the previous years. 
Chapter 3 has shown that during the 1980s the approach of all the EU 
institutions, including the EP, was characterised by a negligent cooperation, 
which was supported and promoted by those member states that had growing 
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economic and strategic interests towards the country. The Tiananmen Massacre 
stirred the lukewarm attention of the EU and its member states towards the 
situation of human rights in China. However, the initial response was in mildly-
worded rhetorical terms and did not include any concrete sanctions apart from 
the arms embargo. The divisions already existing at that time led to an overall 
soft EU response. Only some member states maintained a critical approach, in 
particular the Nordic countries.  
It has been shown that after the beginning of the constructive engagement the 
EU member states achieved compromises of very low common denominators, 
which sidelined public criticism and sanctions against human rights abuses in 
China. Somehow the only significant exception in the strategy of constructive 
engagement was the arms embargo, whose impact was diluted by internal 
divisions. The only policies that emerged in connection with the strategy of 
constructive engagement at the EC and the member states’ levels remained of a 
very soft type, thus showing little progress from the previous approach. 
This highlights an important point that can be considered as a corollary to the 
demonstration of the central hypothesis of this thesis. The interaction at the EU 
level on the issue of human rights in China may have contributed to the 
socialisation of negative norms. This thesis suggests that even member states 
more prone to embark upon critical approaches may have accepted 
compromises of a very low common denominator, as it appears in the cases of 
the resolution at the UNCHR, of the ECDHR and of the EC’s economic and 
development policies. Similarly, from the analysis of the three selected member 
states, it emerges that membership of the EU may have offered them the 
opportunity to delegate responsibilities for normative policies to the EU level. 
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Once the common positions had been embraced at CFSP, any critical 
independent stance by those member states more prone to impose sanctions on 
China may have been limited. Similarly the communitarisation of trade 
competences may have precluded any further sanctioning policy by those 
member states which would have been more critical towards China. At 
development assistance level the sharing of competences may have led to a 
delegation of responsibilities to the Commission, which in turn was unable to 
design substantive projects and did not attempt to reach coordination and 
complementarity with its member states.  
The prevalence of strategic and economic concerns in the interests and policy 
preferences of the member states with the most bargaining power and highest 
stakes in China, compounded by the EU institutions’ ‘sensitivity’ to their 
attitudes, led to the imposition of the strategy of constructive engagement of 
China on all the member states of the EU. Therefore this thesis suggests, 
without yet proving it, that the EU framework may have contributed to the 
socialisation of negative norms, because the strategic and economic interests of 
the most influential EU member states imposed an overall inconsistent and 
uncoordinated EU policy for the promotion of human rights in China. In this 
perspective it would be interesting to analyse to what extent the EU institutions 
played the role of a negative normative trap in the overall EU promotion of 
human rights in China. 
6.5 Thesis contribution to EU-China studies on human rights 
Chapter 1 has offered a simple tripartite categorisation of EU-China 
literature. This thesis has clearly embraced a member states-centred approach, 
although it has done so in a more theoretically and analytically-conscious way, 
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which has combined the notion of multilevel governance with liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Similarly, at an analytical level this approach has shown 
the validity of analysing the consistency and coordination of the positive 
policies of the EC and its member states for the promotion of human rights in 
China. This approach has been shown suitable to analyse and explain the EU 
strategy of constructive engagement on human rights in China.  
Applying this framework to the EU and its member states’ present promotion 
of human rights in China implies considering the existing divisions among the 
member states, the mostly economic and strategic interests of Germany, France 
and the UK towards China, and their interaction within the system of multilevel 
governance in the EU’s external relations. 
It can be maintained that in line with the 2006 Commission Communication 
on China, the EU still rhetorically considers human rights an important issue in 
its relation with China. However this does not seem to be warranted by the 
present possibilities at the disposal of the EU and its member states and their 
envisaged actions to promote human rights in the PRC in the near future.  
On the one hand the accession of China into the WTO has eliminated any 
possibility to chastise its behaviour through economic means, although these 
have been seen to never have been seriously considered by the EU and its 
member states. At the same time the fact that the UNCHR was replaced by the 
Council on Human Rights has also eliminated another multilateral venue where 
the EU could exert some influence on China. The only sanction remaining is the 
arms embargo, whose lifting at the moment does not seem to be on the table due 
to new internal European resistance coming mostly from the new German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
ostensibly tougher stances on this issue. 
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On the other hand, the pretences of the previous strategy of constructive 
engagement seem to have been further sidelined, with only the ECDHR 
remaining. Interestingly, while Chinese authorities continue to request member 
states’ bilateral dialogues to be eliminated, EU officials appear to have given 
even more importance to the ECDHR, which has already proven its 
inefficiency.  
Strengthening the ECDHR and its relevant seminars are the only practical 
activities envisaged by the EU to promote human rights in China. Projects on 
the ground have not been envisaged either through the classic ALA budget lines 
or through the EIDHR in the CSP for 2007-2013. According to some EU 
officials though, the issues of human rights, good governance and the rule of 
law have not disappeared, they have been included in all the actions of the EC.5 
At the same time, even the three selected member states seem to have 
abandoned the field of political aid, which has been one of the first to be phased 
out in their strategies for development assistance exit from the PRC. 
If since 1995 the pursuit of a constructive and effective engagement of China 
characterised the EU and its member states’ approach towards the country, 
starting from the 2006 Communication such concepts have been replaced by the 
notion of partnership.6 This prescribes that the EU, its member states and China 
cooperate on the basis of equality and mutuality. This is also reflected in the 
ongoing discussions and negotiations on a Partnership Cooperation Agreement, 
which should replace the 1985 Economic and Cooperation Agreement.  
In light of the historical overview of the EU’s promotion of human rights in 
China and of the present instruments at the disposal of the EU and its member 
                                                 
5 Opinion expressed by an EU official during the presentation on EC human rights and the rule 
of law activities in China held in Brussels in May 2008. 
6 European Commission, EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, COM(2006) 631 
final, 2006. 
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states to promote human rights in the country, it would appear logical to argue 
that better coordination should be established among member states in their 
bilateral policies, as well as in their positions in the definition of EU policies. 
This could also trigger a more consistent EU policy. Yet better coordination 
may seem highly idealistic, considering the internal divisions among member 
states and their divergences on the best ways to promote human rights. 
Therefore it could be argued that European officials and policy makers 
should be ready to lower their expectations in their human rights promotion, and 
focus most on issues where a real internal consensus can be built, at least for the 
time being. Secondly, in relation to the previous point, European officials and 
policy makers should be aware that at the moment, the EU and its member 
states do not dispose of any meaningful instruments to promote human rights in 
China. Thus either new instruments must be devised or some of the old ones be 
revived.  
The need for better coordination for a real consensus, for effective policy 
tools and for the pursuit of a concrete strategy leads to a modest proposal: the 
issues in which the EU and the member states could reach a higher level of 
consistency and coordination could concern those on which the CCP is more 
readily willing to accept EU support, and on which Chinese civil society is more 
focused. 
Throughout the thesis it has been shown, although only secondarily, that the 
EU and its member states have been unable to apply appropriate human rights 
policies. This was mostly due to the fact that they focused on political and civil 
rights. In fact the Chinese authorities appear more inclined to promote and 
accept support for socio-economic rights. The CCP has made progress in these 
sectors, as is shown by the recent enactment of the 2007 Labour Contract Law 
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or by the present attempts to establish a more equal, just and harmonious 
society, respectful of people’s social rights. Similarly, China has shown its 
willingness for collaboration in the field of socio-economic rights, as testified 
by its requests for EU support in its 2003 China’s EU White Paper.7 
At the same time Chinese civil society also appears more interested in the 
pursuit of socio-economic rights. Today the Chinese civil society strongly 
mobilises in cases of local corruption, environmental degradation, labour rights, 
and rights to health and education. Today, therefore, support for social and 
economic rights seems to offer the biggest manoeuvring room, as also 
maintained in Chapter 1.  
Focusing on these issues may be the right strategy for Europeans in the short 
term, because coordination could be easier to achieve as furthering these rights 
will not imply any political or economic costs for the member states, due to the 
Chinese government’s willingness to cooperate. Secondly, member states could 
find it easier to agree on these issues because there is a growing awareness in 
Europe of environmental and socio-economic issues in the context of 
globalisation. Contributing to the improvement of such rights could ease the 
living conditions of the Chinese population and diminish the competitiveness of 
China’s products, often based on sheer exploitation of workers and the 
environment, and on the lack of concrete social provisions. Thirdly, as the 
economic dimension remains the most important in the EU’s relations with 
China, useful and effective instruments exist in this domain to pursue such 
rights, as exemplified by the application of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
EU companies investing in the country. 
                                                 
7 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU White Paper, 2003. 
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To conclude, in a paradoxical manner, the EU and its member states could 
reframe their policy for the promotion of human rights in China by trying to 
push and support the CCP to embrace more social-democratic policies. At the 
moment, the EU and its member states are instead only rhetorically, 
intermittently and incoherently criticising the CCP. At least in the short term, a 
realistic outlook on the actual abilities and interests of the EU and its member 
states in relation to the actual situation in China would suggest spending the 
bulk of European energies in improving Chinese social and economic rights, 
while continuing to address political and civil rights in China through the 
existing channels and instruments. 
6.6 Future research on the EU’s promotion of norms 
This thesis has contributed to the literature on the EU’s normative policies 
through the analysis of the EU and its member states’ strategy of constructive 
engagement of China on human rights. Although this thesis only focuses on a 
single country, its relevance for the study of the EU’s promotion of norms is 
justified by the fact that integrating China in the international human rights 
regime can be seen as essential to put to the test the EU and its member states’ 
commitment to some of the better established and less controversial norms in 
international relations. In this perspective the fact that the EU and its member 
states were unable to elaborate consistent and coordinated policies for the 
promotion of human rights in China suggests that they have been unable to 
balance normative and material interests in their relations with the PRC.  
This has broader implications for the EU’s external relations because it 
suggests that the EU is able to exert its clout in international norms promotion 
only when the member states with the most bargaining power and highest stakes 
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in a specific foreign policy issue (in this case human rights promotion in China) 
privilege normative interests over material ones. This in turn opposes the claims 
of sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches, for which specific 
EU institutions, identity and norms influence the conduct of the EU and its 
member states’ external relations. Similarly, it suggests that the EU framework 
may contribute to the socialisation of negative norms as well as positive ones, 
depending on the orientations of the member states with the most bargaining 
power and highest stakes in a specific foreign policy issue. 
The EU’s promotion of norms and human rights has to clear numerous 
hurdles given the interaction between divided member states and the inefficient 
architecture of its decision-making system. In the case of China this was due to 
the economic and strategic interests of the most influential member states and 
their divisions in the articulation of policies within the various levels of 
governance in EU external relations. Therefore further research should be 
carried out on the conditions that could lead the EU and its member states to 
elaborate and implement consistent and coordinated normative policies vis-à-vis 
third countries. 
As argued in section 6.4, the research results generated by the analysis of the 
specific case of the EU and its member states’ promotion of human rights in 
China open new interesting avenues in this respect. In particular, it has been 
shown that the predictions of sociological institutionalist and constructivist 
approaches concerning the EU’s promotion of norms cannot be confirmed in 
this specific case. Rather the opposite appears true. The interaction of member 
states’ material interests and policy preferences within the complex architecture 
of the EU’s external relations may lead to a dilution of normative concerns in 
the overall European approach. 
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Thus this work suggests that analysts avoid running too quickly to the 
conclusion that the EU is a civilian, normative or ethical power, without 
considering the member states’ interests and policy preferences as well as their 
bilateral policies. Concentrating on the ability of the EU to promote human 
rights may seem wise against the concept of longue durée. However, even in the 
perspective of the long term it is necessary that little steps are made in the right 
direction in the present. Therefore this thesis has provided an original 
contribution to the analysis of the short-term capability of the EU and its 
member states to promote human rights in a specific and significant case. 
 207 
 
Appendix 1 - List of interviews 
Interview 1:  Mr. José Bustamante, First Counsellor of the Co-Operation 
Section of the Delegation of the European Commission to China, Beijing, May 
2006. 
Interview 2:  Ms. Ann Karen Friis, Third Secretary of the Political Affairs 
Section of the Delegation of the European Commission to China, Beijing, 
October 2007. 
Interview 3:  Ms. Maria Rosa Sabbatelli, Project Officer, Development and 
Cooperation Section of the Delegation of the European Commission to China, 
Beijing, April 2006. 
Interview 4: Dr. Jürgen Ritter, Team Leader, EU-China Training Programme 
on Village Governance, Beijing, March 2007. 
Interview 5:  Prof. Michael Palmer, Head of Law Department, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, London University, Coordinator of EU-China 
Lawyer Exchange Programme, London, May 2007. 
Interview 6: Mr. Toby King, Project Officer, European Commission, Human 
Rights Unit, Brussels, November 2008.  
Interview 7: Geoffrey Harris, European Parliament, Human Rights 
Committee, Brussels, March 2009. 
Interview 8:  Mr Thomas Helfen, First Secretary, German Embassy in Beijing, 
Beijing, February 2007. 
Interview 9:  Mr Arne Gooss, Director of KFW Office in Beijing, Beijing, 
April 2007. 
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Interview 10:  Prof. Dr. Heinrich Julius, German Director, German 
Development Cooperation, Legal Cooperation Service, GTZ, Beijing, March 
2007. 
Interview 11:  Dr. Astrid Skala-Kuhmann, Country Director GTZ China, 
Beijing, March 2007. 
Interview 12:  Ms Cassandre Maury, Chargée de Mission, Cooperation 
Juridique et Administrative, French Embassy in Beijing, Beijing, February 
2007. 
Interview 13:  Ms Agnes Biscaglia, Deputy Representative, Groupe Agence 
Française de Développement, March 2007. 
Interview 14:  Ms Lucy Hughes, British Embassy in Beijing, Beijing, June 
2007. 
Interview 15:  Mr Adrian Davis, Director of DfID in China, Beijing, September 
2007.  
Interview 16: Mr Mike Liu, Project Manager Global Opportunity Fund, British 
Embassy in Beijing, Beijing, April 2007. 
Interview 17:  Mr Orlando Edwards, Senior Project Manager, Great Britain 
China Centre, London, May 2007. 
Interview 18:  Ms Nicola Macbean, Director of The Rights Practice, London, 
May 2007. 
Interview 19: Ms Annika Siwertz, Head of Development Cooperation Section, 
Embassy of Sweden in Beijing, Beijing, March 2007. 
Interview 20: Mr Job Van Den Berg, First Secretary, Embassy of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, April 2007. 
Interview 21: Ms Hattla Telle, Director of the Danish Centre for International 
Studies and Human Rights, written answers, April 2007. 
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Interview 22: Ms Tiziana Tota, China Project Coordinator, The Danish Centre 
for International Studies and Human Rights, Beijing, February 2007. 
Interview 23: Mr Liu Huawen, Institute of Law Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Beijing, March 2007. 
Interview 24: Mr. Giorgio Sparaci, Director of the Italian Development 
Cooperation Office in Beijing, Italian Embassy, Beijing, November 2007. 
Interview 25: Ms Alessandra Tissot, Senior Deputy Resident Representative, 
United Nations Development Programme, Beijing, July 2007. 
Interview 26: Ms Bai Guimei, Professor of Human Rights, Peking University, 
June 2007. 
Interview 27: Mr Gong Renren, Professor of Human Rights, Peking University, 
June 2007. 
Interview 28: Ms Chen Ruhua, Deputy Division Director Department of 
International Trade and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China, May 2007. 
Interview 29: Mr Sun Jianyuan, Desk Officer, Soft Loan Division 2, Ministry 
of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, May 2007. 
Interview 30: Ms Luo Hongbo, Professor Deputy Director, Institute of 
European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, February 
2007. 
Interview 31: Prof. Song Xinning, Director, National Research Centre for 
European Studies at Renmin University of China, June 2007. 
Interview 32: Prof. Zhu Liqun, Director of Institute of International Relations 
of the China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, April 2007. 
Interview 33: Prof. Dai Bingran, Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European 
Studies Fudan University, Beijing, April 2007. 
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Interview 34: Prof. Zhu Guichang, Assistant Director, Centre for European 
Studies, Shandong University, October 2007. 
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